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I argue that conscious visual experience consists in a direct and non-
inferential grasp of the way one’s current perceptual contact with the 
environment poises one to pursue various intentional plans, goals and 
projects. I show that such a view of visual consciousness is supported by 
current work in cognitive neuroscience, affords a compelling account of 
colour perception, and suggests a way to bridge the ‘explanatory gap’ 
between consciousness and the language of the natural sciences. In chapter 1, 
I examine the reasoning that leads to the appearance of an explanatory gap 
between the phenomenal and the physical in more detail, and set out the 
constraints on a solution that our discussion of the problem has imposed.  I 
then sketch the two rival takes on the relationship between perception and 
action mentioned above – adjudicating between these two theories (and 
finding in favour of the action-space view) is the task of the next two 
chapters, and is a recurring theme throughout.  Chapter 2 moves on to 
discuss some recent work in the neuropsychology of vision and what it 
might suggest about the functional role of conscious vision, and the first half 
of chapter 3 considers two puzzle cases concerning colour perception.  Each 
of these discussions turns out to constitute a source of support for the action-
space view that visual perception consists in a grasp of the practical 
consequences of sensation, and the second half of chapter 3 sets out this view 
and responds to an initial range of questions and objections it might face.  
Chapter 4 illustrates our view via a discussion of colour perception, and 
chapter 5 discusses the type of grasp of practical consequences that is 
necessary for perceptual sensitivity to issue in conscious experience.  By 
chapter 6, we are in a position to see how the action-space approach can help 
close the explanatory gap for phenomenal consciousness, and our final 
chapter sets out how I think this should be done.  I conclude with a brief 




This is a dissertation about conscious experience.  More specif ical ly, i t is about two sorts of 
questions about experience: firstly, is it possible to give a reductive explanation of conscious 
experience – to explain what it is and why it occurs in terms of anything less than conscious 
experience itself?  Secondly, what role should an appeal to involved, intel l igent action 
play in an account of conscious experience?  It seems striking that whenever we find a locus 
of suitably intel l igent action geared towards successfully inhabiting and navigating an 
environment, we are inclined to suppose that we have a lso found a seat of conscious 
experience – how might such intuitions be grounded, and how should they inform an account 
of experience? 
 
Much ink has been spilt over each of these questions in recent years.  Our first question 
(which we’l l consider in detail very shortly) l ies at the heart of the debate concerning the 
apparent ‘explanatory gap’ between conscious experience and the sorts of neural , 
psychological, functional and physical properties in terms of which we might try to ground 
an explanation of that experience.  As we shall see in chapter 1, there are various ways to 
bring out the worry that no amount of information about the latter sorts of properties can 
ever add up to complete information about the qualitative character of a conscious 
experience – the way that experience feels to the person who undergoes it – but here is one.  
Einstein is a l leged to have said that science cannot give us the taste of chicken soup.  
Presumably he meant that a lthough the physical science of soup might a l low us to deduce 
many facts about its chemical composition, its colour, its viscosity, its temperature, and 
innumerable other properties of the soup, it will not a l low us to deduce important facts 
about the particular way the soup tastes to its eater.  We might, given our accumulated 
scientific knowledge about the various ways in which people are disposed to react to soups 
with certa in physical properties, be able to predict that the eater is l ikely to describe the 
soup as tart, or tepid, or thin, but this, it seems does not amount to complete information 
about how eating the soup actually feels to its consumer.  We might conclude, then, that our 
experiences of eating soup have certa in sorts of properties that science cannot tel l us about – 
the properties that specify what it’s like to undergo that experience.  We can call these 
properties the experience’s qualitative character, or its phenomenal properties, or qualia.  Such 
properties seem to be stubborn obstacles to an explanation of experience in physical terms – 
they seem to be essentia l ly ineffable, private and subjective, in contrast to the public and 
objective language in terms of which we wish to explain them.  We have just suggested, in 
fact, that these properties do not seem to be entailed by any combination of the 
experience’s non-phenomenal properties.  An apparently innocent l ine of reasoning seems to 
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have led to the conclusion that experiences have kernels of pure phenomenal properties 
that cannot be accounted for in terms of the non-phenomenal properties of experience.  Part 
of the aim of this thesis is to examine whether and how such a view of experience can be 
resisted. 
 
Our second question concerned the nature of the appeal that an account of conscious 
experience should make to skil led behaviour.  In contemporary philosophy of mind, there 
is a strong current that emphasises the embodied, environmentally extended and active 
nature of minded creatures.  There is a growing camp of theorists from philosophy, the 
cognitive sciences and related disciplines a l l concerned to emphasize that we should view 
the mind as (to borrow from the ti tle of a recent conference) embodied, embedded, enacted 
and extended.  A multiplicity of different empirical and conceptual work tends to be 
grouped together in support of this vision, and I won’t attempt the diff icult tasks of 
specifying lines of thought that unite such work, or teasing apart the many different 
strands of thought and research that divide it.  I’l l be concerned solely with investigating 
the proper role of an appeal to intel l igent action in an account of conscious visual 
experience.  This is a question that has been pursued by a number of different theorists in 
the above camp.  One thing that many such theorists have in common is a suspicion that a 
certain ‘traditional’ view of the relations between perception, cognition and action is in 
need of revision.  According to this traditional view, (dubbed “the Classical Sandwich” by 
Susan Hurley) perception takes in raw data from the environment, which is then operated 
on by some central cognitive faculties, that then issue commands for actions in light of 
those cognitive operations.  However, there is a possibil i ty that due stress on the 
embodied, embedded and active nature of mind might suggest that relations between 
perception, cognition and action are more intricate and interdependent, and less seria l and 
segregated, than the traditional picture would have us believe. 
 
One way of fleshing out this possibil i ty is suggested by work on “sensorimotor” theories of 
perception.  According to such theories, perception consists in a practical grasp of the 
sensory consequences of movement.  Perceiving the shape of a visually presented cup, for 
example, consists in understanding the various ways in which possible movements are 
related to possible sensory impressions.  Perceiving a vertical l ine consists partly in 
understanding that nodding one’s head up and down wil l leave visual sensations of the line 
unchanged, and understanding the predictable and regular way in which moving one’s 
head from side to side wil l cause sensations to change.  On such a view, perception and 
action are intimately related, rather than the occupants of two extremes in a perception – 
action – cognition progression.  Part of the a im of this thesis is to argue that this view of 
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the intimate relation between perception and action is mistaken.  Whi lst the sensorimotor 
theorist understands visual perception in terms of a grasp of the sensory consequences of 
action, I wil l argue that we should understand it in terms of a grasp of the practica l 
consequences of sensation.  According to the “action-space” account I’l l develop in what 
fol lows, visual perceptual experience consists in a certa in kind of openness to the 
possibil i ties for action afforded by the perceiver’s current environment.  The chief aim in 
this thesis is to elaborate on this cla im, and marshal both empirical and philosophica l 
reasons for accepting it. 
 
Importantly, I think that the two questions we’ve just briefly considered should be 
addressed together.  I wil l suggest that an appeal  to the essentia l ly active nature of 
perception can show us how to deal with worries about the apparent inexplicabili ty of 
visual experience in non-experientia l terms.  And considering how alternative ways of 
emphasising the role of action in perception interface with questions about the 
explicabil i ty of conscious experience can provide us with reasons to prefer one sort of 
emphasis over another.  The action-space account of visual experience I develop suggests 
how we might close the explanatory gap, and the fact that i t does so constitutes one strong 
reason (among others) to think that it constitutes the correct view of the relationship 
between perceptual experience and skil led action.  
 
Here is how we’ll proceed.  In chapter 1, I examine the reasoning that leads to the 
appearance of an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical in more 
detail, and set out the constraints on a solution that our discussion of the problem has 
imposed.  I then sketch the two rival takes on the relationship between perception and 
action mentioned above – adjudicating between these two theories (and finding in favour of 
the action-space view) is the task of the next two chapters, and is a recurring theme 
throughout.  Chapter 2 moves on to discuss some recent work in the neuropsychology of 
vision and what it might suggest about the functional role of conscious vision, and the first 
ha lf of chapter 3 considers two puzzle cases concerning colour perception.  Each of these 
discussions turns out to constitute a source of support for the action-space view that visual 
perception consists in a grasp of the practical consequences of sensation, and the second ha lf 
of chapter 3 sets out this view and responds to an initia l range of questions and objections it 
might face.  Chapter 4 i l lustrates our view via a discussion of colour perception, and 
chapter 5 discusses the type of grasp of practical consequences that is necessary for 
perceptual sensitivity to issue in conscious experience.  By chapter 6, we are in a position to 
see how the action-space approach can help close the explanatory gap for phenomenal 
 8 
consciousness, and our final chapter sets out how I th ink this should be done.  I conclude 




Chapter 1: Deflating Experiences 
 
Looking at the sky outside the window by my desk, I have an experience of its colour.  
Focussing on this experience, it seems natural to say that the sky’s colour qualitative ly 
looks a certa in way to me, or in pla iner language, that my experience of the sky’s colour 
feels a certa in way to me.  And, generalising from this observation, it seems natural to think 
that an experience’s feel ing one way rather than another to its subject is an essential property 
of that experience.  One way of individuating experiences is by reference to such properties 
– the property of what it feels l ike to have that experience.  Philosophers have labelled 
such properties of experience phenomenal properties, or qualia, and the sum of these properties 
for a particular experience the phenomenology of that experience.  Someone who has 
experiences with such properties enjoys, they say, phenomenal consciousness. 
 
But whilst i t seems natural to say that there are both experiences and such properties of 
experiences, this view of matters appears to confl ict with an equally natural view of the 
world and our place in it.  According to what we can call a ‘minimal naturalism’, a l l the 
world’s properties are either properties posited by natural sciences, or explicable in terms 
of those properties1.  The explanatory and predictive power of the natural sciences and the 
lack of counterexamples to such a minimal naturali sm drawn from outside the realm of 
experience give us good reason to adopt such a worldview.  But when we attempt to find a 
place for experience and its phenomenal properties in such a view, we appear to run into 
diff iculties. 
 
1.1 The Phenomenal and the Physical 
 
A stark way to bring out these diff iculties is suggested by Chalmers (1996, 2003), who 
argues as follows:  
 
P1: Physical accounts explain at most structure and function. 
P2: Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness. 
C: No physical account can explain consciousness. 
(Chalmers (2003), p.105) 
 
                                                
1  This rough definition of naturalism suffices for my purposes here.  For a thorough 
discussion, see MacDonald (1992). 
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It seems plausible, as P1 claims, that physical facts2 can, at most, tel l us about structural 
and functional organisation.  All we can deduce from information about physical properties 
is information about structural and functional properties.  But reflecting on the phenomenal 
properties of my experience of the sky’s colour yields the intuition that these are not 
structural or functional properties.  A specification of the structural and functional 
properties of my experience, such as its neurophysiological basis and its relations to 
various discriminatory and motivational states, does not seem to yield information tha t 
suffices to determine its phenomenal properties – how the experience feels to me (P2).  
Accepting this premise is what gives the argument its anti-physicalist force.  It relies upon 
the intuition that simply reflecting on a given experience al lows us to see that no amount of 
structural or functional information can add up to information that determines the 
experience’s phenomenal properties. If we credit th is intuition, Chalmers’ conclusion 
follows: phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained in physical terms.  Here are three 
ways of making the same point. 
 
The Zombie Argument: Chalmers (1996 p.94-9) invites his readers to consider a creature 
physically identical to them, but lacking phenomenal consciousness.  When my zombie 
twin contemplates the colour of the sky, he processes optical information identically to me, 
and is disposed to judge, discriminate and act in an identical manner to me as a result of 
this processing, but lacks any phenomenal experience of the sky’s colour.  If we can conceive 
of our zombie twins without apparent incoherence or contradiction, this shows that we 
cannot see how the physical facts about us serve to fix or explain the phenomenal facts 
about us.  If we could see how they did so, then we could see that the physical identity 
that obtains between us and our zombie twins precludes there being any phenomenal 
difference between us – and thus that the possibil i ty of a creature’s sharing our physica l 
properties whilst lacking our phenomenal properties3 is incoherent.  The apparent 
conceivabil i ty of zombies shows that we lack a grasp of how our physical properties fix or 
explain the phenomenal properties of our experiences.   
 
                                                
2 References to physical facts and properties should be understood to encompass a l l facts 
and properties compatible with a minimal naturalism (e.g. to encompass functional and 
intentional facts and properties).  This is to accommodate skepticism about whether a l l 
truths of the natural sciences are reducible to truths of physics.  See Fodor (1974) and 
Laurence and Margolis (2003) for reasons for such skepticism. 
3 Strictly speaking, phenomenal properties are properties of experiences rather than of 
persons.  Throughout, references to “S’s phenomenal properties” should be read as 
abbreviating “The phenomenal properties of the experience S is currently having.” 
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The Inverted Spectrum Argument4: Alternatively, we can ask whether we can conceive of 
a physical duplicate of ourselves whose experiences have phenomenal properties tha t 
differ from those of my experiences.  In virtue of our physical identity, my duplicate and I 
wil l act, discriminate and judge in an identical manner, including exhibiting identica l 
colour naming behaviour, and judging similarity relations between colours to be the same.  
In light of this, a simple switching of the phenomenal properties of yellow and blue 
experiences alone would not result in the indistinguishable inversion between my twin and 
I that we require – our judgements, dispositions and discriminatory capacities concerning 
the relations between yellow, blue, and the intervening colours would also need to be 
systematically inverted.  A widespread intuition is that such an inversion of phenomenal 
properties between physical or functional duplicates is more readily conceivable than the 
zombie scenario above.  But, as with the zombie argument, the lack of apparent 
incoherence in such a situation shows that we lack a grasp of how our physical properties 
fix our phenomenal properties.  Our accepting the conceivabil i ty of zombies requires us to 
acknowledge that we do not grasp how our physical properties ensure that we have 
experiences with phenomenal properties.  Accepting the conceivabil i ty of inverted spectra 
requires us to acknowledge that we lack a grasp of how physical properties ensure that the 
phenomenal properties of our experiences are one way rather than another. 
 
The Knowledge Argument:  Lastly, the knowledge argument (Jackson (1982)) invites us to 
consider Mary, a bri l l iant colour scientist who has spent her life incarcerated in a black 
and white room.  Over the course of her l ife, Mary has acquired a comprehensive 
knowledge of al l the physical properties of the world, via reading black and white 
textbooks and watching black and white television.  In particular, she has a complete 
knowledge of the physical properties of coloured objects and of l ight, and of the precise 
way such information is processed by human colour-vision. But the nature of her 
surroundings has ensured that Mary has experienced no colours other than black, white and 
intervening shades of grey.  One day, she is released into the coloured world, and has her 
first colour-experience whilst looking at a red rose.  Our intuitions say that this experience 
wil l constitute a discovery for Mary – her learning a new fact about what it is l ike to 
experience a red object.  But a l l the relevant physical facts about roses, l ight and the 
mechanics of her colour-vision were already in her possession.  So, we are invited to 
conclude, the new fact Mary learns about experience is not a physical fact.  Complete 
knowledge of physical facts (and complete abil i ty to make relevant deductions from those 
                                                
4 Shoemaker (1982) is the locus classicus for contemporary discussions of inverted spectra .  
See a lso Palmer (1999) for an interesting list of possible (and impossible) inversions and 
their relative likelihoods. 
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facts) does not entail knowledge of a l l the facts about what i t’s like to have a particular 
experience.  Our intuition that Mary will learn something new upon leaving her room 
shows that we lack a grasp of how knowledge of physical properties could be translated 
into knowledge of phenomenal properties. 
 
Each of these arguments tests the connections between our concepts of phenomenal 
consciousness and those of the physical, structural and functional.  If we accept the 
intuition behind the knowledge argument, or the conceivabil i ty of zombies or inverted 
spectra, it seems that we must conclude that there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between our 
concept of consciousness and the physical concepts with which we wish to explain i t .  
Following Carruthers (2004), we might say that there is no ‘conceptual mesh’ between the 
explanandum of consciousness and any candidate physical explanans.  Were there such a 
mesh, we could see how Mary could move from her complete knowledge of physical facts to 
the knowledge of phenomenal facts she intuitively lacks, and how the physical identity 
between myself and my putatively inverted or zombie twin rules out there being any 
phenomenological difference between us.  But, proponents of the explanatory gap argue, i t 
is just this sort of conceptual mesh that reductive explanation aims to provide.  If a 
physicist cla ims to have reductively explained temperature in terms of mean molecular 
kinetic energy, but also that she can coherently conceive of holding facts about mean 
molecular kinetic energy fixed whilst facts about temperature vary, or that she might be in 
possession of complete information about something’s mean molecular kinetic energy (plus a 
suitably keen mind) whilst unable to deduce its temperature, we should conclude either 
that she has misunderstood her own explanation, or that her explanation has fa i led5.  A 
good explanation of temperature in terms of kinetic energy would let us see how to move 
from the facts about kinetic energy to the facts in the target domain – temperature.  Being 
able to conceive of the capabil i ty of one set of facts varying independently of the other 
shows that we do not understand how to move from the domain in terms of which we wish 
to explain the target phenomenon and the target phenomenon in the required way.  For this 
                                                
5 This might not be so if our scientist was a sort of Humean, believing that facts about 
temperature and facts about mean molecular kinetic energy were merely constantly 
correlated.  But this doesn’t seem like a desirable form for a reductive explanation of 
consciousness.  It rules out arguing that phenomenal facts are identical to 
structural/functional facts, or that they can be deduced from those facts independently of 
knowledge of brute bridging principles.  The undesirabil ity of an appeal to such principles 
is addressed in the next section’s discussion of dualism and type-B materia l ism.  
Relatedly, these discussions provide support for my endorsement of the ‘conceptual mesh’ 
requirement. 
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1.2 Mapping the Gap 
 
How should we respond to the arguments for the existence of an explanatory gap?  One 
response is to reject the intuitions required for the arguments of the previous section to work 
– the conceptual mesh required for reductive explanation does indeed obtain between the 
phenomenal and physical domains.  As a result, zombies and inverted spectra are not 
really conceivable, and Mary learns nothing new upon her release.  Upon reflection, we can 
see that there is nothing in our concept of phenomenal consciousness that prohibits its 
explanation in physical terms.  Chalmers (2003) cal ls such a position ‘type-A materialism’, 
since the cla im that there is the required conceptual  mesh between the phenomenal and 
the physical amounts to a cla im of a priori entailment between the two domains.  
Philosophers occupying this camp will include analytic functionalists such as (one 
interpretation of) Dennett (1991), who argue that our concept of consciousness only picks out 
various functional and intentional activity7, and eliminative materia l ists such as Rorty 
(1965), who argue that our concept of consciousness picks out nothing at al l . 
 
Sticking with Chalmers’ taxonomy, ‘type-B materialism’ cla ims that phenomenal 
properties are identical to physical properties, but that this identity is not knowable a 
priori.  Rather, the l inks which obtain between the physical and phenomenal are to be 
discovered a posteriori, by empirical investigation rather than conceptual analysis.  The 
relationship between consciousness and its physical  basis should be understood on the 
model of other empirically discovered identities, such as water’s identity with H2O8.  
Such a position can acknowledge that we share the intuitions relied upon by the above 
arguments whilst denying that this is a barrier to a physicalist account of consciousness – 
zombies and inverted spectra seem conceivable and Mary seems partia l ly ignorant because 
we lack an a priori grasp of the relevant identities.  But the identities between phenomenal 
and physical states are there to be discovered empirically nonetheless.  Type-B 
                                                
6 For a defence of the conception of reductive explanation at work here, see Chalmers and 
Jackson (2001).  For criticism of this conception, see Laurence and Margolis (2003). 
7 Though Dennett’s overall position is difficult to fit into any philosophical taxonomy, I 
take the spirit of his view to be consistent with the position I eventually defend rather 
than the analytic functionalism or eliminativism he is sometimes taken to endorse. 
8 Alternatively, type-B materia l ists can hold that the phenomenal is a posteriori 
necessitated by, rather than identical to, the physical.  The rest of my discussion is framed 
in terms of identities, but al l arguments are neutral between the two options. 
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materia l ism thus al lows the attractive combination of conceptual dualism with respect to 
the phenomenal and the physical, with ontological physicalism.  The dualist component 
accommodates our intuitions about our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness 
whilst the physicalist component accommodates our naturalist tendencies.  Psycho-
functionalists and empirical functionalists such as Putnam (1960/75) and Lycan (1996) wi l l 
occupy this camp, as well as the representationalist and phenomenal concept strategies of 
Tye (1995) and Carruthers (2007), to be discussed in chapter  6. 
 
Type-C materialists hold that the explanatory gap can be closed in principle, but that we 
currently lack the theoretical or cognitive resources necessary to see how this is possible.  
Some theorists hold that this lack is a necessary and permanent consequence of our 
cognitive limitations (McGinn (1991)), whilst others suggest that conceptual (Nagel 
(1974)) or empirical (Churchland (1997)) advances could resolve matters. 
 
Lastly, dualists of various types hold that our diff iculty in seeing how consciousness might 
be explained in physical terms is due to the fact that consciousness is a feature of the 
universe that is incompatible with our current conception of physicalism.  As a result, the 
physicalist ontology should be either abandoned (Foster (1989)) or expanded to encompass 
fundamental phenomenal properties (e.g. Chalmers (1996)). 
 
It seems to me that none of the above theories are promising candidates for a satisfactory 
explanation of phenomenal consciousness.  The position that fa i ls most clearly is type-C 
materia l ism, which asserts that such an explanation is impossible.  The position of 
optimistic type-C materia l ists such as Nagel and Churchland collapses into type-A or B 
materia l ism (each of which are criticised below), depending on the type of explanation 
available once the relevant conceptual or scientific advances have been made. 
 
Dualism posits a new fundamental feature of the universe in order to account for 
phenomenal properties.  As well as being ontologically extravagant, this gives up on the 
prospect of demonstrating a conceptual mesh between the phenomenal and the physical , a 
necessary criterion for reductive explanation as I have construed it here.  One option for the 
dualist is to cla im that the fundamental phenomenal properties they posit are necessari ly 
immune to our investigation, clearly ruling out the possibil i ty of demonstrating a mesh 
between those properties and familiar physical properties.  Alternatively, dualists can 
posit fundamental laws l inking phenomenal and physical properties (Chalmers (2004)).  
But whilst such laws might be empirically investigated by discovering correlations 
between phenomenal and physical properties, we could never arrive at a satisfactory 
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understanding of why one set of laws rather than another obtains.  In order to do so, we 
would need to understand how things being a certa in way physically necessitates the ir 
being a certa in way phenomenally (or vice versa), otherwise the laws linking the two 
domains wil l appear contingent.  But in doing so, we would have obtained the desired 
conceptual mesh between the phenomenal and the physical, and our position would be a 
type-A materia l ism – there would be no need to posit additional fundamental properties, 
since an understanding of the way things are physically gives us al l we need to understand 
how things are phenomenally.  So, whilst one form of dualism might yield a theory of 
consciousness, we would be unable to grasp why this theory should be true.  By my l ights, 
such a theory thus fal ls short of an explanation of consciousness9. 
 
A similar problem arises for type-B materia l ism.  To see this, consider Jackson’s (2003) 
discussion of the reduction of facts about temperature in gases to facts about mean kinetic 
energy in gases.  This reductive explanation will be of the fol lowing form: 
 
1) Temperature in gases is that which does so and so (a priori premise about the 
concept of temperature) 
2) That which does so and so is mean molecular kinetic energy (empirica l 
premise) 
C) Therefore, temperature in gases is mean molecular kinetic energy.  
(Jackson (2003), p.5) 
 
Jackson argues that if we are to identify temperature in gases with mean molecular kinetic 
energy, we need the f irst a priori premise in order to avoid the possibil i ty of our being 
el iminativists about temperature in gases.  For without that connection between 
temperature and the functional role (‘that which does so and so’) which premise 2) tel ls us 
is occupied by mean molecular kinetic energy, there is nothing to prevent our explanation 
being interpreted as explaining away temperature – we thought there was such a property 
as temperature, though actually there is only mean molecular kinetic energy.  The a priori 
premise rules this out, since it tel ls us how our concept of temperature is related to the 
functional role occupied by mean molecular kinetic energy.  So, without the right sort of 
conceptual mesh between the domains in our explanation, an explanation of consciousness 
risks being indistinguishable from an elimination of consciousness, asserting that the closest 
thing there is to consciousness is a functional role we have identif ied, but admitting that 
                                                
9 See Dennett’s (1993) reply to Foster for similar arguments for the explanatory impotence 
of dualism. 
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there is no conceptual l ink between this functional role and consciousness conceived in the 
first-person, phenomenal way we were interested in explaining.  
 Chalmers (2003) criticises explanations appealing to a posteriori identities or 
necessitation in a more general way.  If the functional description and phenomenal target 
are held to be identical by our explanation, then it seems that this identity wil l be 
“epistemically primitive” (p.15), since it wil l not be an identity that we could deduce just 
by considering the functional and phenomenal facts – if such a deduction were possible, 
then we would have an explanatory story about how and why our functional description is 
one and the same as our phenomenal target, giving us the a priori reduction we were after, 
and making our position a type-A materia l ism.  Likewise, if the functional is said to 
necessitate the phenomenal without being identical  to it, this wil l be what Chalmers 
calls a “strong necessity” (p.16) – a necessity we posit despite being unable to see how or 
why one level necessitates the other. 
 Chalmers wants to conclude that these considerations mili tate in favour of 
dualism.  Because we can’t give an explanation of the relevant identity or necessitation in 
terms of the mesh between the concepts in the two domains, the identity or necessitation 
we posit should be viewed as a fundamental law in our explanatory theory.  But if our 
explanation of consciousness is in terms of fundamental laws l inking domains that are at 
least conceptually distinct, then it looks l ike we end up with a kind of dualism.  Even if 
someone holding such a position wanted to remain a physicalist, they would be a 
physicalist who cla imed that there are (at least) two distinct types of physical property 
(the functionally specif iable ones and the phenomenal ones) and that statements about one 
of these physical domains cannot be translated into statements about the other – rather 
the two domains are l inked by contingent, empirically discoverable laws.  Such a position 
seems to be physicalism in name only. 
Coupled with Jackson’s argument, above, we might th ink that this shows that a 
posteriori explanations of consciousness look to be neutral between eliminativism, 
physicalism and dualism.  Accepting these arguments implies that the physicalist must 
demonstrate a conceptual mesh between the phenomenal and the physical if their theory 
of consciousness is to be logically different from the non-explanatory positions of 
el iminativism and dualism.  As Chalmers  (1997, p.10) puts it, “For a satisfactory theory, 
we need to know more than which processes give rise to experience; we need an account of 
why and how.  A full theory of consciousness must build an explanatory bridge.” 
 
Endorsing the conceptual mesh requirement apparently commits us to type-A materia l ism – 
since it holds that there is an a priori entailment between the phenomenal and the 
physical, i t is the only position above which holds that the relation between the two 
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domains is one that we can grasp in the necessary way.  However, it seems diff icult to 
reconcile the intuitions pumped by the arguments of the previous section with the 
possibil i ty of type-A materia l ism’s truth.  If reflection on our experience al lowed us to see 
that its physical properties were a l l that required explaining, type-A materia l ism would 
be stra ightforwardly vindicated – we would know that a conceptual mesh obtained 
between the phenomenal and the physical since experience told us that phenomenal 
properties are instances of physical properties.  But the intuition behind the knowledge 
argument and the apparent conceivabil i ty of zombies and inverted spectra show that th is 
is not what reflection on our experience tel ls us.  Rather, it seems to be an experientia l 
datum that experience has phenomenal properties that go beyond the structural , 
functional and intentional properties to which physicalism can appeal.  By asserting the 
presence of a conceptual mesh between physical properties and the felt properties of our 
experiences, type-A materia l ism apparently commits itself to denying this datum, and 
thus to an unpalatable eliminativism about the phenomenal properties we wished to 
explain.  The type-A materia l ist might try to provide arguments that introspection 
reveals only physical properties, but it is hard to see how such arguments could overcome 
the force of our intuitions to the contrary10. 
 
I have argued that none of the positions considered in this section possess the resources for 
a satisfactory explanation of consciousness.  There are various ways we might try to resist 
this conclusion.  In defence of type-A materia l ism, we might argue that our conceptual 
framework should be answerable to our best empirical  theory, and thus that our concepts of 
phenomenal consciousness should be physical ones picked out by neuroscience, al lowing an a 
priori reduction of the phenomenal to the physical (Lamme (2006)).  In defence of type-B 
materia l ism, we might argue that our cla ims of identities or necessitations between the 
physical and the phenomenal should not be seen as fundamental posits, but as instances of 
inference to the best explanation warranted by the perfect correlation we will hopefully 
discover between the physical and the phenomenal (e.g. Churchland (2005), Hil l (1997)) .  
More generally, we might question the conceptual mesh requirement by casting doubt on 
whether paradigm instances of reductive explanation really have an a priori component 
(Block and Stalnaker (1999)).  More generally sti l l , we might give reasons for general 
skepticism about the a priori, and conclude that the entailments being demanded do not 
exist (e.g. Quine (1951), Laurence and Margolis (2003)).   
Whilst these are al l interesting avenues, I don’t think we need pursue any of them 
until more orthodox responses have been properly considered.  I propose to concede to 
                                                
10 See Chalmers (2003) Section 4 for a survey and critique of current candidates for such 
arguments. 
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proponents of the explanatory gap both that explanations of consciousness drawing on a 
posteriori necessities leave explanatory questions that we might care about unanswered, and 
that a conceptual mesh obtaining between the domains in our explanation is a desirable 
feature of a reductive explanation.  I think it’s worthwhi le seeing how far we can get 
whilst accepting these constraints.  If the account we arrive at does not meet these 
constraints, we should be able to say something about why they should not apply in the 
specific case of phenomenal consciousness.  If it turns out that we cannot meet these 
constraints, or say why they should not apply in th is case, we can return to the more 
general l ines of resistance above.  Part of the task of this thesis is to argue that this wi l l 
not be necessary.  The next section presents the explanatory model occupied by the theory I 
wil l outline and defend.  
 
 
1.3 Deflationism Defined and Defended 
 
The cla im that an explanatory gap exists has been motivated by asking us to reflect on our 
experience, and claiming that what we find will not seem amenable to the sort of reductive 
explanation that proponents of the explanatory gap demand of physicalists.  The last 
section argued both that we should (at least temporari ly) grant these points about 
experience and explanation, and that none of the theories in Chalmers’ taxonomy afford 
good prospects for a suitable explanation.  However, in this section I argue that between 
the unsatisfactory type-A and type-B materia l isms, there is space for a promising solution 
to the problem of the explanatory gap. 
 
It is the rel iance on intuitive conclusions about the deliverances of introspection that gives 
us the necessary room to manoeuvre.  It is open to the reductionist to argue that a lthough 
we’re prone to think we’re acquainted in experience with properties that are not 
physically analyzable, this is a mistaken characterisation of our introspective evidence.  
There certa inly seem to be cases where subjects are prone to misdescribing their experience – 
for example, we have a tendency to assume that our colour vision is uniformly sensitive 
from the centre of the visual fie ld to its periphery, but proper scrutiny of the way things 
seem to us, perhaps with the help of visual a ids such as a coloured playing card held at 
the periphery, wil l reveal that this is not the case (Dennett (1991))11.  Perhaps we make a 
similar mistake when we think we find physically unanalysable properties of our 
experiences.  Alternatively, we might grant that introspection really tel ls us that there 
                                                
11 See a lso Schwitzgebel (2002, 2008) for a variety of cases where subjects appear to have 
poor knowledge of the character of their conscious experience. 
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are such properties, but try to explain how introspection misleads us here – we might think 
that if we give an explanation of how and why introspection distorts how things are with 
experience, and show that a non-distorted characterisation of experience can be 
reductively explained, then this constitutes an explanation of al l the puzzling features of 
experience12.  
 
We can see each of these options as deflationist, since they both a im to deflate the 
apparent introspective evidence which motivates the positing of an explanatory gap, 
rather than taking that evidence at face value13.  If we grant the above requirements on 
explanation, and that thinking about our experience makes it tempting to posit an 
explanatory gap, then our reductive explanation must be deflationist in this way, since 
a lternative construals of our introspective evidence involve reta ining a physical ly 
unanalysable explanandum.  Such a position does not fi t neatly into the mould of either 
type-A or B materia l ism as defined by Chalmers, and avoids the features of each tha t 
made them unsatisfactory.  Unlike type-B materia l i sm, our deflationist a lternative does 
not require explanatori ly primitive principles l inking the physical and the phenomenal – 
the deflationist cla ims that once we construe the introspective evidence correctly14, we 
will be able to grasp how the phenomenal properties of our experience reduce smoothly to 
the physical.  Unlike type-A materia l ism, this reduction does not come at the price of 
denying that naïve introspection presents us with evidence for phenomenal properties of 
experience that are irreducible to physical properties – the deflationist cla ims either that 
we can distinguish between informed and naïve introspection, and that only the latter 
                                                
12 Setting up a dichotomy in this way looks l ike it presumes a strong realism about the 
deliverances of introspection, and a corresponding sharp divide between our experience and 
our acquaintance with it.  We might not be happy with either of these.  The position I 
defend is neutral between these two deflationist options, and I take this as a point in i ts 
favour, since I’m suspicious of the conception of experience required to see the distinction 
between them as a substantive one.  My reasons for th is emerge as I develop my account, 
particularly in chapter 6. 
13 Such a construal of deflationism might do it a disservice, since we should question 
whether the interpretation of the introspective evidence required to motivate the 
explanatory gap is really the natural one.  Terminology with the opposite rhetorical bias 
might cal l proponents of the explanatory gap ‘inflationists’, and deflationists 
‘naturalists’.   
14 For the first type of deflationism mentioned in the previous paragraph, this wil l 
involve coming to see that our introspective evidence is other than we initia l ly took it to 
be.  For the second, this wil l involve coming to see that our introspective evidence misleads 
us as to the sorts of properties our experience has.  Recall from footnote 12 that I am 
skeptical about the difference between these two options, and my eventual account (see 
chapter 6) does not distinguish between them. 
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seems to provide evidence for irreducible phenomenal properties, or that introspection does 
present us with such evidence, but misleads us in doing so15. 
 An analogy will help clarify the position being outlined.  We see a magician place 
a ball under a cup, then tap the cup with a wand.  When she lif ts the cup, two balls are 
underneath.  She replaces the cup, taps it then l i f ts it again, and the balls have 
disappeared.  How should this trick be explained?  Taking our description at face value 
seems to commit us to events in the world that are not readily explicable in physical ist 
terms – objects appearing from nowhere then vanish ing into thin air, or perhaps being 
teleported.  A type-C materia l ist about the trick wil l argue that vanishings and 
teleportations are explicable in physical terms, but that we are either currently or 
necessari ly unable to see how such an explanation will go.  A dualist about the trick wi l l 
argue that we should expand our physicalist ontology to make room for fundamental sorts 
of events such as vanishings and teleportations.  A type-B materia l ist wil l argue tha t 
vanishings and teleportations are identical to physical events, but that there is no 
conceptual mesh between their properties as vanish ings and teleportations and their 
properties as physical events that lets us deduce one set of properties a priori from the 
other.  A type-A materia l ist wil l argue that noth ing in what we have seen resists 
explanation in physicalist terms, either by claiming that there is an a priori path from 
physical properties of events to their properties as vanishings and teleportations, or tha t 
the trick contained no vanishings or teleportations to be explained in the first place. 
 None of the outl ined explanations are adequate, for reasons we saw in the previous 
section.  The first constitutes a denial of the possibil i ty of an explanation, the second 
stipulates that the sorts of events for which we wanted an explanation are fundamenta l 
features of reali ty, and the third stipulates that there is an identity between explananda 
and explanans, but cla ims that we cannot grasp why th is identity holds.  The fourth owes 
us either a story about how we can move a priori from the problematic explananda to the 
physical explanans, or why it is legitimate to deny that apparently manifest explananda 
exist.  The deflationist position lies between our third and fourth options.  The deflationist 
argues that thinking more about how the trick could be turned lets us see that positing 
teleportations and vanishings is not the only way we could explain what we have seen.  
                                                
15 Focussing on the first option might prompt us to categorise deflationism as a type-A 
materia l ism, since the phenomenal properties of our experiences suitably construed are a 
priori reducible to the physical.  Chalmers does not explicitly address whether type-A 
materia l ists are required to provide an a priori reduction of the naïve construal of 
phenomenal properties, and I think answering the question of whether such a deflationism 
qualif ies as a type-A materia l ism ends up being a stipulative matter.  Note, though, tha t 
in chapter 6 I argue that my deflationist position is usefully classif ied as a sort of 
phenomenal concept strategy, a position Chalmers classes as type-B materia l ist, 
supporting my contention that my position fal ls between the gaps of Chalmers taxonomy. 
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Empirical and conceptual investigation reveals that the description of the trick on the 
previous page does not commit us to the existence of teleportations and vanishings 
construed as such – rather, the facts as we have described them are explicable via an 
appeal to sleight-of-hand, a phenomenon which is a priori reducible to the physical.  The 
deflationist explanation acknowledges the type-B materia l ist’s conviction that our 
evidence makes it natural to posit the existence of teleportations and vanishings, and 
agrees with them that a satisfactory explanation of the trick should make reference to 
such events.  They also agree that, understood under the description of teleportations and 
vanishings, such events are not reductively explicable.  But, they cla im, investigation 
reveals that such a description is not the best way to make sense of our evidence.  Once we 
understand how the trick is done, we can identify vanishings and teleportations with 
reductively explicable sequences of sleight-of hand manoeuvres.  The deflationist 
explanation of the trick, then, includes reference to vanishings and teleportations and an 
acknowledgement of our reasons for believing in them, but shows us how and why we 
should redescribe those events in a way that renders them reductively explicable. 
 
The crucia l feature of the trick for the deflationist is that the evidence we are attempting 
to explain forces us to make reference to vanishings and teleportations, but does not force a 
conception of those events upon us that renders them reductively inexplicable.  The 
deflationist about phenomenal properties argues that the same is true of our introspective 
evidence.  Reflecting on our experience gives us reason to posit reductively inexplicable 
phenomenal properties of experience, but empirical and conceptual investigation can 
reveal how and why we should redescribe these properties in a way that renders them a 
priori reducible to the physical.  The crucia l feature of our introspective evidence for the 
deflationist is that it dictates that there are phenomenal properties of experience, but not 
how those phenomenal properties are described.  If the deflationist can give an account of 
how those properties can be plausibly redescribed in such a way as to render them 
reductively explicable, they will have provided a solution to the explanatory gap tha t 
avoids the pitfa l ls of type-A and type-B materia l ism16.   
 
I have argued that this deflationary type of explanation occupies a place in between type-
A and type-B materia l ism, and avoids the problematic features of each.  Might Chalmers, 
or someone with a similar philosophical disposition, object to such a strategy?  It seems 
possible that Chalmers might think the position fai ls to “take consciousness seriously”17, 
                                                
16 A similar conclusion is argued for by Carruthers (2004).  Lewis (1995) is a lso suggestive of 
such a position. 
17 See the introduction to Chalmers (1996) 
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by ultimately understanding experience as a physical phenomenon, in spite of apparent 
introspective evidence to the contrary.  Whilst I agreed above that this might be an 
appropriate objection to type-A materia l ism, I think that i t begs the question in the 
present context.  The deflationist, l ike Chalmers, starts with introspectively known 
phenomenal properties as her explanandum, and, like Chalmers, acknowledges the 
temptation to construe these properties in a way that makes them inaccessible to 
physicalist explanation.  Thus, she cannot be justif iably accused of trivia l ising the 
problem of consciousness by ignoring or denying the explanandum.  Where she differs from 
Chalmers is in denying that the anti-physicalist construal of these properties is the only 
one available, though she does not cla im that the a lternative construal is itself 
transparently available to introspection18.  If Chalmers is to object to this sort of strategy, 
he must cla im that the introspective evidence admits only one metaphysical gloss on the 
phenomenal properties of experience – and this doesn’t seem to be something we can sett le 
by introspection alone.  It may be that al l other glosses offered are somehow untenable, and 
we are thus forced to an anti-physicalist conception of experience.  But in this case, the 
candidate glosses must be assessed on their merits.  It is the task of this thesis to provide 
such a gloss, and offer empirical and conceptual arguments in its favour. 
 
 
1.4 The Duties of the Deflationist 
 
This lets us see what is required of a deflationary explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness.  It must accommodate the introspective evidence that leads to the putative 
explanatory gap, but plausibly redescribe that evidence in a way that renders i t 
compatible with physicalism.  The redescription must be such as to explain why the anti-
physicalist construal of the evidence is natural, but mistaken, and why the deflationist 
construal is not introspectively obvious.  Additionally, the deflationist construal of 
experience must be empirically plausible – otherwise the deflationist has shown only how 
the explanatory gap could be closed (perhaps a worthwhile achievement in itself), but not 
how it can be closed for our experience. 
 
Thus far in setting out the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for reductive 
explanation we have supposed that introspection makes it obvious that phenomenal 
properties pose a problem for physicalism.  Whi lst I think this simple appeal to 
introspection is sufficient to make the case for an explanatory gap between the phenomenal 
                                                
18 Instead, it must be developed by considering the kinds of arguments and data I set out in 
subsequent chapters of this thesis, particularly chapter six. 
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and the physical, some go further, and attempt to spell out the features of phenomenal 
properties that make them reductively problematic.   
 
Firstly, phenomenal properties seem to be ineffable -  the way things seem for the subject 
cannot be precisely expressed in words.  We might be able to al lude or gesture to the 
phenomenal properties of our experience, but any amount of metaphor or verbal description 
will necessari ly fa i l to characterise them completely.  No matter how eloquently I 
describe the taste of the beer I am drinking, or the colour of the sky I am viewing, my 
description will a lways lack some of the richness and particularity of my experience.  
Relatedly, phenomenal properties seem to be private – they belong and can be fully known 
only to the subject who instantiates them.  Another feature of our acquaintance with the 
phenomenal properties of our experience is that they are directly available to us in a way 
that (for example) the neural properties of experience are not.  Some make the apparently 
stronger cla im that our knowledge of phenomenal properties is incorrigible.  We might 
wish to say that there are cases where we can be mistaken about the character of our own 
experience, as suggested in 1.319, and so deny that such knowledge is incorrigible in a strong 
sense.  However, it seems plausible that there is a weaker sense in which such knowledge 
is incorrigible – a lthough we can make mistakes in the way we construe or describe our 
experience, we cannot be mistaken about the way the experience seems to us.  Suppose I 
sincerely but mistakenly cla im to be sober on the basis of introspection.  The next day, if I 
can bring my experiences back to mind with sufficient acuity, I might realise that this was 
not in fact what introspection was tel l ing me – it really did seem as if I was drunk, but I 
made an erroneous judgement or report on the basis of that seeming.  Finally, it is sometimes 
cla imed that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of experience20.  Intrinsic 
properties are notoriously difficult to define precisely, but presumably the idea here is 
that the way phenomenal properties of an experience are not dependent for their existence 
on factors other than that experience itself, such as the dispositions or abil i ties that 
experience gives rise to21. 
 
A further requirement on an adequate deflationist theory, then, is that i t explain the 
compatibil i ty of these putative properties of experience with physicalism.  However, the 
                                                
19 See Schwitzgebel, op cit.  Someone who mistakenly believes that they are sober on the 
basis of introspective evidence might be a good example of such a case. 
20 See (e.g.) Harman (1990), and references. Harman argues against the thesis th a t 
phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of experience. 
21 This l ist of problematic properties is adapted from Dennett (1988).  I have omitted other 
properties which a proponent of irreducible qualia might wish to include on the l ist where 
I think they are entailed by properties I have included, or have been unable to find a 
sufficiently clear formulation of the property being cla imed. 
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deflationist need not concede that these are a l l genuine experientia l properties.  Since 
they a im to explain introspective evidence, but attempt to motivate a particular construal 
of that evidence, it is open to them to argue that we attribute one or more of these 
properties to our experience in error.  It is sufficient for the deflationist to explain merely 
why it is natural to construe our experience as possessing these properties, without granting 
that the properties actually obtain.  This is particularly important for the above property 
of intrinsicali ty -  cla iming that the phenomenal properties of an experience are intrinsic 
to it entails that those properties do not depend on anything external to that experience for 
their existence.  Whilst this may be compatible with those properties being reductively 
explicable, it places a strict l imit on the domain in terms of which we might explain them.  
Deflationists can eschew this limit if they can provide an argument that the introspective 
evidence makes natural but does not force a construal of phenomenal properties as intrinsic 
upon us.  I won’t be in a position to make a full case for how I think a deflationist should 
treat these properties unti l chapter six, so I defer further discussion of them until then.  In 
the meantime, let’s start to equip ourselves with some of the tools we will need to construct 
our deflationist position. 
 
 
1.5 Two Enactive Theories 
 
There is a growing consensus that an adequate philosophical understanding of conscious 
perception must make essentia l reference to its l inks to skil led worldly action22.  We can 
call a view that makes such an essentia l appeal to action an enactive view. The 
‘essentia l i ty’ of the appeal indicates that the importance of action is in virtue of more 
than its role in effecting some other (perhaps neuronal or cognitive) properties in terms of 
which consciousness is to be explained – action is being given a non-instrumental role in the 
account of perception. One motivation for such an enactive focus might be the intuition th a t 
whenever we find an agent with the capacity for flexible and intel l igent action, we 
intuitively deem it conscious23.  Another might be the adaptationist conviction tha t 
consciousness would not exist unless it were of some value to its possessors, and that th is 
value must consist in the abil i ty of conscious entities to act in a way that increases their 
chance of surviving and reproducing – thus comparing the sort of things that conscious 
creatures can do with those that intuitively non-conscious creatures can do might provide 
                                                
22 See e.g. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991), Hurley (1998), Noë and O’Regan (2001), 
Noë (2004), Matthen (2005), Schellenberg (2007), Thompson (2007). 
23 This intuition seems less strong in the case of ‘artif icia l’ agents, such as sophisticated 
robots, prompting Hurley (1998, ch.4) to suggest that life is required for the intuition tha t 
consciousness is present to take hold. 
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an account of the function of consciousness, and perhaps its identification with th is 
functional role.  I won’t try and fully motivate adopting such a focus  in this section, 
however.  This thesis wil l argue for a particular brand of enactivism, citing empirical 
evidence in its favour and arguing that it can provide a way of fleshing out the kind of 
deflationary explanation of conscious experience argued for above.  A key part of my 
strategy will be contrasting the ‘action-space’ account which I favour with the 
‘sensorimotor’ account of Noë (2004), in order to argue against Noë’s position and to clarify 
and motivate my own.  The character and motivations of the views will emerge in more 
detail over the fol lowing chapters of the thesis - my aim in this section is merely to set out 
two competing views of the relationship between action and perception, rather than fully 
motivate either position. 
 
According to the sensorimotor theory of Noë (2002, 2004, 2005), the content and character of 
our visual experience is determined by our implicit knowledge of the systematic ways in 
which sensation will change as a result of certa in bodily movements24.  Perception, on th is 
view, is not merely a matter of passive reception of sensory stimulation.  Rather, the 
perceiver is partia l ly in control of the sensory information she receives, since this varies 
with her movements.  Perception acquires its content and qualitative character through 
the perceiver’s acquired knowledge of this interdependence; through the perceiver 
understanding movement-dependent patterns, regularities and contingencies in the sensory 
stimulation she receives.  For example, a l ine in front of the perceiver appears vertical just 
in case she deploys her implicit knowledge that her sensations wil l remain largely the 
same if she nods her head up and down the l ine, but wil l differ in a predictable and regular 
way if she moves her head from side to side.  A visually-presented tomato appears 
spherical (rather than appearing as a circular tomato-façade) if the perceiver possesses 
implicit knowledge of how her sensations would change were she to move around it.  And 
the tomato is experienced as visually rather than tactually presented if the perceiver 
implicitly knows that (for example) moving her head and eyes around will a lter her 
sensations in characteristic ways, but leave the her tacti le sensations unchanged. 
 
Much of the support for Noë’s position comes from discussion of various empirical work.  To 
take a single example, consider Bach-y-Rita’s work with tacti le-vision substitution 
                                                
24 Sensorimotor views are also defended by Hurley (1998), Schellenberg (2007) and O’Regan 
and Myin (2002).  I briefly discuss some of the other forms sensorimotor theory may take in 
the next chapter, and discuss Hurley’s position in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.  I focus 
chief ly on Noë’s view in this thesis, since his position provides the best contrast with the 
action-space account I develop. 
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systems (TVSS)25.  Such devices consist of a head-mounted camera which transduces 
patterns of optical information into isomorphic patterns in an array of vibrating rods on 
the back, abdomen or thigh of a blind subject.  After a short period wearing the device, 
subjects no longer perceive the signals from the device as vibrations on their body – rather, 
they perceive them as originating from dista l objects, out there in the world.  They thus 
begin to act and speak as if they are in visual contact with the world, ducking when objects 
loom at them, describing occluded objects as hidden from view, and making the kind of 
correct judgements about the size, shape and position of objects in her environment that we 
would expect of a sighted subject.  According to the sensorimotor view, this is because they 
have begun to visually experience their environment, and this in turn is because the TVSS 
device provides an approximation of the relations which obtain between visual perceptual 
stimulation and movement for the subject.  Importantly, TVSS-users must go through a 
period of actively exploring their environment whilst wearing the device, thus implicit ly 
learning about the relations between stimulation from the device, their own movement, 
and objects in their environment. Thus, cla ims the sensorimotor view, to the extent to 
which TVSS replicates these relations, users wil l enjoy visual experience. 
 
All perception, according to the sensorimotor view, is a matter of implicit understanding of 
relations between sensation and movement (sensorimotor contingencies) such as these, and 
implicit expectancies concerning the ways in which sensation would vary with the 
perceiver’s movement, according to these contingencies. Thus, perceiving on Noë’s account is 
a matter of knowing how what we can do affects what we can see. 
 
The dispositional account of Petti t (2003) a lso emphasises the role of skil ls and implicit 
understanding in perception, but in a different way to the sensorimotor view.  For Petti t, for 
something to look a certa in way is for it to empower certa in abil i ties in the perceiver.  On 
this view, a tomato’s looking red to a perceiver is a matter of its empowering her to, among 
other things, sort it with red and other similarly-coloured objects, sift it from differently-
coloured objects, or different shades of red, and track it across a range of different 
backgrounds and perceptual situations.  Once we have detailed the various sifting, sorting 
and tracking abil i ties enabled in a perceiver by exposure to a coloured object, we have said 
a l l there is to say about her experience of that colour26. 
 
                                                
25 See Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003) for a recent review. 
26 I develop and defend a related view of colour perception in detail in chapters 3 and 4, so 
wil l not try to motivate this view further here. 
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Though Pettit restricts his treatment to colour looks, his account might be generalised to 
other aspects of perception.  For example, Matthen (2005) extends this kind of approach to 
sensory perception in general, arguing that: 
 
“[P]erception is for action of two kinds.  First, i t is for the guidance of the body as i t 
interacts with other materia l objects.  Second, it is for finding out about things in 
the world, for building up a record of the characteristics of such objects, and 
forming expectations concerning how they should behave in the future.  The main 
thesis to be advanced builds the content of perception on what it tel ls us about how 
objects should be treated with respect to these goals.” (p.8) 
 
It might be cla imed, for example, that a tomato’s looking spherical to the perceiver is a 
matter of her perception of it disposing her to sort it with other spherical objects and sift i t 
from differently shaped ones.  And the tomato is experienced as visually, rather than 
tactually presented just in case it empowers a suite of abil i ties in the perceiver that are 
characteristic of vision rather than touch (sifting and sorting it on the basis of its colour, 
rather than, say, its temperature to the touch). 
 
An important feature of the view to be defended is that the enabled abil i ties in terms of 
which perception is to be explained must be available for integration with the subject’s 
capacities for practical reasoning and action-planning (Clark (2006b, 2007)).  My account of 
just what this requirement amounts to wil l be given in chapter 5, and we will see empirica l 
evidence in its favour in the next chapter.  For now, I’l l merely note that the basic 
motivation for such a requirement is that perceptually enabled abil i ties seem entirely 
consistent with the absence of conscious experience – a simple robot can use sensory 
information to guide its behaviour without, presumably, being a seat of perceptual 
consciousness.  As we shal l see in chapter 5, the action-space theorist argues that this is 
due to the unavailabil i ty of that sensory information to systems of practical reasoning and 
action-planning – rather, that information is automatically and inflexibly used to guide 
behaviour, thus fa i l ing to enable a conscious experience according to the action-space 
account’s criteria. 
 
As with the sensorimotor theory, proponents of thi s view of the relationship between 
perception and action appeal to various strands of empirical work to support their 
position.  Petti t appeals to results showing adaptation to colour-distorting goggles (which 
we will discuss in detail in chapters 3 and 4), and Matthen appeals, amongst other things, 
to the conception of sensory processing at work in our most successful current psychological 
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theories.  The remainder of this thesis tries to motivate such a view, so I shall not attempt 
to do so here.  For present purposes, note only that Pettit and Matthen both attempt to 
explain perception in terms of the ways that a perceiver’s sensitivity to her environment 
enables her to act.  We can call a theory that appeals to action in this way an ‘action-
space’ account.  Perceiving, according to such an account, is a matter of knowing how what we 
can see affects what we can do.   
 
1.6  Enactivism and Deflationism 
 
So, we have two contrasting ways of understanding the relationship between action and 
perception.  The camp occupied by Noë thinks we must appeal to action in understanding 
perception since perception is constituted by our understanding of how possible perceptions 
depend on what we might do.  The camp occupied by Pettit, Matthen, and myself, argue for 
an opposite direction of dependence between perception and action, cla iming tha t 
perceptual experience is constituted by our understanding of how possible actions depend on 
what we perceptually detect.  What makes each of these positions a potentia l 
deflationary solution to the explanatory gap?   
 
Sensorimotor theorists often stop short of addressing the explanatory gap itself, cla iming 
that an appeal to sensorimotor contingencies can provide an account of the properties in 
terms of which one experience differs from another, but remaining silent on whether such 
an appeal might explain why a subject enjoys some experience rather than none27.  
However, in their bolder moments, they sometimes cla im that their enactive focus 
reconfigures the explanatory problem, and lets us see how it may be addressed.  For 
example, Noë and O’Regan (2001) state that: 
 
“In our view, the qualia debate rests on what Ryle called a category mistake.  
Qualia are meant to be properties of experientia l states or events.  But experiences, 
we have argued, are not states.  They are ways of acting.  They are things that we 
do. […] Qualia are an il lusion, and the explanatory gap is no real gap at a l l .” 
(p.960) 
 
Noë and O’Regan take care to emphasise that they are not denying that there is 
something-it’s-l ike to perceive various aspects of the world.  Rather, they deny that we 
                                                
27 See (e.g.) Hurley and Noë (2003), Noë (2004), p.230-1.  Hurley and Noë thus distinguish 
between a ‘comparative’ explanatory gap, which they attempt to address, and an 
‘absolute’ explanatory gap, about which they remain largely si lent.  I criticise th is 
position in chapter 5.6. 
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should understand this manifest feature of experience in terms of our acquaintance with 
inner states or events, such as ‘qualia’ traditionally construed.  Rather, experiences are 
temporally extended encounters with our environment, more akin to processes than states or 
events.  We could fit this position into our deflationist schema by interpreting Noë and 
O’Regan as cla iming that introspection makes it tempting to posit physically inexplicable 
experientia l states where there are none, but when we view our introspective evidence 
accurately, we see that it is compatible with experience being a matter of active 
engagement with the world, rather than acquaintance with a qualitative state.  A 
sensorimotor deflationist would then argue that such a conception of experience makes i t 
amenable to physicalist explanation, and cite the empirical work implicating grasp of 
sensorimotor contingencies in perception as evidence that their theory was true of human 
conscious perceivers.  Lastly, they must show that their conception of experiences as grasp 
of sensorimotor contingencies has the resources to explain why phenomenal properties are 
experienced as ineffable, private, directly-available and intrinsic. 
 
Whilst Matthen also leaves questions about the explanatory gap largely to one side28, such 
questions are a major part of the focus of Petti t’s account.  Petti t offers his account as an 
antidote to the anti-physicalist account of colour experience as involving acquaintance 
with an intrinsic, effect- independent property of experience.  We should resist th is 
characterisation of our introspective evidence, in favour of one according to which our 
experience of an object’s colour is wholly explained by the abil i ties enabled by our 
perceptual exposure to it.  Thus,  
 
 “The way the object looks has no character that we might imagine being 
dissociated from the enabling effects, being present in their absence, or absent in 
their presence.  It has a character only as something that manifestly enables the 
subject to sift, sort and track in a certa in way, and thus to make corresponding 
judgements; it has a character that is essentia l ly tied to those empowering 
effects.” (Ibid. p.229) 
 
This construal of our experience is not introspectively obvious, since “…we come to conceive 
of red, and we come to see red through its dispositional aspect, if not under it.”  (p.225) – we 
don’t need to see redness as a property that disposes us to sift, sort and track objects in 
various ways for that to be the correct account of that property.  We might explain th is 
fact by arguing that these dispositions come about as the result of subpersonal processing of 
whatever features subserve the objects colour.  So,  
                                                
28 Except briefly in its comparative form ((2005), p.241-2). 
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“The idea is that perceptual exposure to a red object tunes us in a way that enables 
us to sift, sort and track in various ways, and that th is tuning occurs ‘behind our 
back’; it occurs in virtue of the brain’s response to the perceptual input at the 
subpersonal level.  What we become aware of in the experience presupposes th a t 
those subpersonally induced responses are in place; the red look of the object is the 
look it has so far as the perceived object is registered as enabling – as having 
already enabled – those responses: so far as it is registered as having that active 
power.” (p.232)29 
 
The idea is that such a story could be fleshed out to provide both a physicalist-friendly 
construal of our introspective evidence, and an explanation of why such a construal is not 
immediately evident to us.  The above quotes from Pettit a lready suggest his rejection of 
intrinsicali ty as a property of experience – he argues that rather than our colour-
categorising abil i ties being enabled by effect- independent properties of experience, those 
enabled abil i ties help constitute that experience.  The hope is that charting the enabled 
abil i ties essentia l to colour perception will also yield explanations of the other 
putatively problematic properties of experience detailed in section 3, and that th is 
conception of visual perception is empirically justif iable. 
 
So, these are the bare bones of deflationist sensorimotor and action-space theories of 
phenomenal consciousness.  The remainder of this thesis wil l be devoted to arguing that 
the action-space theory should be preferred over its sensorimotor counterpart, both for i ts 
better mesh with empirical work and its abil i ty to meet the constraints on an adequate 




In this chapter, we have looked at the motivations for believing that certa in properties of 
our perceptual experience pose a problem for physicalism.  I argued that we should see the 
challenge posed by the explanatory gap as a demand for an explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness which provides a conceptual mesh between experience and a physicalist-
friendly explanans.  Once we see the challenge in this way, we see that none of the 
positions surveyed in section 1.2 look tenable.  However, I argued that there is room for an 
intermediate, deflationary position, between type-A and type-B materia l ism.  According 
to such a position, we can redescribe our introspective evidence in a way that renders i t 
                                                
29 Pettit intends such ‘registration’ to be a subpersonal-level phenomenon. 
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compatible with physicalism, whilst explaining the temptation to construe it in an anti-
physicalist way.  To be plausible, such a position must do justice to our introspective 
evidence, and to the ease with which it can be used to generate anti-physical conclusions.  
It must a lso be empirically plausible, and provide explanations of putative problematic 
features of experience such as intrinsicali ty, ineffabil i ty, privacy and direct-availabil i ty.  
We brief ly surveyed two enactive theories of perception with a structure that might 
permit them to discharge these obligations – Noë’s sensorimotor theory, according to 
which conscious perception is a matter of understanding the l ikely sensory effects of 
movement, and the ‘action-space’ theory, according to which conscious perception is a 
matter of understanding the ways one is poised to act on the basis of one’s perceptual 
sensitivity to the environment. 
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Chapter 2:  Action, Perception and the Two Streams 
 
In chapter one, we set out the problem of the ‘explanatory gap’ between the phenomenal 
and the physical and the constraints on a satisfactory solution, then raised the possibil i ty 
that an enactive theory of consciousness might have the structure necessary to meet these 
constraints.  The two enactive theories we brief ly considered were Noë’s sensorimotor 
theory, according to which visual experience arises through a grasp of the perceptual 
consequences of movement, and the ‘action-space’ theory, according to which visual 
experience arises through a grasp of the practical consequences of perception.  The next 
three chapters are chief ly devoted to adjudicating between these views, and ultimate ly 
finding in favour of the relationship between action and perception advocated by the 
action space theorist.  In chapters three and four we will see that the action-space account 
has resources to give an account of colour experience that are unavailable to the 
sensorimotor theorist.  In this chapter, I want to consider what the dual visual systems 
hypothesis (DVS) - a currently influentia l theory in the neuropsychology of vision - 
suggests about the functional underpinnings of conscious vision, and whether it mil i tates in 
favour of one or the other of our enactive views.  I argue that, contrary to the views of 
several recent commentators, this hypothesis is not directly inconsistent with a 
sensorimotor theory of visual perception.  However, whilst DVS is not strictly 
incompatible with the sensorimotor theory, I argue that i t suggests a view of the nature of 
conscious visual experience that has strong aff inities with the action space approach, and 
according to which knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies plays, at best, an indirect role 
in visual perception.  We should conclude that our current best neuropsychology of vision 
gives us reason to favour the action-space approach over the sensorimotor theory, and that 
we thus have empirical reason to focus on the action-space approach in our attempt to 
develop a deflationary theory of phenomenal consciousness. 
 
In section one, I review the commitments of various possible sensorimotor theories of 
perception.  Section two is an overview of the features of the dual visual systems 
hypothesis relevant to our consideration of the debate between action-space and 
sensorimotor theories.  Section three considers various ways in which DVS has been used to 
challenge Noë's sensorimotor view, and argues that Noë and sensorimotor theory can 
respond to each.  However, in section four I argue that the real challenge from DVS to 
sensorimotor theory is the affinity that obtains between the action-space account and 
DVS’s suggestions about the functions of conscious vision.  This suggests that the importance 
of sensorimotor contingencies should be relegated to (at best) a possible implementation of 
this functional role, thus compromising the sensorimotor theorist’s cla im that an appeal to 
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sensorimotor dynamics is of non-instrumental importance in an account of perceptual 
experience.  Lastly, in section five I address the challenge that the standard conclusions 
from DVS to the functional role of conscious vision are too hasti ly drawn.  I conclude th a t 
DVS gives us empirical reason to favour an action-space account over a sensorimotor view 
in developing a deflationary theory of phenomenal consciousness. 
 
2.1 Sensorimotor Theory Reviewed 
 
Recall from the previous chapter that a sensorimotor theory of conscious perception is one 
that holds that the content and character of perception is determined by a perceiver’s 
understanding of the ways in which possible actions wil l effect possible perceptions.  
Crucial ly, sensorimotor theorists argue that such sensorimotor dependencies are of non-
instrumental importance to the generation and explanation of perception.  Everyone can 
agree that possible movements are important to the content and character of a perceiver’s 
experience, since her movements wil l usually a lter what she perceives.  But the 
sensorimotor theorist’s view of the relationship between action and perception goes beyond 
a bland appeal to actions as means to different perceptions.  On their view, a perceiver’s 
grasp of possible movements and the perceptions that they would result in is constitutive of 
the content and character of experience.  The discussion of TVSS in 1.5 i l lustrated th is 
cla im – according to the sensorimotor theorist, the ‘visual’ experiences of TVSS users are 
l ike the visual experiences of normally sighted perceivers to the extent that both involve 
a grasp of an isomorphic set of contingencies between possible movements and possible 
patterns of perceptual stimulation. 
 
This sketch of sensorimotor theory leaves room for several possible variants, due to the 
ambiguities in the notion of dependence between perception and action.  The senses of 
‘perception’ and ‘action’ being appealed to can be cashed out in a number of ways, and 
different views of the sensorimotor contingencies to be appealed to are thus possible.  For 
example, ‘perception’ admits of both a personal-level construal, denoting contentful 
experience, and a subpersonal construal, denoting patterns of retinal stimulation, or 
subsequent neural activity30.  ‘Action’ in this context can likewise be given a personal- level 
                                                
30 This ambiguity can be used to create a potentia l dilemma for the sensorimotor theory 
taken as an attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness.  For if perceptual stimulation in 
the contingencies appealed to is construed subpersonally, we are owed a supplementary 
story about why expectations about subpersonal stimulation should give rise to experience.  
And if the appeal is to contingencies between movement and personal- level perceptual 
experience, then the theory presupposes the phenomenology it is intended to explain.  This 
dilemma has been independently noted by several critics of the sensorimotor view, 
including Block (2005) and Clark (2006), and I won’t pursue it further here. 
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construal, denoting gross intentional actions aimed at the fulfi lment of a goal of the agent, 
or a subpersonal construal, perhaps denoting efferent neural signals corresponding to motor 
commands.  Intermediate construals of ‘action’ also seem possible – exploratory eye 
movements are bodily actions of the agent, but there is good reason to believe that they are 
not a lways under intentional control31.  Each construal of perception can be combined with 
each construal of action to yield a different sort of sensorimotor contingency, and 
sensorimotor theorists might appeal to some or al l of these in their account of perception.  
For example, Noë and O’Regan (2001) focus chief ly on the effects of exploratory head and 
eye movements on subpersonal retinal stimulation, citing (for example) the way in which 
the retinal stimulation from a vertical l ine wil l remain largely unchanged as a perceiver 
nods her head up and down, but change in a regular and predictable way as she moves her 
head from side to side.  Noë (2004) focuses chief ly on the relationship between such 
exploratory movements and perceptual experience, discussing (for example) the changing 
ways a plate or a penny looks to the perceiver as she moves in relation to it32.  An appeal to 
contingencies between higher levels of perception and action is at work in O’Regan Myin 
and Noë’s (2002) suggestions that the feel ing of materia l wealth might be partia l ly 
explained by the knowledge of the l ikely consequences of the intentional action of 
attempting to withdraw a large sum of money from a cash machine, or that the feel ing of 
confidence might be a matter of expecting the successful consequence of some intentional 
endeavour.  And Hurley (1998, ch.9) appeals to the relations between the lowest levels of 
perception and ‘action’ in her explanation of Gall istel ’s (1990) report that the visual scene 
seems to move as a result of the attempted movement of a paralyzed eye in terms of the 
relation between retinal stimulation and the efferent copy of the motor command to move 
the eye33. 
 
Thus, different sensorimotor theories emphasise the different levels of sensorimotor 
contingencies to varying degrees.  Noë and O’Regan focus chief ly on contingencies between 
subpersonal stimulation and exploratory movement, whilst Noë (2004) focuses on those 
obtaining between personal- level perception and movement, whilst also appealing to 
contingencies at other levels in various places in the book.  Hurley’s view is diff icult to 
categorise in these terms – she argues that the personal- level categories of perception and 
action have a shared underpinning in the dynamic, looping nexus of perceptual inputs and 
                                                
31 See (e.g.) Weiskrantz (1998) on gaze-redirection in blindsight patients. 
32 Though at other points in the book different levels of sensorimotor contingency are 
emphasised, as when he appeals to the role of patterns of variation in retinal stimulation 
due to inhomogeneities in the distribution of rods and cones in his account of colour 
perception (p.129-130). 
33 Though Hurley usefully uses ‘perception’ and ‘action’ to refer only to personal- level 
phenomena, ta lking instead of ‘input’ and ‘output’ at the subpersonal level. 
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motor outputs at the subpersonal level.  At the subpersonal level, inputs and outputs cannot 
be cleanly distinguished, and the fact that the contents of perception and action each 
supervene on this single subpersonal system means that they are both co-enabled and co-
defined.  Such a framework seems able to appeal to sensorimotor contingencies at any of the 
levels surveyed above34.  For our purposes, we can define a sensorimotor theory as any view 
which attempts to explain the content and character of perception via a non-instrumenta l 




2.2 The Dual Visual Systems Hypothesis 
 
The Dual Visual Systems hypothesis (DVS) (Milner and Goodale (1995), Jacob and 
Jeannerod (2003), Goodale and Milner (2004), Jeannerod and Jacob (2006)) identif ies two 
distinct strands of visual processing in the human brain.  The ventral stream runs from the 
primary visual cortex, through V4, to the temporal lobe, and appears to be implicated in 
object-recognition and classification, and linked to working memory and capacities for 
visual imagery.  The phylogenetically older dorsal stream runs from the primary visual 
cortex, through MT, to the posterior parieta l cortex, and is implicated in our fine-grained 
motor interactions with the world, such as controll ing reaching movements towards objects 
and calibrating appropriate grip-sizes with which to grasp them.  Initia l evidence for the 
existence and possible functions of the two processing streams came from lesion studies on 
primate vision (with antecedents in work on frogs (Ingle (1973)) and hamsters (Schneider 
(1969)) by Mishkin and collaborators (Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982)), and has 
subsequently been well confirmed as a neuroanatomical hypothesis by various single cel l 
(e.g. Taira et a l (1990)) and neuroimaging (e.g. James et a l (2003)) studies35.  
 
However, neuroanatomy is not our concern here - we are interested in what DVS suggests 
about the functional role of conscious vision, and how this might diverge from the role of 
motion-guiding vision.  Perhaps it is useful to begin our survey of DVS by considering what 
our visual contact with the world a l lows us to do. It is a commonplace that vision al lows us 
to, among other things, recognise, recall and reason about perceived objects, to contrast 
                                                
34 See Hurley (1998), esp. ch.10, for detailed discussion of her ‘two-level interdependence 
view’.  I discuss the relation between Hurley’s position and the action space view in 
chapter five, but focus chief ly on Noë’s (2004) position until then, since it affords the best 
contrast with the action-space view I develop. 
35 See Jacob and Jeannerod (2003) ch.2 for a useful survey of the neuroanatomical f indings in 
primates. 
 36 
them with other perceived and unperceived objects, to see how they might help or hinder 
the satisfaction of various of our goals and projects, and to fluently act upon them by, for 
example, grasping them with just the right hand-position and finger-separation for their 
shape.  However, note that the very last capacity seems to demand very different 
computational resources from the others on the l ist.  To identify a perceived object as of a 
particular type, to remember that object when it is no longer perceived, and to reflect on its 
actual or possible relations to other objects or to our intentional goals al l require us to (in 
some sense) grasp the fact that it is an objective and enduring object, whose existence and 
properties are independent of our current perceptual relation to it – its objectivity must be in 
some way represented, or factored into, our perception of it.  On the other hand, to quickly 
and fluently grasp an object, we need only process information about its current location 
relative to ourselves (in particular to the bits of our body we wish to use to grasp it), and 
the properties of it relevant to the way we should grasp it, such as its width and 
orientation.  The availabil i ty of such information doesn’t require width and orientation to 
be represented as objective and enduring properties of an external object – just that those 
features be processed in a way suitable to guide fluent action in the here-and-now.  But th is 
in turn seems to require that information regarding the position of the object (or at least of 
the portions of it to be grasped) relative to the agent be constantly updated as the hand 
and arm move toward it, that its position and orientation be coded with respect to the 
reaching arm, wrist and hand in a way that a l lows each to be positioned and oriented in a 
way appropriate for grasping the object, and for a l l these parameters to be computed with 
sufficient accuracy to support the speed and precision with which we can grab a perceived 
object.  None of these computational demands seem necessary to perceive that an enduring 
object has a certa in property.  Thus, these two functions of vision – guiding fluent action on 
one hand, and enabling recognition, recall and reasoning on the other – seem to require very 
different computational resources36: 
 
“The former requires a constantly updated, (multiply) egocentrically specif ied, 
and exquisitely distance and orientation-sensitive encoding of the visual array.  
The latter requires the computation of object-constancy (objects do not change their 
identity every time they move in space) and the recognition of items by category 
and signif icance, irrespective of the fine detail of location, viewpoint, and retinal 
image size.  A computationally efficient coding for either task looks to preclude 
the use of the very same encoding for the other.” (Clark (2007), p.565-6) 
 
                                                
36 See Milner and Goodale (1995), p.25-66, for a more detailed discussion of such 
computational arguments for DVS. 
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The crux of DVS is that each of the anatomical pathways sketched above specia l ises in 
handling only one of these sets of computational challenges, the dorsal stream dealing 
with the former, and the ventral with the latter. 
 
Strong support for this hypothesis comes from dissociation studies of patients with damage 
to one of these streams but not the other.  Visual agnosics, such as Milner and Goodale’s 
patient DF, have damaged ventral streams but intact dorsal streams.  As a result, DF is 
unable to visually recognise or classify objects, and cannot perceptually discriminate 
between even simple triangular, circular and square objects, reporting no conscious 
experience of their shapes.  However, whilst denying experience of these shapes, she can 
fluently pick them up using appropriately-scaled grips on the basis of her visual exposure 
to them.  In a striking demonstration of DF’s spared and impaired abil i ties, Milner and 
Goodale found that she was virtually at chance when asked to orient a hand-held card to 
match the orientation of a visually presented slot (whose orientation is varied over the 
course of the tria ls), but could post the card through the slot with a lmost the same degree 
of accuracy as a normally-sighted control subject37.  Also noteworthy is the fact that DF 
had to be prompted by the experimenters in order to successfully post the card – she denied 
that she could see the slot, and was initia l ly surprised when her posting behaviours were 
successful38.  And, just as DF was unable to orient the card successfully whilst refra ining 
from actually posting it, she was unable to orient it successfully when a delay was 
introduced between the presentation of the slot and the instruction to post the card.  The 
hypothesis is that each of these last two conditions constitutes ‘pantomimed’ action, 
guided by ventrally-mediated visual imagery or memory, and thus compromised in DF. 
 
In contrast to visual agnosics, optic ataxics have damaged dorsal, but intact ventra l 
streams.  Whilst they can visually recognise and classify objects, their performance of the 
fluent reaching and grasping movements available to DF and normal subjects is impaired.  
Jeannerod et a l (1994) found that optic ataxic AT could provide an accurate manual 
estimate of object-size by matching it to the separation between her thumb and index 
finger, but could not accurately scale the grip between thumb and index finger in order to 
                                                
37 See Milner and Goodale (1995) for a full account and discussion of these results. 
38 Matters are sl ightly complicated when interpreting the abil i ties of DF by the fact th a t 
she has spared colour and texture vision (thought to be due to spared regions of her ventra l 
stream).  Thus she can often guess the identity of an object, and the resulting ways in which 
she can act on it, by inference from these cues.  Goodale and Milner (2004) report that she 
has a lso developed an abil i ty to self-prompt her actions by making exploratory 
movements and seeing how they unfold.  As a result of her experience of her condition, and 
her subjection to numerous psychophysical tests, she has a good grip of the sorts of actions 
she can and cannot fluently perform, and thus no longer exhibits surprise at her abil i ty to 
perform them.  
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grasp the same object.  We would thus expect that optic ataxics attempting DF’s posting 
task could consciously perceive, report and remember the orientation of the slot, and 
consequently succeed in the pantomimed and delayed-posting conditions, whilst showing 
an impairment in the actual posting of the card through the slot39. 
 
Additional support for DVS’s view of the division of labour between dorsal and ventral 
streams comes from the fact that different aspects of normal human vision are 
differentia l ly susceptible to certa in il lusions, with some il lusions apparently deceiving 
only vision devoted to categorising or attributing properties to objects without fooling 
motion-guiding vision.  In the Titchener circles il lusion, two circles of the same size are 
experienced as being different sizes when one circle is surrounded by an annulus of smaller 
circles and the other by an annulus of bigger circles (the circle surrounded by smaller circles 
appears to be bigger).  Aglioti et a l (1995) constructed a version of the i l lusion with poker 
chip shaped discs, and demonstrated that whilst subjects have a non-veridical experience 
of the sizes of the discs, as evinced by their choosing the chip surrounded by smaller discs 
when asked to pick up the larger of the two central  chips, their grip wil l be accurately 
scaled to the actual size of the disc, rather than to the i l lusory size which it is 
experienced as having.  Grip is scaled identically if the subjects are asked to pick up the 
other, identically-sized but apparently smaller, disc.  Thus, it seems that their perception 
of the relative size of the discs and their resultant choice of which disc should be picked 
up in order to comply with the experimenter’s request are under the influence of the 
i l lusion, whilst their reaching behaviour is not.  Daprati and Genti lucci (1997) have 
obtained similar results for the Muller-Lyer i l lusion – when subjects attempt to pick up 
either of the central bars in the i l lusion, their grip is scaled appropriately, despite their 
erroneous perception of the bar’s size, as evinced by drawings or manual estimations40. 
                                                
39 Jacob and Jeannerod (2003, p.186) thus note that AT is aided in the task of pointing to a 
visually presented l ight by a delay between the presentation of the l ight and the 
pointing.  Matters are complicated when contrasting optic ataxics with visual agnosics by 
the fact that ataxics usually show only sl ight behavioural impairments, often only 
relating to stimuli in their peripheral rather than central vision.  Rosetti (forthcoming) 
suggests that this casts doubt on DVS’s view of the division of labour between the streams, 
but the paucity of most impairments might a lso be explained by the fact that dorsal 
lesions are usually relatively minor – due to its location in the brain, a lesion that fully 
compromised the dorsal stream would result in death.  It seems reasonable to say that 
subjects with the most severe lesions approximate most closely the deficits that a strong 
version of DVS would predict. 
40 The dissociations Daprati and Genti lucci found between perceptual and grasping 
conditions were less striking than those in the Titchener circles experiments.  This is l ikely 
explained by the fact that their experiment involved presenting the bars in the Muller-
Lyer i l lusion singly rather than concurrently – thus perceptual estimation of size was not 
affected by comparison of two il lusory lengths, as it would be in the standard Muller-Lyer 
i l lusion.  It seems reasonable to suppose that concurrent presentation of the bars would 
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Conversely, some perceptual cues seem to have a far greater effect on reaching and grasping 
than on perception and judgement. Haffenden and Goodale (2000) and Haffenden et a l . 
(2001) show that the distance between the central circle and the annulus in the Titchener 
circles i l lusion has a far greater effect on grip-scaling than on perceptual estimates of 
size41.  They hypothesise that this is because the visuomotor system that controls the 
grasping movements treats the annuli as obstacles to be avoided when reaching, whereas 
this consideration is irrelevant to the purposes of the ventral processing which causes the 
perceptual i l lusion. 
 
The last class of il lusions we should consider do have an effect on the way perceivers 
engage with the non-veridically perceived object, but not on the scaling of the grip used to 
act upon it.  In the Ponzo, or ‘ra i lway lines’ il lusion, one or two objects are displayed within 
a pair of converging lines.  The l ines give an impression of receding into the distance 
towards a vanishing point, and objects placed further up between the l ines appear larger 
than identically-sized objects lower down.  Brenner and Smeets (1996) asked subjects to pick 
up discs placed at various points in between the l ines, and found that the force used to li f t 
the disc increased the higher up the disc was placed, suggesting that subjects took the disc 
to be larger, and thus heavier, than it in fact was.  Similarly, Ell is et al (1999) found tha t 
when a bar is placed at an angle between the Ponzo lines, subjects grip it closer to one of its 
ends, suggesting that they take it to be heavier at one end than the other, and Jackson and 
Shaw (2000) found that a bar was grasped with greater force according to how high up the 
l ines it was placed.  Grip-scaling remained unaffected in each of these experiments. 
 
These i l lusions and the studies on lesioned subjects support the idea that there is a 
distinction, and possibil i ty of dissociation, between the fine control of reaching and 
grasping behaviour and other aspects of visual perception, and we have good reason to 
believe that this corresponds to the distinction and possibil i ty of dissociation between the 
ventral and dorsal streams of processing.  What can th is tel l us about the functional role of 
conscious visual experience?  The first point to note is that ventral stream activity seems 
especia l ly implicated in visual consciousness.  DF’s conscious experience of visual form was 
                                                                                                                                     
increase the i l lusionary size discrepancy, and produce a stronger dissociation between 
perceptual and grasping conditions. 
41 These studies are two of several designed to resolve the controversy over Aglioti et a l’s 
initia l results.  Those results are controversia l since slight effects on grip-scaling are in fact 
found in such experiments.  The upshot of the considerable l iterature on this topic seems to 
be that this can be explained by appeal to the visuomotor system treating the annuli as 
objects to be avoided, and interaction between dorsal and ventral streams – I’l l thus assume 
here that the results do indeed support the version of DVS under discussion.  See Jacob and 
Jeannerod (2003, ch.4) for a review. 
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lost when her ventral stream was damaged, as evinced by her reports of its absence, her 
initia l surprise at her abil i ty to perform certain types of action, and her inabil i ty to use 
visual information about objects to initiate actions upon them based upon their shape, or to 
recognise or recall their shape-properties.  Likewise, our il lusory conscious perceptions of 
the figures in the various il lusions discussed above seem to be due to ventral processing, 
rather than the dorsal processing which appears to accurately track the attributes about 
which it processes information42.  If we grant that we have reason to think that visual 
consciousness is underpinned chief ly by the ventral  stream, what do the above results 
suggest about the function of visual consciousness? 
 
Firstly, it seems plausible that conscious vision is responsible for making objective and 
enduring properties of objects apparent to the perceiver.  In this connection, Matthen (2005) 
contrasts ‘descriptive vision’, devoted to building up a record of the objective properties of 
visually-presented objects that is accessible to memory and conscious awareness, with 
motion-guiding vision, devoted to the control of fine details of action on visually-
perceived objects.  The following aspects of the DVS data support the idea that the 
ventral stream, and thus conscious vision, is geared towards representing objects in the 
former way: 
 
• The computational arguments considered at the start of this section suggest that 
the ventral stream must somehow represent, or take account of, such properties of 
objects.   
• DF is unable to categorise, identify of remember items based on their objective 
shape, and reports no awareness of that shape, whilst nonetheless being able to 
display sensitivity to their shape when prompted to grasp them.  This suggests 
that to the extent to which DF’s brain processes information about shape, it treats 
i t egocentrically, representing an object’s shape only in terms of the movements DF 
needs to make in order to grasp it, given her current position relative to it.   
• By contrast, the ventrally- intact optic ataxic’s visual sensitivity to shape a l lows 
her to reason about, recognise and recall the consciously-perceived shape (a l l 
processes that we suggested above require shape to be represented as an objective, 
perceiver-independent property of the object), whilst the way in which 
information about the relations between object’s shape and the current position of 
the perceiver can be put to use in grasping an object is impaired. 
                                                
42 It might be objected here that the supposition that the activity of the dorsal stream does 
not issue in consciousness is unwarranted – perhaps it issues only in conscious experience 
that is somehow unavailable to report and judgement.  I address this objection in section 
five. 
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• The generally accepted explanation of the non-veridical experiences in ventrally-
mediated il lusions is in terms of the visual system’s attempts to maintain size 
constancy across the visual fie ld, triggered by il lusory perspectival cues.  In the 
Titchener circles il lusion, the annulus of small circles is treated as composed of far-
away objects, and the central circle is taken to be the same distance away.  It is 
thus perceived as larger than the other central circle, which is perceived as 
nearby due to its being surrounded by an annulus of larger circles.  Similarly, the 
l ines in the Ponzo il lusion are perceived as being different distances away from the 
perceiver, and hence the l ine higher up the Ponzo tracks is perceived as larger.  
This suggests that our conscious perception of size results from the ventral stream’s 
treating it as an objective property, which an object possesses independently of the 
particular angle it currently subtends in our visual fie ld.43 
• Similar considerations apply to the demonstration by Brenner and Smeets (1996) 
and others that the position of objects in between the Ponzo lines affects the 
weight they are perceived as having. 
 
Secondly, it seems plausible that conscious vision is l inked to capacities for memory and 
action-selection in a way that motion-guiding vision is not.  In this connection, Clark (2001) 
proposes the “Principle of Experience-based Selection” on the basis of consideration of the 
DVS data, according to which “Conscious visual experience presents the world to a subject 
in a form appropriate for the reason-and-memory based selection of actions” (p.512), as 
opposed to a form appropriate for the fine-grained control of action, such as the calibration 
of reaching and grasping movements.  Several parts of the DVS data support this claim: 
 
• Our initia l computational arguments suggest that ventral stream processing is apt 
for integration with reasoning and memory, but that the business of fine-grained 
control requires a different set of informational resources. 
• Whilst DF can grip objects accurately, she shows impairments in selecting the 
appropriate type or target of the grip – for example, she might deploy a precision 
rather than a power grip when picking up a screwdriver, and pick it up by its tip 
rather than its handle.   
• DF’s perceptual sensitivity to the orientation of the slot in the posting task is not 
such as to al low her to reason or plan that she would have to orient her hand like so 
were she to post the card – we noted above that she fa i ls at this task.  Nor is i t 
such as to a l low her to post the card through the slot after a delay between seeing 
the slot and attempting the action, suggesting that the information processed about 
                                                
43 See Jacob and Jeannerod (2003, ch.4) for discussion of such accounts of the i l lusions. 
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the slot’s orientation is short- l ived and not accessible to memory, or systems tha t 
would enable her to plan or reason that the card should be posted with a certa in 
orientation. 
• Dorsally damaged but ventrally intact optic ataxics consciously experience the 
slot’s orientation, but show the converse set of impairments – they do better at 
matching the orientation of their hand to the orientation of the slot, or posting the 
card after a delay, than they do at the straightforward posting task. 
• The i l lusory experience of the relative sizes of the Titchener circles guides the 
subject’s selection of which disc to pick up in Aglioti et al’s (1995) study, but not the 
scaling of the grip they use. 
• In the studies with the Ponzo il lusion, the force the subject elects to use when 
picking up the bar is affected by the i l lusion, but the scaling of their grip is not. 
 
The DVS data might inspire other suggestions about the nature and function of conscious 
vision.  For instance, Jacob and Jeannerod (2003, e.g. p.112-3, p.193-8) propose that the DVS 
data suggests that conscious vision is essentia l ly comparative and contrastive, arguing 
that the ventral stream always represents properties of objects in relation to other real or 
possible objects (in an ‘a l locentric’ frame of reference), whereas the dorsal stream 
represents properties of objects only in relation to the fine details of certa in possible actions 
upon them by the agent (an ‘egocentric’ frame of reference).  I won’t pursue this, or other 
suggestions, further here – it seems to me that the conclusions that the DVS data warrants 
most clearly are captured under our two headings above.  So, with an overview of the DVS 




2.3 DVS and Sensorimotor Theory 
 
Several commentators (e.g. Block (2005), Clark (2006a, 2006b), Jacob (2006)) have cla imed 
that there is a tension between Noë’s sensorimotor theory of perception and the DVS 
results.  And at first glance, the relevance of these results to the sensorimotor view seems 
fa irly direct.  DVS apparently demonstrates at least a functional dissociation between 
conscious visual perception and our visually-guided motor interactions with the world.  By 
arguing for the constitutive role of action and sensorimotor engagement in visual 
perception, it seems that the sensorimotor view is emphasising the functions of vision 
thought to be dealt with by the dorsal stream.  However, a natural interpretation of DVS 
suggests that these functions are largely independent from our conscious, reportable, 
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memory-informing perception.  Thus, the plausibil i ty of the sensorimotor theory as an 
account of the basis of visual consciousness is under apparent threat. 
 
Hence, Block notes the fact that colour and size perception are significantly worse in our 
peripheral visual field than in its centre, but that our capacity to reach and grasp objects 
on the visual periphery is largely unimpaired, and concludes that “The upshot is that i f 
the activity guided by sensorimotor knowledge with which the enactive approach 
includes visually guided action, it simply does not reflect the phenomenology of conscious 
vision.” (Block (2005), p.10, his ita l ics).  Jacob (2006, p.9-10) makes a similar point, 
cla iming that the sensorimotor view appears to be committed to characterising visual 
experience as tied to the control of action, a tie of which DVS gives us reason to be 
suspicious.  And Clark uses the DVS results to argue for a “sensorimotor summarising” view 
of conscious perception, where the function of conscious vision is geared towards reasoning, 
planning and the selection of actions.  Once such action-plans have been formed, the job of 
carrying them out in fine detail is delegated to dorsal  stream processing that does not issue 
in conscious awareness.  He concludes that dealings with detai led sensorimotor knowledge 
are the preserve of the dorsal stream, and thus of l imited importance in explaining 
perceptual consciousness. 
 
Hurley and Noë (2007) give a brief response to such worries about the possible dissociation 
between conscious and motion-guiding vision, focussing on the Titchener circles, and other 
‘action resists i l lusion’ results surveyed in the previous section.  They agree that such 
findings seem to constitute cases where the subject’s implicit sensorimotor knowledge and 
expectancies, but not their conscious experiences, are tuned to the actual size of (for 
example) the Titchener discs, as evinced by contrasting their intact abil i ties to act 
accurately upon them with their non-veridical phenomenology and judgements of relative 
size.  However, they argue that to reject their sensorimotor view on this basis is premature 
– the results show only that a narrow range of sensorimotor knowledge and skil ls are lef t 
intact by the i l lusions (such as the practical knowledge of how to scale one’s grip 
appropriately to the size of a disc), whereas the range of sensorimotor knowledge and 
expectancies to which they wish to appeal in explaining the content and character 
experience is far broader than this.  Thus, they cla im that: 
 
“Subjects in the experiment of Aglioti et al can use what they see to guide certa in 
specific movements correctly […] But that doesn’t show that the broad set of 
sensorimotor powers and expectancies associated with the i l lusory look of 
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Titchener circles is significantly different from the set associated with similar but 
veridical looks in a variety of different contexts.” (Hurley and Noë (2007), p.18) 
 
Moreover, they object that even the narrow range of i l lusion-resistant abil i ties and 
expectancies may be “highly specif ic to certa in tasks or contexts” (Ibid, p.19) such as 
carefully prepared laboratory set-ups, and that we should resist drawing any general 
morals from such cases as a result. 
  
As it stands, this is not a satisfactory way of reconcil ing DVS and the sensorimotor view44.  
Firstly, i t leaves the sensorimotor view in need of an account of why some sets of 
sensorimotor knowledge and skil ls should be more or less relevant to the character of 
consciousness than others, which H&N do not provide.  Even if some property separating 
sensorimotor knowledge that is pertinent to experience from sensorimotor knowledge th at 
is not could be plausibly specified, the sensorimotor view would risk losing its 
distinctiveness by explaining experience in terms of that property, rather than in terms of 
sensorimotor features45.  More importantly, H&N fail to note that the action-resists-
i l lusion results are part of the larger body of DVS data, which points to a pervasive 
dissociation between two types of vision, going far beyond the specif ic contexts in which 
those results are obtained.  The real chal lenge to the sensorimotor view thus arises from 
viewing these results in the context of DVS; can the sensorimotor view accommodate the 
distinction between conscious and motion-guiding vision that the full spectrum of DVS data 
suggests?  H&N’s response here does not address this crucial question.  
 
We can make better progress in considering the compatibil i ty of the sensorimotor view 
with DVS by considering some brief remarks from Noë (2004).  There he suggests that the 
theories are not in confl ict so long as we distinguish between deployment, or possession, of 
                                                
44 I don’t want to deny that H&N’s comments here are correct, as far as they go.  As we 
shall see, the account I develop suggests that the content and character of our experience is 
to be explained in terms of a broader range of abil i ties than reaching and grasping 
behaviours, in keeping with their suggestion.  However, I wil l argue that the correct way 
of cashing this cla im out supports the action-space view, and gives us reason to reject the 
sensorimotor theory. 
45 Again, it wil l become apparent over subsequent chapters that this is what the 
sensorimotor theory must do.  H&N’s only gesture at what such a property might be is a 
brief suggestion, made whilst developing their point about the restriction of the 
experimental results to certa in contexts, that the ‘implicit’ rather than ‘explicit’ use of 
information (see Hurley (1998), ch.4, for an account of this distinction) in these cases may 
contribute to an explanation of why the information that guides grasping does not seem to 
issue in experience.  As we shal l see in chapter 5, th is suggestion is in keeping with my 
eventual account, and thus in fact favours the action-space account over the sensorimotor 
view. 
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sensorimotor skil ls, and the f ine-grained control of action which the dorsal stream is 
thought to handle46.  Hence he claims that:  
 
“[Optic ataxia] does not undercut the enactive view, for from the fact tha t a 
patient suffers optic ataxia, i t doesn’t fol low that he or she lacks the relevant 
sensorimotor knowledge.  What would undercut the enactive approach would be 
the existence of perception in the absence of the bodily skil ls and sensorimotor 
knowledge which, on the enactive view, are constitutive of the abil i ty to 
perceive.”  (Noë (2004), p.12) 
 
S imilarly, he says later that: 
 
“[DVS] is, at best, orthogonal to the basic cla ims of the enactive approach.  The 
enactive approach is not committed to the idea that vision is for the guidance of 
action, so neither the fact that some visual processing is for the guidance of action, 
nor the fact that some visual processing is not, has any direct bearing on the 
enactive approach.  From the standpoint of the enactive approach, al l perceptual 
representation, whether the result of dorsal or ventral activity, depends on the 
perceiver’s deployment of sensorimotor skil ls.” (Ibid. p.19) 
 
The idea, then, is that knowledge and expectancies concerning the way appearance 
changes with movement are being appealed to as constitutive of perceptual experience, not 
the way in which perception so-constituted is then put to use in the control of action47.  
However, the possibil i ty is sti l l open to Noë of holding that possession or exercise of some 
type of sensorimotor knowledge is constitutive of perceptual consciousness (and perceptual 
representations in the ventral stream) without holding that this need take a form suitable 
for fine-grained control of action. 
 
                                                
46 Noë’s officia l position seems to be that the deployment of sensorimotor knowledge is 
constitutive of the content and character of perception, though occasionally he writes as i f 
mere possession of such knowledge were sufficient.  I won’t attempt to distinguish or 
adjudicate between these two options here. 
47 Note that dorsal perceptual representation could not depend on sensorimotor knowledge 
in the preferred sense of Noë (2004), where the perceiver implicitly understands how 
(phenomenological) appearances wil l change with movement, since visual form agnosics 
(in conjunction with other aspects of the DVS data)  seem to demonstrate that dorsally-
mediated vision takes place without the subject enjoying any visual experiences.  It might 
be that a different type of sensorimotor account could be given for the dorsal pathway, 
perhaps giving ‘knowledge’ and ‘expectancies’ some subpersonal construal. 
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Is this position a stable one?  Jacob (2006) notes that Noë makes this move, but questions 
whether al l aspects of Noë’s theory are consistent with the eschewal of appeal to 
visually-guided action.  The passage Jacob cites (Ibid. p.9) is Noë’s discussion of the role of 
egocentric behavioural space in the localisation of objects and our experience of the way 
they look.  For example, Noë cla ims: 
 
“The plate looks ell iptical to me because, to indicate i ts shape, I can (and indeed, 
in some sense, must) move my hand in a characteristic manner.  That is, to 
experience a thing as el l iptical is precisely to experience it as occupying a 
particular kind of region in one’s egocentric, sensorimotor space.” (Noë (2004), p.89) 
 
Presumably Jacob’s idea here is that in tying our visual experience of a shape to possible 
bodily indications of that shape, Noë is committed to constitutive ties between motion-
guidance and visual experience that run counter to the DVS data.  However, it is not clear 
that this passage, or this type of appeal, provides Jacob with the ammunition he needs.  
Noë is here advocating an account of perception of spatia l properties which ties it in some 
way to possible behaviours of the subject, but th is does not commit him to the 
counterintuitive cla im that the ensuing visual representations are for these behaviours.  At 
most, it commits him to the cla im that an appeal to such behaviours plays an essentia l 
role in a proper specif ication of the content of spatia l perception – and it is not clear why 
this cla im should be threatened by DVS.  Moreover, i t is not clear that the behaviours to 
which Noë appeals here are the fine-grained motor responses which the dorsal stream 
coordinates.  Moving one’s hand through the air to mime the contours of a visually-
perceived shape in the way Noë describes looks l ike just the sort of pantomimed action 
that the dorsally intact DF cannot do, but that ventrally intact but dorsally compromised 
optic ataxics can. 
 
In the other passage that Jacob cites in support of his cla im that Noë’s view is committed 
to an action-guiding role for visual experience, Noë notes that “there is no question that 
vision can and does guide movement, but it is not the business of the sensorimotor view to 
emphasise this humdrum fact” (Ibid. p.90).  Jacob responds that “The evidence for the two-
visual systems hypothesis is precisely what would lead one to doubt at least the strong 
assertion that the function of perceptual experience is to guide movement” (Jacob (2006), 
p.9). However, this does not seem to be the assertion Noë makes in the quoted passage, 
which looks compatible both with the view that only dorsally-mediated vision guides 
movement, or a more sophisticated view which holds that conscious vision controls 
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movement only in the sense of selecting and delegating actions to be controlled by the 
dorsal stream.    
 
So, Jacob fa i ls to make a case that Noë is committed to making cla ims in direct tension 
with DVS.  The key point is that in none of the passages Jacob cites (nor, as far as I can tel l , 
throughout Noë (2004)) does Noë appeal to the implicit knowledge that concerns the 
relationship between sensation and the kinds of fine-grained reaching and grasping 
movements which are under dorsal control, knowledge that DVS suggests is largely 
independent of our conscious visual experience.  Rather, the types of “skil led bodily 
activity” to which he appeals to are capacities for intentional exploratory head, body 
and eye movements.  For Noë, conscious perception is borne out of a perceiver’s 
understanding of the relationships between these types of actions and changes in 
perceptual experience.  Since DVS gives us no reason to think that these sorts of actions or 
understanding are dorsally governed, Noë cannot be straightforwardly convicted of the 
most intuitive DVS-inspired objection to his view – that i t is in tension with DVS by dint 
of emphasising capacities that look to be the province of the dorsal stream in its account of 
perception consciousness. 
 
It seems that analogous remarks apply to each of the variants of the sensorimotor view we 
considered in section 1.  Noë and O’Regan’s (2001) view emphasising implicit knowledge of 
the relationship between patterns of subpersonal stimulation and exploratory movement 
looks compatible with DVS so long as they do not make an appeal to the types of actions 
thought to be under dorsal control and subpersonal predictions about their sensory 
consequences in their account of visual experience.  The high-level sensorimotor 
contingencies appealed to in Myin, O’Regan and Noë’s (2002) treatment of certa in cases 
look orthogonal to any theory of fine-grained motor control.  And Hurley’s (1998) 
appropriation of Gall istel’s paralyzed eye case for the sensorimotor theory looks 
compatible with DVS even if we assume that gaze-redirection can be a dorsally-mediated 
function, since here the appeal is to the subpersonal consequences of an intentional action 
(saccading intentionally to the left, rather than doing so as a result of automatic dorsal ly 
mediated gaze redirection) in explaining perceptual experience.  More generally, Hurley’s 
contention that the subpersonal inseparabil i ty of perceptual inputs and motor outputs 
results in the co-constitution of perception and action at the personal level seems perfectly 
in keeping with the DVS results, so long as she does not cla im that the f ine details of 
certain forms of action-guidance are reflected in conscious experience.  DVS is not 
stra ightforwardly incompatible with sensorimotor theory. 
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Block (2005) and Clark (2006) lodge more subtle DVS-based objections to sensorimotor 
theory.  Like Jacob, Block is skeptical about whether Noë is consistent in his denial tha t 
the type of visual guidance of action thought to be the function of the dorsal stream is one 
of the bodily skil ls to which the sensorimotor view appeals, though he does not attempt to 
cite any passages in support of this.  Instead, Block makes a number of other DVS-based 
objections, the two most significant of which we will deal with briefly.   
 
Firstly, he notes that “presumably, the dorsal stream involves at least implicit 
expectations for how objects in the environment shift with visually guided movements”, 
and thus concludes that Noë is committed to cla iming “that the ( in fact unconscious) dorsal 
states are conscious” (Block (2005), p.11).  But this does not fol low.  Firstly, Noë’s (2004) 
view focuses on expectations concerning the experientia l consequences of movement, rather 
than any ‘implicit expectations’ coded for in the dorsal stream.  Secondly, even applied to 
a sensorimotor view that did focus on sensorimotor ‘expectations’, subpersonally construed, 
i t would follow only that the view needed a supplementary story about why some such 
expectations but not others were relevant to consciousness, not that the operations of the 
dorsal stream must have an upshot in perceptual consciousness.  Whi lst the provision of 
such a story may be difficult, Block gives us no reason to suppose that it could not be given48. 
 
Secondly, Block notes that if Noë’s view emphasises not visually-guided action but 
sensorimotor expectations (as it indeed does), then Noë will be forced to leave behind much 
of the radical externalism of his view – expectations can presumably be instantiated in the 
absence of an acting body, so Noë’s vision of perception as essentia l ly active and embodied 
would not be supported by his theory of perception.  Two points in response – firstly, Block 
thinks Noë is forced to emphasise sensorimotor expectations since a sensorimotor view 
which appealed only to dispositions towards visually-guided actions is also rendered off-
l imits by the DVS data.  Block makes this point in the context of analysing Noë’s denia l 
that optic ataxia – where visually-guided action is compromised but visual experience is 
not – undercuts the sensorimotor view, and his subsequent cla im that: 
 
‘What would undercut the enactive approach would be the existence of perception 
in the absence of the bodily skil ls and sensorimotor knowledge which, on the 
enactive view, are constitutive of the abil i ty to perceive.’ (Noë (2004), p.12) 
                                                
48 Though recall our point from earl ier this section – such a supplementary story risks 
shif ting the explanatory focus in the sensorimotor account of experience from sensorimotor 
knowledge to whatever property is appealed to in distinguishing between those sets of 
sensorimotor expectations that are relevant to the content and character of experience from 
those that are not. 
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Block thinks that the sensorimotor view cannot cash out an appeal to skil led behaviour in 
i ts account of perception in dispositional terms, since i t seems plausible that optic ataxia 
compromises dispositions to skil led behaviour as well as the abil i ty to execute such 
behaviour49.  However, as we have just noted, so long as the skil ls or dispositions appealed 
to by an enactive view do not include the fine details of grip-scaling and other dorsal ly 
mediated operations, we have no reason to think that the view is in tension with DVS - 
the dispositions putatively lacked by the ataxic are relevant to an enactive view only if 
that view emphasises dispositions to dorsally-governed action in its account of perception.  
DVS thus constrains, but does not rule out, a dispositional theory of perception. 
 
Secondly, even if we grant Block that the most plausible form of sensorimotor theory is one 
in terms of sensorimotor expectations that could be realised in the absence of a body, it is 
debatable whether this threatens the non-instrumental nature of its appeal to action in its 
account of perception.  Block disagrees, since he thinks questions about what is constitutive 
of any given perceptual experience should be settled by specifying the minimal 
metaphysically sufficient supervenience base for that experience (Block (2005), p.5).  If 
perceptual experience depends on sensorimotor expectations, and sensorimotor expectations 
can be realised by neural activity alone, then Block thinks that skil led activity is only 
instrumentally important to perceptual experience - important insofar as it causally effects 
the neural activity that forms the minimal supervenience base of experience.  But an 
enactivist might disagree with Block’s criterion for constitutivity and non-
instrumentality; why suppose that such questions should be settled by considerations about 
supervenience, rather than (for example) considerations about the factors which must be 
ineliminably appealed to in our best explanation of the phenomena? This option is pursued 
by Hurley (forthcoming) and Noë (2007).  Hurley notes that if our primary concern is the 
explanation and understanding of perceptual experience, the fact that neurally identica l 
brains wil l enjoy identical experience regardless of their different embodiment and 
environment is of no great relevance – it tel ls us nothing about why the resultant experience 
should be of, for example, vermill ion rather than violet.  Since we have, at present, li t t le 
idea of how such explanatory gap questions should be answered, we should not discount the 
possibil i ty that an explanation of the content and character of the experience must make 
reference to extra-neural factors, such as the nature of the sensorimotor dynamics and 
environmental backdrop in which the neural state is embedded.  Indeed, argues Hurley, 
                                                
49 Block’s reason for thinking this seems to be that optic ataxia occurs as a result of a brain 
lesion, and thus ‘affects the dispositions themselves, not just their manifestation’ (Block 
(2005), p.12).  This seems questionable, but I won’t pursue the point here. 
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the plausible diagnoses that the sensorimotor theory affords of various empirical results 
speak in favour of this possibil i ty50.  Even if the contentious point that figuring in a 
minimal supervenience base is criteria l of non-instrumentality and constitutivity is 
granted, Hurley a lso notes that the ‘internalist’ cla im that this supervenience base wi l l 
include neural properties a lone has not been demonstrated.  Noting, as Block does, tha t 
some account of perception does not rule out internalism shows only that the 
internalist/externalist debate has not been settled a priori. To assume that this constitutes 
a victory for internalism is to make what Hurley labels “the ‘causal/constitutive error’ 
error”,  
 
“of objecting that externalist explanations give a constitutive role to external 
factors that are ‘merely causal’ while assuming without independent argument or 
criteria that the causal/constitutive distinction coincides with some 
external/internal boundary” (Hurley (forthcoming), p.5) 
 
Both Block and the Noë can agree that sensorimotor dynamics causally influence neural 
activity.  But Block thinks that we should conclude from this that experience is not 
essentia l ly active.  Hurley’s point is that this begs the question against the enactivist, 
since the tacit assumption that our default supposition should be that al l essentia l 
properties of an experience are neurally enabled has not been defended, and that is 
precisely the point at issue between Block and the enactivist51. 
   
Clark (2006a) brings us closer to the real challenge posed by DVS for the sensorimotor 
theory.  He draws similar conclusions from the DVS data to those summarised at the end of 
the last section, focussing on the suggestion that the enabling of various forms of 
classif ication, reasoning and planning seem especia l ly relevant to conscious experience, and 
concludes that: 
 
                                                
50 Such as the TVSS phenomena discussed in 1.5 and Kohler’s goggle-adaptation results, to 
be discussed below and in the next chapter.  See Hurley and Noë (2003) and Hurley (1998, 
ch.9) for more discussion of empirical work that a sensorimotor perspective seems to 
accommodate well. 
51  I have taken some time over these arguments, since they apply to enactive theories in 
general, and thus to the action-space view as well as the sensorimotor theory.  I remain 
neutral on the internalism/externalism debate for the remainder of this thesis.  However, 
I do hold that the action-space account’s appeal to action is non-instrumental as bil led, 
insofar as even if the minimal supervenience base of an experience is neural, we need to 
know the space of actions the agent takes to be currently enabled and how this relates to 
the neural properties of the agent’s brain in order to correctly specify the neural properties 
that are essentia l to the experience.  The case for this cla im is made in chapter 6. 
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“If this is correct, then one of the most striking implications of the full 
sensorimotor view may be called into question.  This is the cla im that a l l 
differences in embodiment (insofar as they impact sensorimotor contingencies) must 
thereby make some difference to qualitative experience…This cla im will turn out 
to be fa lse if what structures experience is (not the full suite of sensorimotor detai ls 
but) a kind of coarse summary whose main concern is with the selection of targets 
and of action types.” (Clark (2006a), p.7-8) 
 
Here, Clark is referring to passages where Noë cla ims that the f ine details of embodiment 
make a crucia l contribution to the character of experience, since many such details wi l l 
subtly affect the nature of the relationship between perceptual sensation and movement.  
For example, Noë and O’Regan state: 
 
“For two systems to have the same knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies all the 
way down they will have to have bodies that are identical all the way down (at 
least in relevant respects). For only bodies that are al ike in low-level detail can be 
functionally al ike in the relevant ways” (Noë and O’Regan (2001), p.1015)   
 
And Noë cla ims that  
 
“Creatures with bodies l ike ours would have systems that are visual in the way 
ours are.  Indeed, only such systems can participate in the identical range of 
sensorimotor interactions that we participate in.” (Noë (2004), p.159) 
 
I endorse Clark’s interpretation of the DVS results, but disagree that its primary relevance 
to the sensorimotor view is the threat that it poses to an emphasis on the fine details of 
embodiment52.  This is because such an emphasis seems to be a negotiable but 
counterintuitive and apparently inconsistent aspect of the sensorimotor view, that it would 
do well to drop.  It is negotiable since it is not entailed by the essentia l feature of the 
sensorimotor view as I have sketched it – that a non-instrumental appeal to the perceptual 
consequences of movement is required for a satisfactory theory of perception.  The 
‘perceptual consequences’ to which a sensorimotor theory appeals might be at any one of 
various functional levels – retinal, cortical or experientia l, for example – and we have been 
given no compell ing reason to think that the lowest such levels are of importance to an 
                                                
52  However, in his (2006b) Clark treats the DVS-based and ‘sensorimotor chauvinism’ 
objections separately.  The arguments of this chapter are fully compatible with his views 
as expressed there, which I endorse. 
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account of perception.  It is counterintuitive since, as Clark and Toribio (2001) note, such a 
close tie between perceptual experience and the fine details of embodiment results in a 
“sensorimotor chauvinism”, according to which creatures identical but for marginal ly 
different saccade-speeds, or retinal forms cannot enjoy identical experiences.  And it is 
apparently inconsistent with various points used to elucidate the sensorimotor theory.  For 
example, Hurley (1998), Hurley and Noë (2003) and Noë (2004) cite Kohler’s visual 
adaptation results (some of which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter) in 
support of the sensorimotor view.  In one set of Kohler’s experiments, subjects wore goggles 
which inverted the visual signal with respect to left and right, so objects on the left are 
seen through the goggles as on the right, and vice-versa.  However, after several days 
wearing the goggles, the vision of the subjects adapts, and they eventually report visual ly 
experiencing everything as in its proper place.  The sensorimotor explanation of the 
adaptation is that there is some higher-order similarity between the sets of relationships 
between perception and movement that obtain before and after donning the goggles th at 
explains the eventual sameness of the way the world looks pre-goggles and post-
adaptation.  Adaptation, then, is a matter of the perceiver somehow latching onto th is 
h igher-order similarity in the face of what is effectively an alteration of their visual 
physiology.  However, this treatment of the case suggests that the way things look can be 
determined by sensorimotor contingencies that obtain at a level of abstraction removed 
from the precise details of embodiment, and that apparently very different forms of 
embodiment (for example visual systems replicating the effects of any of the various sorts 
of distorting goggles to which subjects can adapt) are compatible with th ings looking th is 
way.  Lastly, an emphasis on the details of embodiment seems out of place in a 
sensorimotor theory such as Noë (2004)’s, which emphasises the relations between changes 
in appearance and possible movements – the details of embodiment are only relevant to 
such a theory insofar as they affect the way things appear, and we have been given no 
reason to suppose that all details in embodiment should do this.  So, whilst Clark is correct 
to note that DVS gives ample grounds for our suspicion of sensorimotor chauvinism, it was a 
feature we had independent reasons to question, and which sensorimotor theorists can 
consistently reject53.   
 
I have argued in this section that Jacob, Block and Clark fai l to demonstrate the 
incompatibil i ty of DVS and sensorimotor theory.  Sensorimotor theories explain 
                                                
53 In fairness to Clark (2006a), he is criticising sensorimotor theory as it appears in Noë’s 
work, in which there are several references to the importance of the details of 
embodiment, rather than the less-committa l form of sensorimotor theory (characterised as 
a certa in view of the nature of the dependence between perception and action) whose 
compatibil i ty with DVS I am arguing for here. 
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perceptual experience by appeal to the perceiver’s implicit knowledge of sets of 
dependencies between appearance and skilful movement, but need not claim that either 
the type of movements or appearance/movement relations appealed to are such as to 
suggest they are mediated by the dorsal stream – the cla im which would be in tension with 
DVS.  The DVS data suggests that a key part of the dorsal stream’s role is to enable fluent 
engagement with objects by processing sensorimotor information, such as coding for the fine 
details of the action appropriate to the agent’s current visual input intentions, but 
sensorimotor theories are not committed to appealing to these particular sensorimotor 
relations.  Block notes correctly that sensorimotor theorists require a supplementary story 
about why the implicit sensorimotor ‘knowledge’ at work in the dorsal stream apparently 
fa i ls to issue in conscious experience, but does not show that such a story cannot be given, 
and his arguments that DVS forces the sensorimotor theorist to abandon their non-
instrumental appeal to the importance of action are inconclusive at best.  And whilst Clark 
correctly notes that DVS seems in tension with an emphasis on the fine details of 
embodiment, such an emphasis is an inessentia l feature of the sensorimotor view as I have 
sketched it.  However, if we grant that sensorimotor theory does not confl ict with the 
letter of the DVS view, might there nonetheless be reason to think that it conflicts with 
i ts spirit? 
 
 
2.4 DVS and the Action-Space Approach 
 
I think there is a case against sensorimotor theory in the off ing from the sorts of points we 
have been considering – most closely tied to Clark’s remarks about what the DVS data 
suggests about the functional role of conscious vision.  Recall the two general morals 
suggested by DVS about conscious vision from section two.  Firstly, we noted that ventra l 
stream activity (and by extension, we supposed, conscious vision) seems geared especia l ly 
to enabling perception of objective and enduring properties of the environment, a l lowing for 
objects and properties to be identified, classif ied and compared in ways that abstract from 
certain details of the perceiver’s current relations to them, in contrast to the egocentric 
representations of properties the dorsal stream seems to employ.  Secondly, we noted tha t 
conscious vision seems linked to capacities for reasoning, remembering and action-planning 
in a way that the motion-guiding vision enabled by the dorsal stream is not.  What, i f 
anything, do these morals suggest about how we should adjudicate the debate between the 
sensorimotor and action-space theorists about the correct way to appeal to action in an 
account of perception?   
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Recall that the sensorimotor theorist wishes to emphasise the agent’s understanding of 
the perceptual consequences of movement, whereas the action-space theorist emphasises 
understanding of the practical consequences of perception.  Now, note that in stating the 
morals we drew from the DVS data, we needed to make no reference to an implicit grasp of 
the perceptual results of movement – nor does an agent’s having a grasp of the sensory 
consequences of movement seem to follow from their having the capacities we have 
identif ied as distinctive of the ventral stream.  However, we did appeal to the abil i ty to 
use perceptual information in practical reasoning – and it seems to fol low that an agent 
with the distinctive ventral capacities wil l be able to act on her environment in a way 
informed by the perceived properties of objects and features, and reason about the ways the 
disclosures of her current perceptual sensitivity might afford the satisfaction of various of 
her goals and projects.  This account of the capacities enabled by the ventral stream looks 
much l ike our sketch of the action-space approach from 1.5.  At first blush, then, it seems 
that the DVS results have a stronger aff inity with the action-space approach than with 
the sensorimotor view.   
 
In support of this cla im, consider again what DF’s perceptual sensitivity to visual form 
does and does not al low her to do.  DF’s brain clearly processes information about the 
width and orientation of objects since she can, when prompted, act in ways sensitive to 
these properties with f luency and precision comparable to that of normally-sighted 
perceivers.  However, it seems that this information does not figure in DF’s conscious 
experience (as suggested by her sincere reports, and her initia l surprise at her residual 
visuomotor abil i ties), nor is it available for integration with her capacities to plan, reason 
and recall based on her current perceptual situation (as suggested by her requiring an 
external prompt before putting her spared visuomotor abil i ties to use, and her inabil i ty to 
report, remember or reason about (for example) the orientation of the slot in the posting 
task).  The action-space account suggests that these facts tel l us something about conscious 
vision – that part of what i t is to be conscious of some content (that a slot has a certa in 
orientation, for example) is for that content to be automatically available for integration 
with capacities for practical reasoning54.  DF, on such an account, fa i ls to be conscious of the 
slot’s orientation since her perceptual sensitivity to that orientation fa i ls this requirement 
– in order for orientation-information to be used in her behaviour she requires an external 
prompt55.  Similarly, the action-space theorist explains the dissociation between grip-
                                                
54  This gloss on DF’s condition is cashed out in much greater detail in chapter 5, especia l ly 
5.4. 
55 As we have a lready noted (footnote 9), matters are complicated by DF’s residual 
perception of colour and texture, and the fact that she now has considerable knowledge of 
the nature and extent of her spared visuomotor abil i ties.  Thus she can now perform many 
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scaling and conscious perception demonstrated in Aglioti et a l’s experiments by virtue of 
the fact that the detailed width information used to scale the subject’s grip is not apt to 
inform their practical reasoning, unlike the non-veridical information about the relative 
sizes of the discs processed by the ventral stream, as evinced by the fact that the non-
veridical information guides the subject’s selection of which disc to pick up, but not the 
scaling of the grip they use to do so. 
 
It seems, then, that the action-space view’s contention that perceptual experience must be 
understood in terms of the perceiver’s grasp of the practical consequences of the current 
deliverances of their perceptual sensitivity accords well with the DVS data.  Though we 
saw in the last section that the sensorimotor theory appears consistent with that data , 
nothing in that theory seems apt to explain the dissociations between fluent behaviour and 
conscious experience that DVS highlights as readily as the action-space account’s view of 
the relationship between action and experience.  So, the key cla im I want to make here is 
that the DVS data presents a real challenge to the sensorimotor theory only when viewed in 
the context of the action-space approach.  If we hold that conscious experience is to be explained 
in terms of a perceiver’s knowledge of the practical consequences of her perceptual 
sensitivity, we can predict and explain the dissociations suggested by DVS as above – DF is 
not conscious of visual form in spite of her spared perceptual sensitivity to aspects of tha t 
form, since she, unlike standard perceivers, lacks an automatic grasp of the practica l 
consequences of that sensitivity.  Standard perceivers have an il lusory experience of the 
relative sizes of the Titchener circles rather than an experience that reflects the veridica l 
information they use to guide the f ine details of their actions upon them since the latter 
information is not available to guide their practical reasoning (such as their choice of 
which disc to pick up), unlike the information which distorts estimates of size due to 
i l lusions of perspective and size-constancy.  The DVS results support the action space view 
since, on their most natural interpretation, those results conform to what we would expect 
if the action-space account were true.  In contrast, whilst the sensorimotor theorist’s view 
of the relationship between action and perception is compatible with those results, no 
obvious explanation of them is suggested by that view.   
                                                                                                                                     
fluent actions without prompting.  This makes it appear, contrary to our gloss here, th a t 
her perceptual sensitivity to the properties of objects and scenes relevant to her fluent 
activity is such that it can be integrated with her ongoing practical reasoning.  The action-
space account cla ims that a l l such cases are to be explained by DF’s employing an 
inferentia l strategy – either inferring from colour or texture cues that some action is 
currently appropriate, or performing speculative exploratory actions and seeing how they 
turn out.  The integration of width and orientation information with her ongoing activity is 




According to the action-space theorist, then, the feature of the sensorimotor view 
threatened by DVS is the key cla im that an understanding the perceptual consequences of 
movement is of non-instrumental importance for an account of perceptual experience.  
Whilst we saw in the previous section that sensorimotor theory can remain compatible 
with DVS, for it to explain the DVS data it would have to demonstrate that an 
understanding of the perceptual consequences of movement was required in order to manifest 
the capacities which seem distinctively enabled by the ventral stream, and are thus 
associated with conscious experience.  However, we have been given no reason to suppose 
that this is so.  Moreover, even if the ventrally enabled capacities of conscious perceivers 
are in fact grounded in some species of knowledge of sensorimotor dynamics, this does not 
negate the advantage the action-space view has over the sensorimotor theory in 
accommodating the DVS data.  For it seems that the functions of the ventral stream 
suggested by DVS could be realised in a variety of different ways – perhaps underpinned 
by implicit knowledge of sensorimotor dynamics, perhaps by a suitably tuned connectionist 
network, or perhaps by some suitable modular GOFAI architecture.  If we take the morals 
of DVS seriously as hypotheses about the functional role of conscious vision then each of 
these suggestions, even if true, would be of importance only as a story about the way the 
capacities crucial to conscious vision are realised, or enabled.  Thus, even if the correct 
explanation of our possession of those capacities turns out to appeal to knowledge of 
sensorimotor dynamics, that appeal plays only an instrumental role in our account of 
conscious vision – the sensorimotor dynamics are only relevant insofar as they serve to 
enable a particular set of capacities.  It is those capacities themselves, however enabled, 
that would do the real work in our account of conscious vision.   
 
DVS suggests that the capacities we should focus on are those enabled by the ventra l 
stream, and I have argued in this section that such capacities are more natural ly 
understood in terms of a perceiver’s grasp of the practical consequences of the disclosures of 
her perceptual sensitivity, rather than of the perceptual consequences of her movement56.  
According to the action-space account, conscious perception consists in a perceiver’s 
manifesting a grasp of the space of actions that the disclosures of her current perceptual 
sensitivity makes appropriate – a grasp that enables the possibil i ty of those actions to be 
                                                
56 Note that this argument for the mere instrumental or enabling role of sensorimotor 
dynamics in perceptual experience does not succumb to the criticisms from Hurley and Noë 
we considered in the previous section.  Our relegating sensorimotor dynamics to such a role 
is based on empirically motivated arguments rather than considerations about minimal ly 
sufficient supervenience bases, and we have not traded on the implicit premise that the 
neural enabling of experience should be our default assumption.  
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factored in to her ongoing practical reasoning.  Over subsequent chapters the nature of th is 
proposal wil l be clarif ied, and we will look at independent reasons for the view.  But note 
for now that such a view allows us to make good sense of the dissociations revealed by 
DVS, and that if we have independent reason for holding such a view, DVS counts as 
empirical support in its favour.  Neither of these points hold for the sensorimotor view – 
this is why, in the debate between sensorimotor and action-space approaches, DVS favours 
the action-space camp. 
 
 
2.5 DVS and Consciousness 
 
The arguments of this chapter have presumed, in l ine with most interpretations of the 
DVS l iterature57, that the functions of the ventral stream are of specia l relevance to visual 
consciousness, whereas the functions of the dorsal stream are not.  Our main reasons for th is 
have been DF’s sincere reports that she has no conscious experience of visual form, her 
initia l surprise when confronted with the extent of her spared visuomotor abil i ties in the 
face of her apparently impoverished visual experience, and reflection on the way normal 
perceivers (ourselves included) have i l lusory experiences of the sizes of figures and objects 
in certa in il lusions despite our near-perfect visuomotor abil i ties with respect to those 
figures and objects.  However, does this give us suff icient reason to suppose that the 
information guiding visuomotor action in these cases is not reflected in conscious 
experience?  Perhaps, it might be objected, the motion-guiding information is experienced, 
but simply not noticed, by the subject.  Wallhagen gives this example in support of the 
possibil i ty of such an interpretation: 
 
“…suppose you see a friend along the street, and your friend has had her hair cut.  
You might not notice this for some time.  Nevertheless, you were aware of her hair, 
and the properties in virtue of which it looks different to you (which explains the 
thought you’re likely to have when you do notice her ha ircut: ‘I had a sense there 
was something different about you today’)…” (Wallhagen (2007), p.552) 
 
Perhaps, then, DF is aware of the information she uses to guide her visuomotor behaviour, 
but simply fa i ls to notice it in a way that is reflected in her sincere introspective reports.  
Certa inly the fluency with which she can get around in the world gives us apparent reason 
                                                
57 E.g. Goodale and Milner (2004), Jeannerod and Jacob (2003), Clark (2007).  See sections 5-7 
of Clark (2007) for his own take on the issues of thi s section, which is fully compatible 
with the arguments I offer here.  
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to suppose she has experience of visual forms – why should her reports to the contrary be 
given ultimate authority?  Likewise, perhaps when we view the Muller-Lyer, Titchener 
circles, or Ponzo il lusions we have both veridical and non-veridical experiences of relat ive 
size, with the veridical experience guiding our reaching behaviour and the non-veridical 
experience guiding our report, recall and practical reasoning. 
 
This is an extremely thorny issue, and I can’t hope to settle it here58.  But note first of a l l 
that the introspective reports of DF and subjects perceiving il lusions, as well as DF’s 
initia l surprise at the dissociations between her reportable visual experience and certain 
of her visuomotor skil ls, and our surprise at the dissociation between our reportable 
experience of the relative sizes of figures in certa in i l lusions, and our visuomotor skil ls 
with respect to those figures surely give good prima facie reasons to think that the 
information guiding the details of visuomotor behaviour is not part of our conscious visual 
experience.  Look long and hard at (let’s say) the Ponzo il lusion.  Introspect as thoroughly 
(or as casually, depending on which you think gives the best insight into your experience) 
as you wish.  Does anything in your experience of the lines, theoretical knowledge of the 
i l lusion aside, tel l you that they are the same length?  It seems to me that, so long as I am 
not stra ining to ignore the fact that the l ines are situated within the Ponzo tracks, there is 
no sense in which they appear the same length.  The objection at hand suggests that I am 
deceived – that I do have a veridical experience of the relative size of the l ines, as would 
be manifested were I to try and grasp them.  But what motivation is there to suppose tha t 
the information that guides my grip-scaling figures in my experience?  Perhaps the fact 
that i t is mildly counter-intuitive to hear from DVS that it is not – but this is surely 
trumped by the way the i l lusion manifestly seems to us.  Claims that al l perceivers who 
are affected by such i l lusions are mistaken about their experience59 must be adequately 
motivated, rather than just made, if they are to be convincing.  It seems far from clear tha t 
DF’s skil l at coping in the world provides such motivation – we must keep in mind that she 
reta ins sensitivity to colour and texture cues which she can use to infer the sorts of 
visuomotor actions she might successfully prosecute, that she has had many years to 
develop strategies to deal with her condition, and that her exposure to hundreds of 
psychophysical tests has left her with a comprehensive sense of the capacities her spared 
perceptual sensitivity has left her with.  We must also remember al l that DF cannot do – 
draw or describe the form of an object, select an object from an array or use it based on its 
                                                
58 See Block (2007), and commentaries, for an argument that what we consciously experience 
far outstrips what we can report, as well as a swathe of empirical and conceptual 
arguments for and against this cla im. Dretske (2006) and Clark (2007) also discuss these 
issues. 
59 Assuming that al l such perceivers experience the i l lusions in the way I have described. 
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form, act on an object without being prompted (either by an experimenter or by her own 
inferentia l strategies based on colour and texture cues, or exploratory movements), match 
two visually presented objects based on their form, and so forth.  I conjecture that if DF 
were (rather cruelly) required to perform novel but simple tasks in an unfamil iar 
monochrome and mono-textured environment, there would be far less temptation to suppose 
that she enjoyed unreportable visual experience of shape.   
 
DF aside, the mere fact that processed information can be put to use in the guidance of 
certain kinds of behaviour does not strike me as adequate motivation for the cla im that 
such information contributes to the character of a conscious experience.  There are many 
sources of processing in the brain that have some kind of upshot in behaviour, and it is 
surely outlandish to suppose that each of these must make a contribution to conscious 
experience.  Do I experience al l the information which guides the countless subtle postural 
adjustments I make to keep my balance when riding a bike, or the information which leads 
me to shif t from an uncomfortable posture when I am asleep?  How about the semantic 
information by means of which I am (apparently) unconsciously primed to act in a variety 
of different ways in experiments such as those described in Chartrand and Bargh (1999)?  
Do blindsight subjects experience the information that guides the forced-choice 
discriminations they can make?  It is possible, if perhaps counterintuitive, to answer ‘yes’ 
to each of these questions.  But unless we wish to answer ‘yes’ to them all, there needs to be 
some rationale behind our contention that some bit of action-influencing information 
processing is reflected in our experience.  My first response to the objection, then, is that the 
prima facie reasons to suppose that the action-guiding information processed by the dorsal 
stream is not part of our visual experience are good enough to place the burden of proof on 
the objector to come up with convincing motivations for the contrary cla im60.  
  
Secondly, even if we were to suppose that the processing in the dorsal stream is reflected in 
conscious experience, it seems unlikely that the content of the dorsally-enabled portion of 
experience would support anything we could naturally describe as ‘experience of visual 
form’.  As Matthen (2005, p.301-305) argues, we need not suppose that the dorsal stream 
codes for the entire shape of an object.  Whi lst such shape information may be necessary for 
the selection of grip type and force, both features our discussion in section two gives us 
reason to think are handled by the ventral stream, to scale finger-separation in a manner 
appropriate to grasp some object requires only that the positions of the points to be grasped 
                                                
60 Actually, I think the action-space approach is in a stronger position than this.  As we 
will see in subsequent chapters, there are independent reasons for adopting an action-space 
approach to conscious perception – in light of these reasons, the action-space account can 
provide a rationale for this interpretation of the DVS data. 
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on the object be coded for, relative to the positions of the f ingers that wil l do the grasping.  
Fulf i l l ing the functions of motion-guiding vision does not require that this information be 
integrated into a representation of the object’s overall shape – indeed, to do so when such 
integration has already been achieved by the ventral functions that select which 
dorsally-governed action should be performed would be needlessly computational ly 
profligate61.  The conjecture that only specific aspects of the target object are coded for by 
the dorsal stream has empirical support from Ganel and Goodale (2003), who demonstrate 
that the width and length of a rectangular figure are processed separately when grasping 
it, but not when perceptually classifying it, and Schenk and Milner (2006), who 
demonstrate that DF is a ided in shape-classification tasks when engaged in a concurrent 
reaching task only when the shapes to be discriminated were of different widths, 
suggesting that the dorsal information DF appears to be using is sensitive only to width, 
not shape62.  Thus, were the information processing in the dorsal stream to issue in conscious 
experience, the content of that experience might be something like ‘it is currently 
appropriate to grasp with a given finger-configuration in a given region of egocentric 
space’.  But we have no reason to suppose that dorsal processing could disclose any more 
specific information about objects or their properties.  It strikes me as quite diff icult to 
imagine what such sparse phenomenology might be l ike – but in any case, it surely fa l ls 
short of the unnoticed experience of visual form hypothesised by the objector63.  My second 
response to the objection, then, is that the sorts of experiences which might plausibly be 
enabled by dorsal activity are of marginal importance at best in understanding the content 
and character of our visual experience.  It would be misleading to suggest that the dorsal 
                                                
61  See Matthen (2005, p.303) for an argument to the same conclusion from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
62  Both these findings look compatible with the Matthen’s conjecture that only the 
relative positions of grasping fingers and points-to-be-grasped on the object are coded for 
by the dorsal stream, as well as the authors’ hypothesis that only width is coded for.  
Schenk and Milner’s result has the water-muddying implication that dorsal activity can 
effect classif icatory abil i ties – I won’t attempt to fully interpret this finding here, but note 
that DF sti l l performs with far less accuracy (about 75%) than normally-sighted control 
subjects (100%), and her classif ications are described as guesses, rather than reports. 
63 According to the action-space account we are developing, if the dorsally-processed width 
information were avai lable to inform ongoing practical reasoning, then that information 
would figure in the content of a conscious experience.  As I understand them, Schenk and 
Milner’s (2006) experiments leave it underdetermined whether this is so.  Whi lst 
dorsally-processed width information can be made available to influence DF’s 
classif ications of shape, it is not clear that it can do this automatically and non-
inferentia l ly, in the way that the perceptual sensitivity of standard perceivers influences 
their classif icatory behaviour – it seems that DF must be externally prompted to at least 
form an intention to initiate a reaching movement before her spared sensitivity can be put 
to any use in the classification task, suggesting that the dorsal information would not be 
conscious on the action-space account.  I remain neutral here on just how these results are 
best interpreted, though. 
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stream could enable experiences just like those enabled by the ventral stream except in that 
they are unreportable.  We might thus remain neutral on whether any dorsal information 
has an upshot in conscious experience, since the sorts of experiences the dorsal stream might 
plausibly enable were surely not a large part of the visual experiences that are our 
explanatory target.  To clarify, consider Matthen’s (2005, ch.13) plausible suggestion tha t 
the operations of motion-guiding vision are responsible for the ‘feel ing of presence’ tha t 
visually-perceived objects have.  The action-space account can agree with this if the 
dorsal information concerning presence is apt to inform the subject’s ongoing practica l 
reasoning.  But even if this information turned out not to be apt in this way, and was thus a 
counterexample to the action-space view (and I see no reason to believe that it should – I 
raise the possibil i ty only to i l lustrate the point), such dorsally-enabled content seems a 
marginal enough feature of visual experience that we could sti l l cla im that the action-





We began this chapter with a brief review of sensorimotor theories of perception, then 
surveyed the evidence for the dual systems theory of visual processing.  I argued that the 
DVS evidence gives us good reason to think that conscious vision is especia l ly implicated 
in providing information about the enduring and objective properties of objects, and tied to 
capacities for memory and action-planning, each in a way that motion-guiding vision is 
not.  Next, we considered the compatibil i ty of DVS and the sensorimotor view, and I 
argued against several different attempts to demonstrate the direct incompatibil i ty of the 
two theories – Jacob fa i ls to demonstrate that sensorimotor theory is committed to an 
action-guiding role for conscious vision that would place it in tension with DVS (as does 
Block, though this point is less central to his treatment), Block’s DVS-inspired arguments 
against sensorimotor theory are inconclusive, and Clark focuses his criticism on a feature of 
sensorimotor theory of which we had independent reason to be suspicious, and which we 
can consistently reject.  However, in section four, I argued that DVS has stronger affinities 
with the action-space theorist’s contention that perceptual experience consists in a grasp of 
the practical consequences of perception than the sensorimotor theorist’s contention th a t 
perceptual experience consists in a grasp of the perceptual consequences of action.  I argued 
that when viewed in the context of the debate between these two theories, we see that the 
real challenge to sensorimotor theory from DVS is the possibil i ty that a grasp of 
sensorimotor relations is of only instrumental importance in an account of perception – 
important insofar as it contributes to a perceiver’s grasp of the practical consequences of 
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perception.  Finally, we considered the objection that our inferences from the DVS data to 
conclusions about the functions of conscious vision were too hasti ly drawn.  I argued that we 
have prima facie reasons to trust our interpretation of the data that suffice to put the 
burden of proof on those who would argue that the processing of the dorsal stream can have 
an upshot in conscious experience, and that the sorts of experiences the information-
processing of the dorsal stream could plausibly support form, at best, a marginal subset of 
what we standardly mean by ‘visual experience’.   
 
The conclusions of this chapter, then, are that the DVS data suggests that conscious vision 
involves an abil i ty to integrate ones perceptual sensitivity to the objective properties in 
one’s environment with reasoning and planning, and that this data gives us empirical 
reason to favour the action-space approach over the sensorimotor view.  Next, I consider 
some puzzling cases in the domain of colour-perception, and argue that we can draw the 
same conclusions there. 
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Chapter 3: Special Spectacles, Synaesthetic Sensations and the Action-Space Theory 
 
 
In the last chapter I argued that the DVS data meshes well with the action-space 
theorist’s view of the relationship between action and conscious perception as sketched in 
1.5 and 1.6.  Thus, if we wish to use the DVS data to motivate some form of enactivism, we 
should favour the action-space view over the sensorimotor view.  Moreover, if we can 
provide independent reasons for adopting an action-space theory of conscious vision then 
the empirical support that DVS affords the action-space view will be strengthened – the 
action-space account wil l be an independently plausible theory of visual experience tha t 
can predict and explain the dissociations uncovered by the DVS data, rather than one 
among several possible views of conscious vision that are consistent with that data.  Th is 
chapter makes a start on providing such reasons64.  It is divided into two main sections.  In 
the first, I argue that the action-space theory is better equipped to deal with certa in 
puzzle cases than the sensorimotor view – firstly, adaptation to colour-distorting goggles, 
and secondly, the perception of synaesthetic sensations.  I begin by going over the key 
features of Petti t’s (2003) account of colour looks, drawing paralle ls with the action-space 
approach, then argue that such an account can deal with each case, unlike the sensorimotor 
view.  As with our discussion of the DVS results, our overall moral wil l be tha t 
sensorimotor dynamics look to play at best an instrumental role in an account of perceptual 
experience.  The second section pools the resources of the discussions of these cases and the 
results in the last chapter to formulate our first pass at an action-space theory, and 






3.1 Sifting, Sorting and Seeing 
 
We briefly discussed Petti t’s (2003) account of colour looks in 1.5 and 1.6.  It is time to give 
i t a fuller treatment.  Petti t’s discussion centres around two competing accounts of what it is 
                                                
64 Subsequent chapters continue this task – chapter four consists in a detailed discussion of 
what the action-space account should say about colour experience.  Chapter five clarif ies a 
key feature of our account – the requirement that the actions which a perceiver takes to be 
enabled must be apt for integration with her practical reasoning to issue in conscious 
experience.  Finally, chapter six argues that the action-space account suggests how we 
might tackle the problem of the explanatory gap with which we began in chapter one. 
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for an object to look red (or any colour)65.  Firstly, according to what Pettit ca l ls ‘the qual ia 
theory’, an object looks red (has a red look) to a perceiver iff it produces a red quale in the 
perceiver – that is, iff it effects a state in the perceiver such that:  
 
i)  The way the object looks to the perceiver is independent (at least in 
principle) of the perceptual abil i ties typically enabled by an object’s 
having such a look, such as sifting that object from differently-coloured 
objects, sorting it into the same category as similarly-coloured objects and 
tracking it over time, al l on the basis of its apparent colour. 
i i )  The way the object looks is ‘manifest’ for perceivers – they experience the 
object as looking that way. 
i i i )  The object manifestly enables the above perceptual abil i ties – perceivers 
see the look as “inviting relevant contrasts and comparisons: they make 
those contrasts and comparisons as responses that the look extracts from 
them; they don’t just find themselves disposed to make them, they know 
not why.” (Ibid, p.226)66 
 
Such an account has its merits – points ii) and ii i ) (or perhaps a sl ightly weakened version 
of the third point) appear to be truisms about colour perception, and qualia theorists wi l l 
argue that i) looks like a truth about our experience – we might have the intuition that i t 
is possible in principle to have an experience with the phenomenal quality of redness, but 
in the absence of the discriminatory abil i ties that are usually characteristic of such an 
experience67.  However, as Petti t notes, we might be suspicious of the fact that such a 
theory appears to rule out the compatibil i ty of the ‘minimal naturalism’ with which we 
began chapter one and our account of colour experience.  As Lewis (1995) argues, it seems 
plausible that the folk-psychological conception of qualia 68 entails that they are known in 
their essence by their subjects – thus, if a subject’s quale is subserved by a particular neural 
signature but the subject knows nothing about that signature, then the signature is, at best, 
an incidental property of that quale.  Given that a subject can have a quale without 
                                                
65 Pettit is concerned with a sense of ‘looking red’ that reflects the way the perceiver takes 
the object to appear (not necessari ly the way the perceiver takes the object to in fact be 
coloured) (see Ibid, p.221-222). 
66 It seems likely that a defender of qualia would question whether this is a necessary 
condition on a subject having a red quale (Petti t in fact says only that looks are ‘a lmost 
a lways’ credited with the three properties above by qualia theorists (p.226)).  However, 
they should agree that this condition is typically met by perceivers. 
67 Or to have such abil i ties without the associated experience – recall the zombie and 
inverted spectrum arguments from 1.1. 
68 Insofar as there is such a thing – see Lewis (1995) for a very nice discussion of these issues, 
on which the present paragraph draws. 
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knowing anything about its physical or functional underpinnings, such underpinnings are 
a l l inessentia l properties of that quale.  And, since the first point of our definition above 
entails that qualia are essentia l ly independent of their typical functionally specifiable 
consequences, qualia have been severed of al l essentia l ties to features in terms of which we 
might give a naturalistica l ly acceptable account of them69.  Additionally, Pettit notes 
that such a conception of qualia wil l make it impossible to resist the modal arguments we 
considered in 1.1 – so long as qualia are conceived as essentia l ly independent of their 
physical underpinnings or associated effects, there wil l be no obstacle to conceiving of 
physically identical situations with differing distributions of qualia. 
 
In light of the metaphysical commitments of the qualia theory, Petti t defends an 
a lternative, dispositional account of an object’s looking red to a perceiver.  On Pettit’s 
view, the explanatory direction employed by the qualia theorist is reversed.  According to 
the qualia theorist, the quale by means of which the subject sees that an object looks red 
explains the subject’s abil i ty to sift, sort and track the object on the basis of its look.  Pett i t 
argues instead that the ways that perceivers are enabled to sift, sort and track an object by 
their perceptual sensitivity to the microphysical properties that subserve its colour fully 
explain the way the object looks to them.  To motivate this possibil i ty, Pettit invites us to 
consider the way a ball moving quickly through the air looks: 
  
“Is there an effect- independent way it looks such that we might imagine that look 
being absent – that ‘fastish’ looks, as we might say – when we remain visual ly 
inclined to judge that the ball is going fast, or being present when we become 
visually inclined to judge that the ball is moving slowly?  Surely not.  All tha t 
happens is that the ball has a look that is essentia l ly tied to the effect of inducing 
in you a judgement ‘It’s going fast!’ and, no doubt more primitively, certa in 
reaching and ducking responses.” (Ibid. p.229) 
 
Pettit’s thought is that we should think of an object’s looking red in this way.  Thus, when 
an object looks red,  
 
                                                
69  I’m puzzled as to how best to interpret Pettit’s th inking here.  He endorses Lewis’s 
account of the connection between qualia and anti-physicalism, but fai ls to say why h is 
definition of qualia (points i)- i i i ) above) entails the thought that qualia are known to 
subjects in their essence.  The reading of ‘manifest’ required for the natural suggestion tha t 
this fa l ls out of i i) seems to create a tension between i) and ii i).  The most plausible 
solution available to Petti t seems to me to be to drop ii i) as a necessary requirement.  We 
should certa inly agree with Petti t’s conclusion, though – that the traditional way of 
construing qualia renders them incompatible with physicalism. 
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“The way it looks is exhausted in the character the perceived object has as 
something that manifestly gives rise to certa in effects. […] The object looks red so 
far as it manifestly enables you to sift and sort and track it in the red-appropria te 
manner, and so to make corresponding judgements; it looks red so far as you see it as 
extracting those responses from you.” (Ibid. p.229-230) 
 
The intuitive response is that such a proposal gets matters backwards; that the abil i ties 
Pettit a l ludes to are not the basis of our visual experience – rather, those abil i ties are 
based upon that experience.  But Petti t’s account, and the action-space account we are 
developing, does not credit this intuition.  As Petti t clarif ies,  
 
“The idea is that perceptual exposure to a red object tunes us in a way that enables 
us to sift, sort, track and so on, and that this tuning occurs ‘behind our back’; it occurs 
in virtue of the brain’s responses to the perceptual input at a subpersonal level .  
What we become aware of in the experience of something red presupposes tha t 
those subpersonally induced responses are in place; the red look of the object is the 
look it has so far as the perceived object is registered as enabling – as having 
already enabled – those responses…” (Ibid. p.232) 
 
Pettit is not absolutely clear about what he takes to be the importance of such an appeal to 
the automatic, subpersonal enabling of the abil i ties he wishes to emphasise70, but I take 
i ts uti l i ty to lie in undermining the supposed obviousness of the intuitive response above.  
Presumably, such a response is motivated by reflection on our experience – it seems 
introspectively obvious to us that our dispositions with respect to colour are grounded in our 
colour experience, not vice-versa.  However, once it has been emphasised that the 
dispositions to be appealed to are automatically and subpersonally enabled ‘behind our 
back’ (as opposed to being the sort of considered and reflective judgements about how things 
look to us that we can and do make), it is no longer clear that the question of whether the 
enabled abil i ties ground our experience or vice-versa can be easi ly settled by introspection.  
                                                
70 He goes on to say that this is in accord with much of what we know about how the brain 
works – that perceived objects can have effects on us without our knowing it.  However, he 
i l lustrates this with the DVS finding that perception of certa in il lusions enables accurate 
grip-scaling which confl icts with what subjects claim to know about the objects being 
grasped, concluding that the way perceiving an object enables us to act is not always routed 
via our experience.  Whilst this is correct, his choice of example looks unfortunate in that 
the enabled grip-scaling abil i ties here have no apparent upshot in conscious experience, 
and so look l ike a counterexample to the approach Pettit advocates.  One way in which 
the action-space account under construction here goes beyond Petti t’s approach is in 
suggesting an account of why some enabled actions have an upshot in experience whi lst 
others do not. 
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Perhaps the intuitive position is that our experience enables us to sift, sort and track objects 
on the basis of our experience – but how would it seem, introspectively, if the appropriate 
enabling of those abil i ties were al l there was to our having a certa in experience, as Pett i t 
suggests?    If this were the case, we would have the same experience, that poised us to 
perform the same range of perceptual discriminations and behaviours, but without 
necessari ly judging explicitly that those are discriminations and behaviours currently 
enabled for us.  It doesn’t seem obvious to me that there should be a clearly introspectible 
difference between these options.  The intuitive response, then, does not give us sufficient 
reason to discount the possibil i ty of Pettit’s proposal. 
 
So, if Pettit’s proposal is to be rejected, it must be rejected for other reasons.  Perhaps it is 
implausible to think that appeal to a range of enabled abil i ties could ground or explain our 
experience, either because the abil i ties appealed to are too sparse and simple an 
explanans to plausibly explain the explanandum of phenomenal experience, or because 
they are poor candidates to meet the constraints on a solution to the explanatory gap we set 
out in chapter one.  Or perhaps there is insufficient reason other than the metaphysica l 
extravagances of the qualia theory to adopt such a view.  Both such points are addressed 
in the rest of this thesis – the question of how the action-space account (of which I take 
Pettit’s position to be an instance) can provide a solution to the explanatory gap is 
addressed in detail in chapter six.  In the next two sections, I try to give independent 
reasons for adopting Petti t’s view of the relationship between action and perception by 
showing that it can give plausible accounts of two puzzling cases of colour perception. 
 
 
3.2 Special Spectacles 
 
The first case I want to consider is one that Petti t cites himself as support for his view.  
Interestingly, it is a lso cited by Hurley (1998) and Hurley and Noë (2007) in support of 
their sensorimotor positions. I wil l argue that the case supports the action-space view, but 
not the sensorimotor theory.  Kohler (1964) conducted a series of experiments involving 
adaptation to colour-distorting goggles. In these experiments, subjects wore goggles with 
vertical ly-bisected lenses, each of which had a blue-tinted left half and a yellow-tinted 
right half.  Upon initia l donning of these goggles, subjects’ colour experiences and the ir 
colour naming and categorising behaviours were predictably disrupted.  A uniformly whi te 
wall would appear half blue and half yellow when the subject looked directly at it, or 
completely yellow or blue when looked at through the appropriate half of the goggles.  
However, after several weeks of wearing the goggles, subjects’ experiences and colour 
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categorisations returned to normal – the distorting effects of the goggles had somehow been 
compensated for.  For example, one subject reports that, by the 36th day of wearing the 
goggles “Even though a great variety of yellow and blue stimuli are transmitted by my 
spectacles and keep impinging on my fovea, I no longer experience the corresponding colour 
sensations,” and that by the 46th day, “If I look first at the blue part and then at the 
yellow part of my visual f ield, the latter does not increase in intensity no matter how long 
I have looked at the former” (Kohler (1964), p.111-112). The subjective reports of 
participants were borne out by a test requiring the subjects to adjust a colour wheel to a 
neutral shade of grey, using a button that varied the colour of the wheel between shades of 
blue, yellow, and neutral grey.  The initia l donning of the goggles predictably disrupted 
the subjects’ abil i ties to perform this task, but after adaptation they could perform the 
task with similar proficiency to their attempts before the goggles were put on (Ibid, p.106, 
114).  When the goggles were removed, subjects experienced the opposite sort of distortion 
in their colour perception to that which occurred when the goggles were first donned – in 
this case, the left half of the visual fie ld was experienced as tinted yellow, and the right 
ha lf as tinted blue.  For example, Kohler reported that  “Whenever I open up a book, I am 
amazed to find that the left page looks yellow, and that it looks white with a bluish 
tinge as soon as I turn it over to the right,” and that “When I take a walk, I am always 
conscious of a peculiar glare on my left, as if someone carrying a lighted candle were 
accompanying me; on my right, nothing of this kind occurs” (Ibid, p.115).  Over time, th is 
distortion also fades away, and subjects’ colour perceptions return to normal. 
 
What do these results tel l us about the relationsh ip between action and perception?  
Hurley and Noë (2007) attempt to account for these results on behalf of the sensorimotor 
theory by cla iming that: 
 
‘The sensorimotor expectancies characteristic of particular colours rela te 
ultimately to the underlying invariant patterns of dependency of sensation on 
movement, and these do not change when the goggles are worn. But they are given 
new clothing, a transformed implementation, and as a result the perceiver’s 
understanding of them is disrupted unti l his expectations have adjusted to this new 
implementation and related it to the underlying invariant patterns.’ (Hurley and 
Noë (2007), p9-10) 
 
The idea is that the sameness of experience before the goggles are donned and after 
adaptation has occurred is explained by the subject’s sensitivity to an underlying invariant 
sensorimotor dependence between perception and movement.  The goggles disrupt th is 
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sensitivity by giving this dependence a ‘new implementation’ which is fi l tered out, or 
compensated for, over the course of the adaptation.  So, to adequately account for these 
results, the sensorimotor theorist must make it plausible that colour perception is a matter 
of understanding some kind of dependence of perception upon movement, and that, at some 
appropriate level of description, that dependence is largely identical before the goggles 
are donned, and after the goggles have been adapted to, thus explaining the similari ty 
between pre-goggles and post-adaptation stages of the experiment.  They will explain the 
distortion in colour experience by pointing towards the obvious distortion in the 
dependencies between perception and movement once the goggles are donned (saccading 
right makes everything appear tinted yellow, saccading left makes everything appear 
tinted blue, and keeping eyes sti l l whilst moving one’s head makes a vertical partition 
between yellow and blue-ish portions of the visual field sweep along with one’s head 
movements), but claim that these altered sensorimotor dependencies are somehow 
‘superficia l’ – perceivers learn to see beyond them, to the invariant sensorimotor 
dependencies that obtain through all pre- and post-goggle stages of the experiment, and 
their colour perception adapts to the extent that they manage to do this. 
 
I suggest that sensorimotor theorists face a problem when attempting to specify exact ly 
what the relevant sensorimotor invariant is.  To see th is, f irst recall (from 2.1) that there 
is an ambiguity in the appeal to the dependency of perception on action - the ‘perception’ 
in this dependency admits of a personal- level and a subpersonal-level construal71.  For 
example, a sensorimotor theorist might construe the perceptions that vary according to our 
movement either as subpersonal activity (such as patterns of retinal stimulation, or at 
some higher level of visual processing) or personal level visual experience.  But neither 
such construal can provide the invariant sensorimotor dependence required for an 
explanation of Kohler’s results.   
 
Sensorimotor relations which obtain between perceptual experience and movement are not 
invariant, since these relations clearly change when the goggles are donned (everything 
looks blue when the subject looks left, yellow when she looks right), return to normal over 
the course of adaptation, and change again when the subject removes the goggles.  If we 
restrict our attention to the sensorimotor relations pre-goggles and post-adaptation, we 
find an invariance, but this ignores the disruption and recovery of the original experientia l 
sensorimotor relations which occurs during adaptation, and the second disruption which 
occurs once the goggles are removed.  Specifying the way in which these relations are 
disrupted, recovered, and disrupted again might be a partia l description of the subject’s 
                                                
71 As, we noted, does the ‘action’, though this won’t concern us here. 
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experience through the different stages of the experiment, but it does not give us an 
example of a sensorimotor invariant which we need to appeal to in order to explain the 
adaptation.  So, a sensorimotor invariant cannot be found in the relations between 
perceptual experience and movement, since the relationships between the way things look 
and the perceiver’s movements differ over the different stages of the experiment. 
 
Neither, on the most obvious construal, are sensorimotor relations which obtain between 
subpersonal stimulation and movement invariant, since donning the goggles introduces a 
new dependency between eye and head movements and systematic shif ts in the 
wavelength of light hitting the retina.  This new dependency continues to obtain after 
adaptation has occurred, but the subject’s experience has reverted to the way it was when 
the normal set of dependencies was in place.  On this construal, we have an invariance in 
the stages of adaptation after the goggles are donned.  This might seem heartening for the 
sensorimotor view – it could be that the adaptation process constitutes gradually latching 
on to this new invariance.  But remember that the challenge was to come up with a pattern 
of dependency that was invariant across pre-goggle, adaptation, and post-adaptation 
periods.  Our second construal fa i ls to provide an invariance between the pre and post-
goggle-donning stages.  A sensorimotor invariant cannot be found in the relations between 
retinal stimulation and movement, since these relations change when the goggles are 
donned, remain the same over the course of adaptation, and change once again when the 
goggles are removed.  
 
Perhaps, then, the sensorimotor theory should focus on relations between movement and 
subpersonal goings-on at a level higher than that of retinal stimulation, such as patterns 
of cortical stimulation.  However, the subpersonal processes underpinning colour perception 
are multifarious, and can be described at many different levels – thus, cla iming tha t 
Kohler’s results should be explained by reference to the relations between those processes 
and movement leaves the content of this solution radically underdetermined. 
Additionally, i t would surely be surprising if we found that the relations between 
some portions of subpersonal processing and movement were stra ightforwardly invariant 
throughout the stages of the experiment – visual colour processing consists in transforming 
information in the l ight hitting the retina into information about the colours in the world 
around the perceiver, and when systematic distortions in the relations between the 
character of the l ight hitting the retina and movement are introduced, we would expect 
the character of any processing that codes for those relations to be similarly distorted.  
The suggestion that some such processing might remain invariant over the different stages 
of the experiment would seem to entail that there was some pattern of activity that helps 
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subserve colour perception that remains unchanged even when the l ight hitting the retina 
is dramatically distorted.  The possible function of such processing would be unclear – why 
would the brain employ a coding scheme for colour that was neutral as to whether the 
subject was or was not wearing (a certa in type of) colour-distorting goggles? 
 It seems more likely, then, that any invariant relations between subpersonal 
processing and movement would only be found by focussing on a higher level of abstraction 
than cortical activity or the mechanics of subpersonal processing.  Perhaps the 
sensorimotor theorist should hold that the relations between subpersonal processing and 
movement are systematically distorted when the goggles are donned, but that there is some 
h igher-order similarity between the original set of relations and the relations reflecting 
the distortion introduced by the goggles.  If this is the possibil i ty that the sensorimotor 
theorist wishes to pursue, then we should note firstly that more needs to be said about 
what this higher-order similarity might be if the sensorimotor theorist cla ims to have 
accommodated these results.  For there are indefinitely many ways in which the 
processing/movement relations that obtain over the different stages of the experiment 
might be said to be similar.  They are similar in that they are both sets relations between 
events in the brain and movements of the body, and in that they are both mentioned in th is 
section of this thesis, but clearly higher-order similarities at these levels cannot ground an 
explanation of Kohler’s results.   The sensorimotor theorist thus needs to say more about 
what kind of higher-order similarities they have in mind, and why they are more 
promising candidates than those just mentioned.  Secondly, we must bear in mind that i f 
the explanation of Kohler’s results is to count in favour of sensorimotor theory, the higher-
order similarity must be given in sensorimotor terms.  That is, the property that unites the 
relations between processing and movement over the separate stages of the experiment 
must be the property of perception varying with movement in a certa in way.  If the common 
property were instead (for example) that each set of sensorimotor dependencies al lows the 
perceiver to represent the colours in their environment as being distributed in a certa in 
way, then our theory of colour perception would turn out representationalist rather than 
sensorimotor – the importance of sensorimotor relations would be merely instrumenta l , 
consisting in enabling a certa in representational state in terms of which the content and 
character of the perceiver’s experience was then explained.  It seems, then, that the only 
way the sensorimotor theorist might account for Kohler’s results is to specify a set of high-
level dependencies between perception and movement that is shared by the various sets of 
lower-level dependencies between perception and movement over the different stages of 
the experiment.  However, it is opaque to me what sort of high-level dependencies these 
might be – I have just argued that they cannot be dependencies obtaining between 
movement and experience, retinal stimulation or cortical activity, and nowhere in the 
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development of the sensorimotor theory (to my knowledge) do other possible candidates 
suggest themselves.  It seems, then, that the invariant feature needed to make sense of 
Kohler’s results cannot be specif ied in sensorimotor terms. 
 
Whilst it proves diff icult to even make a case for the possibil i ty of an account of Kohler’s 
results in terms of dependences between perception and movement, an account of those 
results in terms of the abil i ties enabled for perceivers by their colour perception suggests 
i tself fa irly naturally, as Petti t notes72.  According to an action-space theory, what is 
disrupted and restored over the course of the goggle experiment is the range of actions and 
abil i ties enabled for the perceiver by coloured objects.  Before the goggles are donned and 
after adaptation occurs, an identical space of colour discriminations, categorisations and 
judgements are enabled by the subject’s perceptual exposure to a coloured object.  The 
invariance that a l lows the subject to adapt to the disruption of these abil i ties caused by 
the goggles is, on this account, the fact that coloured objects are objectively apt to be sifted, 
sorted, tracked and otherwise categorised and acted upon on the basis of their colour by the 
perceiver in the same way throughout the stages of the experiment.  The goggles disrupt 
the perceiver’s sensitivity to this fact by introducing a new set of sensorimotor dynamics.  
Adaptation consists in compensating for these a ltered dynamics to bring the perceiver’s 
range of colour-related dispositions and intentions – the space of actions elicited from the 
subject by exposure to a coloured object – back into l ine with the way in which colour 
properties are actually distributed in the world.  The degree of similarity between the 
colour experiences of a subject wearing the goggles and her experience before donning the 
goggles is determined by the degree of similarity  between the sets of abil i ties enabled for 
her before and after she donned the goggles.  As we noted, subjects who have adapted to 
the goggles can match and categorise colours with similar proficiency to before the goggles 
were donned – according to the action-space account, the restoration of the set of abil i ties 
characteristic of colour perception is a l l there is to the restoration of veridical colour 
experience.  The ‘intuitive response’ to this proposal, considered in the last section is tha t 
i t gets matters backwards – these abil i ties are restored because of the adaptation of 
subject’s experience, not vice-versa.  But, as argued previously, our introspective evidence is 
neutral between the ‘intuitive’ and action-space approach, so long as we bear in mind that 
the abil i ties we are appealing to are enabled automatically, ‘behind the subject’s back’, as 
opposed to being considered judgements by the subject on their experience.  Considering 
Kohler’s results seems to provide support the action-space view over the intuitive view 
                                                
72 Ibid, p.244-246.  Petti t does not go into much detail  about what the invariant feature 
needed to explain the results could be – what follows is my own view on behalf of the 
action-space theorist. 
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that colour categorisations are made on the basis of essentia l ly effect- independent qualia – 
if we suppose instead that colour experiences are essentia l ly tied to the abil i ties 
associated with them, the concurrent adaptation of colour experience and colour 
categorisation behaviour can be readily explained.  Conversely, as Petti t notes,  
 
“Short of positing an independently unexplained mobil i ty in qualia, the qualia 
theory would naturally predict that after wearing the glasses for a suitable 
period, people would report that whilst the bluish and yellowish tints introduced 
by the glasses remained in place – whilst the distorted qualia remained in position 
– they had now learned to be very good at a l lowing for the change in making 
judgements on the colour of things; they had learned to recondition their 
judgemental responses to the altered qualia.” (Ibid. p.244-245) 
 
Moreover, our discussion suggests that another moral to be drawn from Kohler’s results is 
that knowledge of sensorimotor relations is of only instrumental importance in explaining 
the content and character of visual experience.  Implicit knowledge of sensorimotor 
relations might be part of what is involved when we come to know the nature and extent of 
the actions our perceptual sensitivity to our environment puts us in a position to perform.  
But Kohler’s results imply that a range of very different sensorimotor backdrops are 
consistent with a perceiver’s abil i ty to grasp that she is in such a position.  Those results 
thus suggest that the character of experience is fixed by the space of actions that are 
perceptually enabled for a perceiver at a time, not by our familiarity with whatever 
sensorimotor dependencies such enabling may involve.   The way things look to perceivers 
over the stages of Kohler’s experiment reflects what they take themselves to be able to do 
on the basis of their perception, not what they know they could perceive as a result of 
their actions73.  We should conclude, then, that Kohler’s results support the action-space 
approach to perceptual experience. 
 
 
3.3 Synaesthetic Sensations 
 
                                                
73 Note that this section has not a imed at a full account of Kohler’s results on behalf of the 
action-space approach.  Doing so would require an of the invariant feature which explains 
the adaptation, and of the abil i ties which the experiences enabled by perceptual 
sensitivity to that feature are cla imed to consist in.  The further discussion of colour 
experience in the next chapter goes some way towards fulf i l l ing these aims.  However, for 
my purposes here (adjudicating between the action-space and sensorimotor views), the 
above outline of an action-space treatment of Kohler’s results wil l suffice. 
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The next puzzle case I want to consider is synaesthetic colour experience.  Like Kohler’s 
results, this case is discussed by Hurley and Noë (2007) – however, they argue there th at 
synaesthetic experience presents a potentia l ly fata l counterexample to both sensorimotor 
and action-space approaches to perceptual experience.  I want to suggest that eschewing an 
emphasis on sensorimotor relations in favour of an emphasis on perceptually enabled 
abil i ties suggests how we might give an account of synaesthetic colour perception, and thus 
that synaesthetic colour experience constitutes another case that suggests we should prefer 
the action space approach to the sensorimotor view. 
 
Synaesthesia is a condition where veridical sensations of one type are accompanied by 
sensations of another type – for example certa in sounds, words or names can be accompanied 
by sensations of taste74.  In colour-grapheme synaesthesia, words or numbers are associated 
with sensations of specif ic colours.  In colour-phoneme, or coloured-hearing synaesthesia , 
certain sounds are accompanied by sensations of colour (photisms).  The manner in which 
photisms are experienced varies with different subjects and different varieties of 
synaesthesia.  Some synaesthetes report experiencing a generic coloured shape, or a 
coloured visual image of the word or letter being seen or heard.  The photism may be 
experienced as non-localised, overla id upon or fi l l ing a visually presented letter, “bound to 
the sound” of an aurally presented one, or located upon an invisible plane located at arms 
reach (Grossenbacher and Lovelace (2001)). Three points about synaesthetic experiences 
are particularly important for our purposes here.  Firstly, synaesthetic sensations are 
genuine features of the experience of synaesthetes (as the results to be considered below 
il lustrate) – genuine synaesthetes are not speaking metaphorically, or delusional, when 
they cla im that they experience (for example) letters as accompanied by specif ic colours.  
Secondly, synaesthetic colours are experienced as of the same phenomenal type as 
veridical colour sensations – synaesthetic green is experienced as phenomenally similar to 
veridical green, rather than somehow sui generis.  Thirdly, synaesthetes nonetheless 
automatically know that their synaesthetic experiences aren’t real – they do not mistake 
synaesthetic experiences for experiences of real, worldly coloured things.   
 
The problem posed for the sensorimotor theorist by synaesthetic colour perception is that 
whilst, for the sensorimotor theorist, phenomenal looks are ultimately explained by 
reference to our sensorimotor knowledge and expectancies, synaesthetic colour looks seem to 
                                                
74 The opening lines to Bob Dylan’s ‘Chimes of Freedom’ are evocative of the running-
together of different modalities that characterises synaesthesia: “Far between sundown’s 
finish, and midnight’s broken toll/We ducked inside a doorway, thunder crashing/As 
majestic bells of bolts struck shadows in the sounds/Seeming to be the chimes of freedom 
flashing”. 
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constitute an example of similar phenomenology75 (that of, e.g., veridical green and 
synaesthetic green) with different sensorimotor knowledge and expectancies implicated in 
each case.  The sensorimotor theorist wishes to explain the phenomenology of a veridica l 
perception of a green object in terms of our sensorimotor knowledge of how our sensations 
wil l change as we move around it, expectations about how sensations would change in a 
variety of similar and different l ighting conditions, and generally, the range of 
sensorimotor skil ls implicated by our perception of the coloured object.  This strategy does 
not seem to work for (e.g. coloured-hearing) synaesthetic sensations76.  Firstly, ta lk of 
sensorimotor skil ls implicated by a synaesthetic sensation seems misplaced, since there is 
no worldly object for the subject to perceptually engage and interact with.  More 
importantly, synaesthetes lack the kind of expectancies about how their photism wil l 
change as they move around and as lighting and other perceptually relevant conditions 
differ in terms of which sensorimotor theorists might naturally explain colour experience77.  
Rather, synaesthetes are aware that the expectancies appropriate to worldly colours do 
not apply to their photisms, and the fact that they never mistake photisms for worldly 
colours suggests that this awareness is automatic and non-inferentia l.  It would thus seem 
implausible for the sensorimotor theorist to respond that synaesthetes implicitly take the 
same range of expectancies to be appropriate to synaesthetic and veridical colours, whilst 
realising on an intellectual level that this is not so – were this the case, we would expect 
synaesthetes to occasionally absent-mindedly mistake photisms for worldly colours, 
which they do not appear to do.  It seems plausible that even the synaesthetes’ implicit 
sensorimotor expectancies concerning the behaviour of synaesthetic colours differ from the 
corresponding expectancies concerning worldly colours.   
 
So, because of the lack of commonality between the sensorimotor profi les of the two 
phenomenologically similar types of sensation, it seems that the sensorimotor view lacks 
the resources to explain this similarity.  Thus, Hurley and Noë concede: 
                                                
75 It seems that there must be some difference in phenomenology, since synaesthetes 
automatically differentiate synaesthetic colour sensations from veridical ones.  However, 
as we see below, the challenge for the sensorimotor view is to account for the commonalities 
between synaesthetic and veridical experience, rather than the differences. 
76 Hurley and Noë put the challenge to their account in terms of coloured-hearing 
synaesthesia, but the problem generalises to any synaesthetic experience where the subject 
apparently fa i ls to have sensorimotor expectations concerning their synaesthet ic 
sensation.  In the positive story I give on behalf of the action-space view, I focus chief ly on 
colour-grapheme synaesthesia, since that is the form most widely discussed in the 
empirical l i terature.  In this and the next chapter I focus only on the way the action-space 
account should treat colour experience – however, in the concluding chapter I brief ly 
suggest how the action-space account could be extended to 
77 The next chapter contains a more detailed discussion of possible sensorimotor approaches 
to colour perception. 
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“…in the case of synaesthesia, pretty well the whole set of hunter-gatherer 
powers and sensorimotor expectancies associated with normal colour looks is 
missing.  Not only can synaesthetic colours not actually be used to guide hunting 
and gathering, but synaesthetic colour experience does not generate expectations 
that sensations wil l vary with movement, with l ight, with background, or any of 
the normal sensorimotor expectations that perceptual experience of colour 
generates.  It is a truly hard case for the hunter-gatherer perspective.” (Hurley 
and Noë (2006), p.22) 
 
They conclude that further work, looking into the neural basis of synaesthetic sensations is 
required to determine whether the hunter-gatherer perspective can meet the challenge 
from synaesthesia. 
 
However, whilst synaesthetic sensations constitute a damaging counterexample to 
sensorimotor views, I argue now that an action-space view is well-equipped to give an 
account of them.  For although the sensorimotor relations and expectations characteristic 
of synaesthetic sensations differ markedly from those characteristic of veridica l 
sensations, there seem to be significant commonalities in the range of abil i ties enabled by 
veridical and synaesthetic colour sensations.  The empirical l i terature on synaesthesia 
makes a compell ing case that synaesthetes’ abil i ti es to sift, sort, track, categorise, re-
identify, and otherwise use their photisms based upon their apparent colours are highly 
similar to the corresponding abil i ties enabled for perceivers by perceptual sensitivity to 
veridical colours.  I want to suggest that an enactive theory can appeal to these 
commonalities to account for the similarity of synaesthetic and veridical colours, and thus 
that reflection on the case of synaesthesia gives us another reason to favour the action-
space over the sensorimotor view. 
 
The first and most simple example of such a commonality is the way in which synaesthetes 
categorise and re-identify synaesthetic colours in the same ways as veridical ones. Baron-
Cohen found that the detailed verbal descriptions of synaesthetes’ photisms were 100% 
consistent over separate tria ls, compared to the 17% consistency of control subjects (cited in 
Smilek and Dixon (2002), p.2).  Similarly, synaesthetes have shown consistency in 
matching the colour of their photisms to very specifica l ly coloured chips over successive 
tria ls (Ramachandran and Hubbard (2003)).  This suggests that synaesthetic colours stand 
in relations of similarity and difference to each other comparable to the relations between 
worldly colours – synaesthetes verbally describe and categorise the colours of the ir 
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photisms in the same way as they would worldly colours, and can place synaesthet ic 
colours in relations of similarity and difference to worldly colours78.  As we shall see in the 
next chapter, such enabled abil i ties to place colours within a network of similarity and 
difference relations on the basis of perceptual sensitivity are a key feature of the action-
space account of colour experience.   
 
That capacities to classify and discriminate between synaesthetic colours are similar or 
identical to those implicated in veridical colour perception are involved in synaesthetic 
perception is a lso suggested by Ramachandran and Hubbard’s (2001) demonstration of pop-
out effects for synaesthetic colours79.  In these experiments, colour-grapheme synaesthetes 
are shown an array of “5”s and “2”s, with the “5”s forming a shape (such as a triangle) 
against the background of “2”s.  Because the synaesthetes see the numbers as different 
colours, the triangle wil l quickly “pop-out” for them, whereas non-synaesthetes take 
significantly  longer to discern the location and shape of the “2”s within the “5”s.  Th is 
suggests that capacities to detect boundaries and contrasts in colour, and to appropriate ly 
integrate and uti l ise this information in perceptual activities, are present in synaesthetic 
experience as in veridical experience.  Similarly, Palmeri et a l (2002) found that the 
synaesthete they studied was a ided in a visual search task when the target letter had a 
differently coloured photism to the surrounding objects80. 
  
Conversely, Smilek and Dixon (2002, p.9) have demonstrated interference effects for 
synaesthetic photisms.  They showed that colour-grapheme synaesthetes are slower at 
identifying a black letter placed on a background of the same colour as its photism than 
when the background is of a different colour to the photism.  This suggests that the 
abil i ties to easi ly sift a coloured object from an incongruently coloured backdrop but not 
                                                
78 Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001, p.5) cla im that “Synaesthetes often report ‘odd’ or 
weird colours they cannot see in the real world but see only in association with numbers”.  
The other work I cite here makes no mention of this fact, but the account of ‘impossible’ 
colours I give in the next chapter suggests how an action-space approach might account for 
this – I return to this point there. 
79 However, Edquist et a l (2006) fai led to obtain similar results – see Edquist et a l for 
discussion.  Thanks to Susan Hurley for bringing this work to my attention.  A salient 
difference between the search tasks studied by Ramachandran and Edquist might be th a t 
Ramachandran demonstrated pop-out for a pattern of photisms against a background of 
distracters, whereas Edquist et al fa i led to find pop-out effects for a single photism against 
such a background.  I won’t attempt to settle this dispute here, though - if synaesthetic 
pop-out does not occur, the other results surveyed in this section seem to me sufficient to 
make a case for an action-space approach to synaesthetic photisms nonetheless. 
80 Though cf. Sagiv et a l (2006), who report a study that suggests that synaesthet ic 
photisms have no significant influence on performance in certa in visual search tasks. 
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from a similarly coloured one is the same (or similar) for synaesthetic and veridical colour 
sensations. 
 
Other similarities in SST-abil i ties are suggested by stroop effects.  In the colour-grapheme 
synaesthetic stroop effect, when a synaesthete attempts to state the (veridical) colour of a 
target letter their performance is impaired if the target colour is incongruent with the 
colour of their photism (Rich and Mattingley (2002), p.47-8).  A variant of this for 
coloured-hearing synaesthesia is Gray’s “Alien Colour Effect” – the abil i ty of coloured-
hearing synaesthetes to name ink colours is disrupted when the sound of the name of tha t 
colour has a photism with a different colour (cited in Hurley and Noë (2007), p.12).  The 
extent of these effects is what we would expect if a subject were to have a veridica l 
sensation of a colour whilst trying to name an incongruent colour.  Thus it seems that 
synaesthetic and veridical sensations can disrupt some of our perceptual abil i ties in the 
same way.  Hurley and Noë reject the suggestion that this result could be used to defend the 
hunter-gatherer perspective, since “…it is not plausible to claim that naming powers and 
expectations alone unite normal and synaesthetic colour looks” (Ibid, p.23). We can agree 
with this, yet sti l l appeal to the al ien colour effect results as providing evidence for the 
similarity of enabled abil i ties characteristic of synaesthetic and veridical sensations.  
Firstly, contra Hurley and Noë, we are not appealing to disruption of naming effects as the 
sole common ground between synaesthetic and veridical sensations.  Secondly, unlike the 
sensorimotor theorist, we are not committed to specifying the common ground between 
synaesthetic and veridical sensations in sensorimotor terms.  The disruption of perceptual 
categorisation abil i ties which occurs during the a l ien colour effect is just the sort of 
commonality to which the action-space account can appeal81. 
  
In the same way, the action-space account can appeal to priming effects – synaesthetes can 
state the colour of a patch presented to them more quickly if it is preceded by presentation 
of a stimulus with a congruently coloured photism.  Incongruently coloured photisms impair 
their abil i ty to give the colour of the patch (Smilek and Dixon (2002), p.7-8).  Again, the 
action-space account suggests that this is not merely a disruption in verbal abil i ties, but of 
the perceptually-enabled abil i ties of synaesthetes to identify and classify stimuli.  And 
again, the nature and extent of the disruption is the same as we would expect from 
veridical colour priming effects, suggesting commonalities between the sets of perceptual ly 
enabled actions characteristic of synaesthetic and veridical colours. 
                                                
81 Note that we should not think of the a l ien colour effect as a mere disruption of verbal 




In light of al l these results, an empirical prediction of the action-space approach might be 
that the extent to which the colours of photisms enhance or interfere with synaesthetes 
performances in search or classif ication tasks, or to which priming or stroop effects are 
found is sensitive to the relations of similarity and difference between the colours involved 
in a comparable way to the corresponding effects with  veridical colours.  For example, pop-
out effects wil l be less marked and interference effects more marked if there is a red 
photism against a background of pink distracters than if there is a red photism against a 
background of green distracters.  Likewise, priming effects wil l be more pronounced the 
closer the colour of the priming photism is to the colour of the patch to be subsequently 
named.  The action-space account explains the similarity of synaesthetic and veridica l 
colour experience by appeal to the similariti es between the sets of abil i ties 
characteristical ly enabled by each type of experience.  Thus, the action-space account 
predicts that, to the extent that synaesthetic and veridical colours are experienced as 
similar, the differences in influence of different combinations of colours on perceptual 
abil i ties i l lustrated in the search, classif ication, priming and stroop results surveyed 
above will be similar for both veridical and synaesthetic colours. 
 
Do some of these results support the action-space view more than others?  It is perhaps 
worth noting that there is some controversy over whether the processing responsible for 
synaesthetic photisms is pre-attentive or not – does attention have to be directed upon a 
grapheme before its photism is experienced?  Of the results surveyed above, 
Ramachandran and Hubbard’s demonstration of pop-out effects, Palmeri et al’s 
demonstration that incongruent photisms aid visual search, and some of the priming and 
interference effects demonstrated by Smilek and Dixon look to support the hypothesis tha t 
synaesthetic colours can enable certa in abil i ties for the perceiver pre-attentively, 
whereas the other results are consistent with the hypothesis that attention is required 
before any perceptual abil i ties are enabled by synaesthetic colours.  The latter hypothesis 
seems to be supported by Edquist et a l (2006), who also survey other work that suggests th is 
conclusion.  The results that suggest that synaesthetic colours are registered pre-
attentively might seem to provide stronger support for the action-space view – recall the 
intuitive response to the action-space view, that the abil i ties associated with a colour 
experience are enabled on the basis of that experience, rather than serving as the basis of 
that experience.  If some of the abil i ties in terms of which the action-space account wishes 
to explain synaesthetic colour experience are enabled for the subject before they attend to 
the grapheme that induces the photism, it becomes more difficult to press this objection – if 
the abil i ties in terms of which synaesthetic colours are to be explained are enabled 
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automatically, independently of the subject’s awareness of the features that enable them, 
then it cannot be objected that those abil i ties are enabled quasi-inferentia l ly, on the basis 
of the subject’s awareness of such features82.  The findings that suggest that synaesthetic 
colours are registered pre-attentively therefore look particularly good for the action-space 
view. 
 
However, an action-space account of synaesthetic sensations would sti l l be tenable were i t 
to turn out that attention is required for the perception of synaesthetic colours83.  The 
important point for the action-space view is that the abil i ties in terms of which we wish 
to explain the commonalities between synaesthetic and veridical colour experience are not 
enabled on the basis of an already-existent colour experience.  As just noted, this seems 
especia l ly plausible if those abil i ties are enabled before the subject becomes aware of the 
relevant stimulus.  But even if the stimulus must be attended before a synaesthetic photism 
is experienced, it does not fol low that the enabled abil i ties characteristic of th a t 
experience are dependent on it, rather than vice-versa.  Suppose that the relevant 
characters in the display used by Ramachandran and Hubbard to demonstrate 
synaesthetic pop-out must be attended before pop-out occurs – this is sti l l consistent with 
our action-space approach, which could then claim that attention is required before the 
enhanced sifting and sorting abil i ties characteristic of the colour pop-out effect are 
enabled for synaesthetic subjects.  The action-space account would be undermined if it were 
compell ing to suppose that a l l the abil i ties evinced by synaesthetes in the experiments 
discussed above were enabled only by an existing synaesthetic experience – but it the 
results we have considered in this section do not seem to warrant this supposition84.   
 
I conclude that there is evidence suggesting substantia l commonalities between the sets of 
actions enabled by perception of synaesthetic and veridical colours which can be used to 
                                                
82 This point need not rely on the contested (though in my view defensible) assumption th a t 
we only experience what we attend.  It is fa irly uncontroversia l that attention is required 
for a perceived feature to be available as the subject of an inference, or control of 
intentional behaviour.  Thus, the cla im that photisms enable their associated abil i ties 
only inferentially, on the basis of their experienced colours does not square with the cla im 
that those photisms (and the abil i ties in terms of which the action-space view wishes to 
account for them) are registered pre-attentively. 
83 Currently there seems to be no consensus on this issue in the li terature – see Edquist et al 
(2006) for review and discussion. 
84 It might seem natural to suppose that the abil i ties to categorise and re-identify 
synaesthetic colours are enabled on the basis of synaesthetic experience, rather than vice-
versa.  As suggested by the previous sections of this chapter, the action-space account 
denies this, cla iming instead that those abil i ties are a key part of the basis of the colour 
experience.  I made the case that this is a tenable position in discussing the ‘intuitive 
objection’ to the view in 3.1, and in the next chapter we will see further arguments for 
adopting this view of colour experience. 
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explain their phenomenal similarity.  This contrasts with the dissimilarities of the 
sensorimotor profiles of synaesthetic and veridical colours, and the corresponding inabil i ty 
of the sensorimotor theory to explain their similarity85.  Considering synaesthet ic 
sensations constitutes further evidence that visual experience should be explained in terms 
of the abil i ties enabled for a perceiver by their perceptual sensitivity, not in terms of tha t 





Our discussion of the explanatory gap in the first chapter, the DVS results in the second, 
and the ways enactive accounts might accommodate the cases we focused on above give us 
sufficient materia ls to state our first pass at an action-space account of perception.  Here I 
outl ine the view, and recap the evidence in favour of it that we have surveyed thus far.  
I’l l a lso try to further i l lustrate and motivate the view by briefly responding to a range of 
obvious objections.  These are grouped into two categories – objections that cla im that the 
conditions set forth for the action-space account are not necessary for perceptual experience, 
and objections cla iming that those conditions are not sufficient for perceptual experience.  
Bear in mind, however, that the case for the action-space view will continue to emerge 
over subsequent chapters, as the key features of the view and its contribution to a 
dissolution of the explanatory gap are clarif ied. 
 
3.4 The Action-Space Approach 
 
In 1.5 we defined an action-space account of perception as one according to which conscious 
perception is a matter of knowing how what one sees affects what one can do – of 
understanding the practical consequences of movement. We also noted, at that stage 
without argument, that a perceiver’s sensitivity to the actions currently enabled for her by 
the environment must show up not merely in her behaviour, but also in her practical 
reasoning and action planning if that sensitivity is to issue in conscious experience.  In 2.2, 
we saw that a natural interpretation of the DVS results supports this requirement – our 
discussion of the DVS data suggested that capacities to integrate perceptual information 
                                                
85 For what it’s worth, perhaps the above discussion also suggests that our intuitions l ie 
more with the SST than sensorimotor perspective.  Despite the lack of similarity between 
sensorimotor profiles of veridical and synaesthetic sensations, we are sti l l wil l ing to take 
synaesthetes’ reports at face value.  However, I th ink we would be more skeptical i f 
synaesthetes claimed to have rich synaesthetic experiences without any attendant skil ls 
characteristic of colour-perception (i.e. if priming and pop-out effects were absent, 
synaesthetes could not use their photisms to aid memory and cognitive tasks, etc.). 
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with practical reasoning and action-planning were distinctive features of conscious visual 
perception.  The other moral we drew from the DVS data was that conscious experience 
seems especial ly involved in representing objective and enduring properties of objects, 
a l lowing for objects and properties to be identif ied, classified and compared in ways th at 
abstract from certa in details of the perceiver’s current egocentric relations to them.  In 
l ight of our consideration of Petti t’s position in 3.1, and the ways in which it can 
accommodate the puzzle cases of 3.2 and 3.3, the action-space account makes the strong 
cla im that the contents of conscious visual experience be understood in terms of the abil i ties 
enabled for an agent by their perceptual sensitivity to their environment.  Just as I have 
been urging in this chapter that we need not think of the abil i ties characteristic of colour 
perception as based upon an essentia l ly effect-independent colour experience, we should not 
think of the abil i ties to identify, co-classify, compare and so forth that DVS suggests are 
distinctive of experience as enabled on the basis of an essentia l ly effect- independent 
perceptual state.  According to the action-space view, then, conscious experience consists in 
a abil i ties to classify, compare, sift, sort and track certa in objects and features in her 
environment being primed for a subject by her perceptual sensitivity to that environment 
and put in touch with her capacities for practical reasoning and action-planning.  We can 
sum this up by saying that conscious experience is understanding the ways in which one is 
currently poised to act in one’s environment, or knowing poise over a space of actions86. 
 
At this stage, the action-space account wil l doubtless strike the reader as in need of both 
further motivation and elaboration.  Subsequent chapters take up both these tasks, but let 
us review the case that can be made for the action-space approach based on our discussion 
thus far.  The minimal conclusion of our consideration of the DVS results in chapter 2, and 
of the puzzle cases in this section was that we should prefer an action-space theory to a 
sensorimotor account of perception when adjudicating between enactive views.  But our 
discussion has also provided support for the action-space account in its own right.   
We can see the action-space account as developed thus far as consisting of two 
cla ims: firstly, that the content of perceptual experience should be understood in terms of 
abil i ties enabled for the subject by their perceptual sensitivity to their environment; 
secondly that those abil i ties form the basis of a perceptual experience when suitably 
integrated with the subject’s capacities for practical reasoning.  The chief support for the 
first cla im has been our discussion of Petti t’s theory in this chapter, and the account it 
suggests of the cases considered in 3.2 and 3.3.  The most obvious objection to such a cla im 
stems from the intuition that enabled abil i ties are simply not the right kind of explanans 
                                                
86 I owe this locution to (some combination of the influences of) Andy Clark and Tom 
Roberts. 
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for conscious experience.  This intuition might have a number of sources, about al l of which 
the action-space account has something to say.  Perhaps the most obvious is the cla im th at 
the abil i ties associated with an experience are enabled on the basis of that experience, 
rather than the enabling of those abil i ties serving as the basis of the experience.  But as 
we noted at several points above, it is not clear that introspection should be able to cleanly 
adjudicate between these options.  If this is so, the arguments for the action-space construal 
of experience must be assessed on their merits, not ruled out in advance.  Another 
motivation for the objection might be the cla im that the abil i ties enabled for an 
experiencing subject are simply too sparse and coarse-grained to explain something as rich 
and complex as visual experience.  We shall see in detail that this is not so in the next 
chapter’s discussion of colour perception, but we can make a preliminary response on behalf 
of the action-space account here: since the enabled actions we are appealing to include 
capacities to discriminate, sort and track, the grain of the abil i ties that might be enabled 
for a subject wil l coincide with the grain of the perceptual qualities to which the subject is 
sensitive.  It seems natural to suppose that it only makes sense to ascribe perceptual 
sensitivity to some quality to a subject if the presence of that quality has some upshot in 
the possible discriminations and classifications enabled for that subject – it would seem 
unwarranted, for example, to say that a perceiver is sensitive to the difference between 
roundness and squareness if they showed no sensitivity to that difference in their thoughts 
and deeds concerning round and square objects, instead treating those classes of objects 
identically.  For every difference in what a subject perceives, however sl ight, the action-
space account holds that there is a corresponding difference, however slight, in the range 
of abil i ties currently enabled for that subject87. 
 
The second key feature of the action-space account – that the abil i ties enabled for a subject 
by their perceptual sensitivity must be integrated with practical reasoning if they are to 
issue in conscious experience – also bears on the first.  It might be objected that the 
discriminations and classifications to which we the action-space account appeals are not 
‘actions’ in a sufficiently robust sense of the term.  Perhaps they should instead be 
construed as the automatic results of subpersonal processes – as informational states 
registering the presence or absence of a feature, rather than sets of enabled abil i ties.  I 
would l ike to resist this suggestion, and hold that a l l perceptual states should be 
understood in terms of enabled abil i ties, but my main reason for this cla im (apart from its 
good fit with the action-space view) is my endorsement of a general view on mental content 
                                                
87 Further considerations in favour on understanding conscious perception in terms of enabled 
abil i ties come from the arguments in chapter four, where I suggest that such an 
understanding al lows for a good account of colour perception, and chapter six, where I argue 
that such an understanding helps us see how to address the explanatory gap. 
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that space does not a l low me to detail here88.  However, the cla im is in any case not 
mandatory for the action-space view, which might grant that informational states or 
subpersonal processes should not be understood in terms of enabled abil i ties, whilst sti l l 
holding that perceptual experience should.  This is because, according to the action-space 
account, such processes or states contribute to the content and character of a conscious 
experience only when the personal- level abil i ties they enable are apt for integration with 
the agent’s ongoing practical reasoning.  Even if those states and processes have features 
that should not be characterised in terms of enabled abil i ties, the action-space account 
holds that only the features that should be so characterised are relevant to an account of 
conscious experience – subpersonal processing and informational states are only relevant to 
experience insofar is they enable the personal-level abil i ties to discriminate and classify 
to which the action-space account appeals. 
 Our chief motivation for this emphasis on the integrabil i ty of perceptual ly 
enabled skil ls thus far89 is our consideration of the DVS results in 2.2 and 2.4, which 
suggested that an important difference between the information in the dorsal stream 
(which apparently fa i ls to contribute to visual consciousness) and that in the ventral 
stream (which seems especial ly implicated in visual consciousness) is the avai labil i ty of 
the latter information to practical reasoning and action-selection.  The action-space 
account’s gloss on the case of DF il lustrates this requirement.  As we saw in 2.4, the action-
space theorist cla ims that DF reta ins spared perceptual sensitivity to aspects of visual 
form, but that this sensitivity has no upshot in her visual experience since it is not 
automatically apt to be integrated with her capacities for practical reasoning and action-
selection – instead, DF requires a prompt from experimenters, or via inferentia l strategies 
that she has learnt herself if her spared sensitivity is to be put to use in pursuit of her 
current goals. 
 
So, these are the reasons we have seen so far for the view that conscious experience consists 
in an understanding of the practical consequences of perception – of knowing poise over a 
space of actions.  Before rounding off this chapter by considering some objections to the 
proposal not a lready dealt with, let’s look at the diagnoses of two other pathologies of 
consciousness that the action-space account suggests.  Firstly, consider blindsight 90.  
Bl indsighted subjects have no awareness of visual stimuli in some or al l of their visual 
fie ld, yet can, under forced-choice conditions make discriminations well above chance 
                                                
88 See Hurley (1998, ch.8) on the debate between informational and teleological theories of 
content and its relevance to the enactive approach to perception for the sorts of 
considerations I have in mind. 
89 Further advantages of this requirement become apparent in chapters 5 and 6. 
90 See Cowey (2004) for a good review. 
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concerning colour, orientation, shape, motion and (interestingly) the emotional content of 
facia l expressions.  Clearly, subjects reta in substantia l perceptual sensitivity to certa in 
features, but (l ike DF) cannot put this sensitivity to use in their current project of a 
discrimination task (or any relevant projects outwith a laboratory setting) without an 
experimenter’s prompting them to make their discrimination.  According to the action-
space account, the fact that blindsight subjects typically report no conscious experience of 
the features on the basis of which they make their discriminations is explained by the 
fact that the abil i ties enabled by their perceptual sensitivity to those features are not apt 
for integration with their capacities for practical reasoning and action-planning. 
 
Secondly, consider unilateral neglect91.  In this condition, subjects fa i l to report or act upon 
objects and features in one half of their visual field (typically the left half, after right-
hemisphere brain damage) – for example, they might shave only one side of their face, eat 
food on only one side of their plate, or draw only one half of a perceived object, reporting no 
awareness of anything unusual about their actions.  However, despite their inabil i ty to 
report or act upon information from one half of their visual f ield, there is evidence that 
information from that hemi-f ie ld is nonetheless being processed to a substantia l level. For 
example, semantic priming effects have been demonstrated where objects in the neglected 
part of the visual fie ld improve response times to words that are related in meaning to the 
neglected object – a neglected picture of a tree wil l facil i tate a faster response to the word 
‘apple’ than a neglected picture of a bed (McGlinchey-Berroth (1997)).  The action-space 
account suggests that various abil i ties are sti l l enabled by the perceptual sensitivity of 
neglect patients, as evinced by their performance in such tasks, but that these abil i ties 
have no upshot in conscious experience insofar as they fa i l to be apt for integration with 
the subjects ongoing practical reasoning – the perceptual abil i ties cannot be automatical ly 
used to achieve any of the current goals of the subjects, and so fai l to issue in conscious 
experience. 
 
The foregoing discussion, I think, should be enough to at least motivate the conclusion that 
an action-space account is worth pursuing.  I end the chapter by responding to two sorts of 
counterexamples to the action-space approach. 
 
3.5 Two Counter-Examples Countered 
 
I have been arguing that conscious experience is a matter of knowledge of the space of 
actions which one’s current perceptual sensitivity to the environment poises one to perform, 
                                                
91 See McGlinchey-Berroth (1997) for a review. 
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of understanding the practical consequences of perception.  One sort of counter-example to 
such an account would be a case where a subject enjoyed a conscious experience, but did not 
take herself to be able to act upon her environment in the ways that are al legedly 
characteristic of that experience.  This would show that an understanding of the practical 
consequences of perception is not necessary for conscious experience to obtain.  Visual 
ha llucinations and some visual i l lusions look like plausible cases of this sort.  During a 
visual hallucination there need be no physical object present for the agent to physical 
engage with, or to sift, sort, classify or compare in any ways the action-space account might 
wish to emphasise.  Similarly, when a subject stares at a Hermann grid and perceives 
i l lusory grey dots at the intersections of the white l ines, there are no such objects for her to 
interact with.  And, if she is familiar with the i l lusion, it seems that she wil l not take 
herself to be enabled in any ways relating to identifying, tracking or otherwise engaging 
with grey dots, for she knows that there are none present – her grasp of the space of actions 
enabled for her wil l , it seems, include the fact that no actions characteristica l ly 
appropriate to the presence of fuzzy grey dots are in fact on the cards.  In what sense, then, 
is it the case that such experiences involve grasp of the empowerment of suites of actions, 
as required by the action-space approach?  
According to the action-space account, such instances of i l lusion and hallucination 
are cases of misrepresentation. For an agent to be poised over an action-space, and hence for 
her to undergo a conscious experience (be it veridical  or otherwise) is for her to represent 
the fact that certa in possibil i ties for action are suggested by her perceptible environment, 
and to do so in such a way that her grasp of those possibil i ties is apt for integration with 
her capacities for action-planning and practical reasoning. Instances of i l lusion and 
ha llucination on this account are cases where some or a l l of these represented possibil i ties 
fa i l to obtain; where the perceiver’s environment fa ils to conform to the way she 
implicitly takes it to be.  If I hallucinate that there is a pineapple before me, I implicit ly 
take there to be an object that is apt (amongst other things) to be sorted with ovoids and 
edible things, and sifted from spheres and things to be grasped with a precision grip, when 
in fact there is none.  When I perceive the i l lusory dots in the Hermann grid, I implicit ly 
take there to be grey dots that occupy roughly such-and-such a set of points in my 
egocentric space and that are discriminable in shade from both the white of the l ines and 
the black of the squares that surround them, when in fact there are none.  Il lusions and 
ha llucinations, then, are simply cases in which the agent takes herself to be empowered in 
ways that she in fact is not92.  
                                                
92 Consequently, the ‘knowledge’ in ‘knowing poise over a space of actions’, and the 
‘understanding’ in ‘understanding of the practical consequences of perception’ should not be 
thought of as factive. 
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How should this response be squared with cases where the perceiver does not take 
her experience at face value?  When an informed perceiver stares at the Hermann grid, she 
knows that no actions characteristica l ly appropriate to the presence of fuzzy grey dots are 
in fact available to her.  When a perceiver who knows that she is prone to hal lucinate 
pineapples under certa in conditions seems to see a pineapple when those conditions obtain, 
she might not take her perception at face value, and will thus understand that no 
pineapple-pertinent actions are currently available to her.  Nonetheless, in such cases the 
action-space account cla ims that these subjects implicitly take themselves to be 
empowered to act in ways appropriate to grey dots and pineapples, respectively.  Whi lst 
those subjects might judge the dots and pineapples to be absent, this is not how they perceive 
them to be – were they to take their perception at face value, they would indeed assent 
that the actions in terms of which our account wishes to explain these cases were enabled 
for them.  When we look at the Titchener circles or the l ines in the Muller-Lyer i l lusion, 
they are experienced as being different sizes despite our explicit knowledge to the 
contrary.  In the Titchener circles il lusion, picking up one circle looks apt to satisfy goal of 
picking up the biggest circle in our environment, whereas the other does not – this is 
something we automatically understand on the basis of our il lusory perception of the 
relative sizes of the circles.  It is this level of understanding, rather than the intel lectual 
understanding that is sensitive to the fact that the current appearances are il lusory, tha t 
the action-space account appeals to in its explanation of conscious experience.  The space of 
actions which an agent implicitly understands to be enabled can come apart from her 
explicit conceptual judgements about what actions her environment affords.  Thus, when our 
informed perceiver experiences the grey dots at the intersections of the Hermann grid, she 
can implicitly take herself to be able to sift, sort, track and compare the dots in a certa in 
way whilst explicitly judging that there are no objects present that are appropriate for 
such actions93.  
 
A second type of counterexample to our account would be a case where an agent takes 
herself to be poised to act on the environment, and can factor this into her reasoning, 
planning and intention-forming, but apparently without conscious experience arising.  Th is 
would show that understanding the practical consequences of perception was not sufficient 
for conscious experience to obtain.  It might be thought that sleepwalkers constitute such 
                                                
93 In chapter 5 I give a detailed account of how this kind of appeal to practica l 
understanding should be cashed out.  We should note here that the practical understanding 
to which the action-space account appeals is not to be construed as an intel lectual ly 
demanding achievement, requiring language use, or general conceptual abil i ties.  Were i t 
so, many agents who are intuitively seats of conscious experience (such as certa in animals 
and infants) would fai l to be conscious on the action-space view.  These issues are a lso 
addressed in chapter 5. 
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cases94.  Sleepwalkers are capable of navigating their way through an environment and 
even, in some cases, of performing relatively complex tasks such as driving cars or 
attempting to carry out mechanical repairs (Cartwright (2004), p.1152).  Intuitively, these 
are examples of agents acting on the basis of their perceptual sensitivity to the actions 
afforded by the environment, selecting action types and targets appropriately, and 
apparently acting in a goal-directed manner.  If it is correct to describe sleepwalkers as 
perceptually sensitive to the affordances of their environments and able to put th is 
sensitivity to use in achieving a goal, do they constitute a counterexample to the action-
space account? 
One option for the action-space theorist is to cla im that the sleepwalker does in 
fact undergo a conscious experience, but is unable to recall that she has done so (Crisp et a l 
(1990) defend such a view).  The sleepwalker implicitly understands herself to be poised 
over a (probably more l imited than usual) space of actions, and puts this understanding to 
use in achieving some goal, thus satisfying the requirements for conscious experience.  But 
due to some inhibition of the systems on which recall and report depend neither she nor we 
can know about this experience afterwards.  Evidence that suggests sleepwalkers are 
amnesic for a short period after being woken (Cartwright (2004), p.1157) might be taken to 
support this hypothesis by suggesting that the sleepwalker may have conscious 
experiences when asleep just as they do shortly after being awoken, but that each such 
period of conscious experience is unavailable to report and recall. 
A second option is to deny both that the sleepwalker has a conscious experience, 
and that her perceptual situation meets the conditions required by the action-space 
account.  The view that sleepwalkers lack conscious experience perhaps accords best with 
the popular conception of sleepwalking.  It a lso seems significant that the most commonly 
cited sleepwalking behaviours such as wandering around, performing a menial household 
task, and even driving, appear to be behaviours that waking subjects can perform with 
minimal conscious awareness.  The action-space account could perhaps be squared with a 
denial that sleepwalkers have conscious experience by pointing to discrepancies between 
the ways in which the perceptual sensitivities of sleepwalkers and normal perceivers to 
their environments inform their behaviours.  The most significant such discrepancy, for our 
purposes, is that sleepwalking behaviour seems to be inflexibly geared towards the 
achievement of a single goal, rather than open to the complex and flexible matrix of goals 
and projects active during waking behaviour.  For example, a sleepwalker engaged in 
cleaning kitchen surfaces might exhibit no sensitivity to the fact that the kitchen is dark, 
that the surfaces are a lready clean, or that a concerned family member is asking them 
                                                
94 This has been noted as a problem for action-oriented theories of consciousness in general 
by Bermudez & Macpherson (1998), para. 32. 
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what they are doing.  This suggests that they are either perceptually insensitive to these 
facts, or that they are not able to modify their behaviour in the light of such sensitivity, 
each of which contrasts with the way a conscious perceiver, on the action-space model, 
must be empowered to act by her environment.  
It seems to me, in fact, that the most plausible account of the sleepwalking case 
l ies somewhere between these options.  Sleepwalkers present diff icult cases for any theory 
of consciousness, since they manifest some apparent hallmarks of conscious experience (such 
as using perceptual sensitivity to their environment to inform a goal-directed behaviour) 
whilst lacking others (such as the abil i ties to recall and report, and to respond flexibly 
and intel l igently to their environment).  As a result, both intuition and empirical studies 
leave it unclear what we should conclude about the conscious state of the sleepwalker.  I t 
seems plausible to conclude that the evidence from both these sources precludes placing 
sleepwalkers at either end of a conscious/non-conscious continuum.  It seems natural to 
describe sleepwalkers as in a state somewhere between sleep and wakefulness – perhaps 
we should assume on this basis that their conscious experience has a similar ly 
intermediate status.  This looks to be the most natural diagnosis of the sleepwalker’s 
situation, and one that is consistent with the action-space as we have developed it here.  
The sleepwalker seems to be located somewhere on a continuum between the full and 
flexible integration of perceptual sensitivity with goals and plans that characterises the 
normal conscious perceiver, and the kinds of rigid and reflexive responsiveness to the 
environment that can occur without conscious experience at al l.  The action-space account 
thus suggests that the sleepwalker enjoys conscious perceptual experience in proportion to 
the extent to which her sensitivity to the affordances of the environment can be integrated 
with her ongoing and long-term goals, wants and plans.  Such sensitivity and integrabil i ty 
are both markedly impoverished with respect to normal conscious perceivers, but present to 
a very limited extent.   
 
Hal lucinations, i l lusions and sleepwalking, then, fa i l as counterexamples to the cla im 
that conscious experience consists in an understanding of the practical consequences of 
perception, serving instead to bring out that view in greater detail , and point up some of 




We began this chapter by reviewing Pettit’s dispositional theory of colour looks, a 
forerunner of the action-space view.  Pettit argues that we should not think of colour 
experience as involving acquaintance with essentia l ly effect- independent qualia, on the 
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basis of which we are poised to categorise, discriminate, and act in our environment in 
various ways.  Rather, our perceptual sensitivity to the environment poises us to act in 
these ways, and this poise is the basis in terms of which we should attempt to explain the 
content and character of the experience.  The discussion of the DVS results in chapter 2, and 
of Kohler’s coloured goggles and synaesthetic colour sensations in this chapter show how 
this proposal meshes well with various empirical work and puzzle cases.  In 3.2 I argued 
that the sensorimotor theory lacks the resources to explain Kohler’s colour-adaptation 
results, in contrast to the action-space view.  In 3.3 I argued for the same conclusion with 
respect to synaesthetic colour sensations.  Each case invites understanding in terms of the 
range of actions perceptually enabled for a subject, rather than in terms of that subject’s 
knowledge of the l ikely perceptual consequences of movement. 
 The second main section of this chapter began by taking stock of our discussion so 
far.  The view that emerges through our consideration of the DVS results, Petti t’s theory of 
colour experience and the cases considered in 3.2 and 3.3 is that conscious experience is a 
matter of understanding the practical consequences of perceptual sensitivity – of knowing 
poise over a space of actions.  On such a model, pathologies of consciousness such as visual form 
agnosia, blindsight and hemispatia l neglect are understood as cases where subjects are 
unable to put their perceptual sensitivity in touch with their capacities for practica l 
reasoning and action-planning, and thus fa i l to enjoy conscious experiences that are based 
on that sensitivity.  We ended by looking at the action-space account’s responses to a pair 
of apparent counterexamples.  I argued that we should see visual i l lusions and 
ha llucinations as cases where the subject misunderstands the space of actions currently 
afforded by her environment, and consequently has an aberrant perceptual experience.  Our 
discussion of these cases brought out the fact that the action-space doesn’t construe 
grasping the practical consequences of perception as an intel lectually demanding 
achievement – thus, the way a subject takes herself to be able to act on her environment can 
come apart from the explicit conceptual judgements she makes about her environment on 
the basis of her experience, and consciousness, construed as knowing poise over a space of 
action, is something that we may share with non-l inguistic and non-concept-using agents, 
such as infants and certa in animals.  Secondly, I argued that sleepwalking fa i ls as a 
counterexample to the action-space view, since the sleepwalker is markedly impoverished 
in the extent to which he can put his perceptual sensitivity to the environment in touch 
with f luent and intel l igent practical reasoning.  To the extent that the sleepwalker can do 
this, they will enjoy conscious experience – a conclusion which looks consistent with the 
data on sleepwalking. 
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Our case for the thesis that conscious experience consists in a grasp of the practica l 
consequences of perception is building, but three outstanding issues loom.  Firstly, can the 
action-space account give us a detailed and plausible account of some specific class of 
experiences, in terms of the sorts of actions and abil i ties they involve?  Secondly, how 
should we cash out the action-space account’s appeal to ‘understanding’ the practical 
consequences of movement, and the ‘practical reasoning’ with which it cla ims perceptual ly 
enabled abil i ties must be integrated if they are to issue in conscious experience?  Thirdly, 
do we have any reason to believe that the action-space theory can address the sorts of 
questions about the explanatory gap with which we began in chapter 1?  The remaining 
chapters of this thesis deal with each of these issues in turn.  Next, we continue to focus on 
colour experience as a case study for the action-space view, and develop a theory of the 
skil ls and abil i ties in terms of which such experience should be understood.   
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Chapter 4: The Agent in Magenta 
 
 
As we have seen, according to the action-space theory of perception conscious experience is 
to be explained in terms of an agent’s understanding of the space of actions her perceptual 
sensitivity to the environment currently poises her to carry out.  In this chapter, I a im to 
clarify the action-space proposal by giving a worked-out account of colour perception.  
Colour experience is possibly philosophy of mind’s favourite example of a reductively 
problematic phenomenal state.  Perceiving colour is also, intuitively, a passive 
phenomenon – colour is a property that ‘hits us in the eyes’ apparently requiring no effort 
or activity on our part.  If the action-space theory contains the resources for a plausible 
explanation of the content and character of such experiences, this must count heavily in i ts 
favour.  I proceed by canvassing the options for both action-space and sensorimotor theories 
of colour, arguing that each type of theory faces problems that the other can deal with 
relatively easi ly, and concluding that we should combine the action-space and 
sensorimotor views.  Crucial ly, however, I argue that the views on colour perception 
espoused by sensorimotor theorists in fact suggest only an indirect role for sensorimotor 
dynamics in colour perception.  Thus, the account of colour perception I develop constitutes 
both another l ine of evidence that perceptual experience should be accounted for in action-
space rather than sensorimotor terms, and a worked-out example of an action-space 
treatment of a class of perceptual experiences.  
 
 
4.1 An Action-Space Account of Colour Looks 
 
How might we ground an account of colour perception in enabled perceptual abil i ties?  A 
natural starting point is to focus on the range of discriminatory abil i ties perceptual 
exposure to a colour enables for a perceiver.  We have a lready come across this general 
idea in Petti t’s (2003) account of colour looks as powers of objects to enable a range of sifting, 
sorting and tracking abil i ties in a perceiver.  One thing that each of Petti t’s paradigmatic 
actions of sifting, sorting and tracking look to have in common is their reliance on the 
subject’s abil i ty to make perceptual discriminations of sameness and difference based on 
sensitivity to the object’s colour.  Abil i ty to track an object based on its colour requires an 
abil i ty to discriminate that object from its background on the basis of its colour, as does the 
abil i ty to sift an object from a class of differently coloured objects on the basis of its colour.  
The abil i ty to sort objects into classes of same or similar colours requires the abil i ty to 
make appropriate discriminations of perceptual similarity.    
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Following Austen Clark (1993, 2002) and Mohan Matthen (2005, especia l ly ch.11), we can 
try to ground a theory of colour perception in a catalogue of the range of, and relations 
between, such discriminatory abil i ties.  Two colours are discriminable from each other for 
a given perceiver iff the perceiver’s same/different judgements in response to the two 
colours are correct above chance.  Knowing the extent of these abil i ties for a perceiver 
a l lows us to chart the space of colours to which they are perceptually sensitive, and the 
relations of relative similarity and difference which hold between those colours.  For 
example, by presenting a subject with a series of pairs of colour chips, each with 
marginally different hue properties, but the same level of saturation and brightness, we 
can move from presenting a subject with a unitary shade of red (a shade which is perceived 
as containing no traces of yellow or blue) to presenting her with a unitary shade of yellow, 
whilst at no stage presenting her with a pair of samples she can reliably discriminate from 
each other.  Likewise, we could present her with a series of pairs with a gradual variation 
in brightness, and move from presenting a pure white chip to a pure black chip in the same 
way.  In fact, for any pair of colour samples, we can move from one to the other by a series of 
presentations of different samples, each one marginally but indiscriminably differently-
coloured from the last.  In this way, we build up a picture of a multi-dimensional colour-
space, its geometry dictated by the extent of a perceiver’s sensitivity to similarities and 
differences between its constituent shades.   
  
Just as we can construct such a colour-space by successive presentation of indiscriminable 
shades to a subject, we can construct the same space by exploiting the discriminatory 
abil i ties the perceiver possesses, by presenting the perceiver with a series of barely-
discriminable colour samples.  Such a space needn’t be any less fine-grained than the one 
constructed via indiscriminable samples – a perceiver may not be able to discriminate red 
234 from red 235, or red 235 from red 236 (and so on), but sti l l able to discriminate red 234 
from 236, and red 235 from 237 (and so on).  Thus, al l perceptible shades, and the relations 
of discriminabil i ty between them, are captured in the resultant space.  This space is one in 
which any constituent point can be picked out by specifying its coordinates a long three 
degrees of variation.  In the diagram below, an idealised version of the space of colours 
discriminable to standard human perceivers, the vertical axis represents degree of 
brightness, the angular coordinate represents degree of hue, and the radial coordinate 
represents degree of saturation. 




Any point in colour space can be specif ied by a location in terms of these three coordinates, 
and the relation between any two points in the space can be given by specifying the vector 
l inking one set of coordinates to the next95.  The fact that the geometry of this space is 
dictated by the range of discriminatory abil i ties possessed by a perceiver gives action a 
constitutive role in this account of colour perception – our proposal is that the coordinate 
system which makes up discriminable colour space has enabled discriminatory abil i ties as 
i ts metric96.  Action-space theorists can use the conceptual apparatus outlined above to 
cla im that an agent’s experiences of colour are explained by her implicit knowledge that a 
certain range of discriminatory abil i ties are currently enabled for her.  The enabling of 
                                                
95 For much more on the precise methods of constructing such a space, including detailed 
descriptions of the mathematical regularities describing its geometry, and how these are 
arrived at, see Austen Clark (1993).  Matthen (2005), section 2, contains a detailed 
discussion of sensory ordering in general. 
96 Glossing such an account as action-oriented requires that we count operations of 
discrimination, comparison and the l ike as actions.  Recall our defence of this point in 3.4 – 
firstly, we might think that it makes sense to attribute a discriminatory capacity to a 
subject only if that capacity can show up in their behaviour, or at least their behavioural 
dispositions.  Secondly, the action-space account cla ims that discriminatory abil i ties only 
have an upshot in perceptual experience when the personal-level abil i ties they enable are 
put in touch with capacities for practical reasoning.  
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these abil i ties constitutes her occupying a specif ic point in a complex space of possible 
enabled discriminatory abil i ties, the geometry of which is given by the total i ty of 
similarity and difference relations obtaining between colours to which the perceiver is 
sensitive.  This is our first pass at an action-space theory of colour perception. 
 
A few points about our proposal.  Firstly, since the action space account aims at an 
explanation of our phenomenology, the discriminatory abil i ties in terms of which it 
wishes to explain colour experience had better not presuppose phenomenology, on pain of 
circularity.  But it seems that the discriminatory abil i ties to which we appealed above 
don’t make such a presupposition – we might suppose that a robot could be successfully 
programmed to make discriminations between similarly-coloured objects presented to i t 
and output a ‘same/different’ response without supposing that i t experienced the colours it 
was discriminating. Indeed, as briefly noted in 3.4, some blindsight subjects can make 
surprisingly fine-grained forced-choice chromatic distinctions between colour-samples 
presented in their scotoma, whilst reporting that they are not basing their choice on any 
experience of the colours being presented. 
 
Secondly, note that the set of discriminatory abil i ti es our account wil l appeal to is rich 
and complex, as intuitively required of a candidate explanans for colour experience.  As 
noted above, any perceptible colour can be specified by giving its locations on the three 
axes that structure our colour space.  Our proposal is that the metric of those axes be 
understood in terms of enabled discriminatory abil i ti es – thus, on our proposal, the content 
of any colour sensation can be captured in terms of a specification of the discriminations 
currently enabled for a subject. Note also that the range of discriminatory abil i ties enabled 
for a subject by exposure to a particular colour contains information not just about the colour 
currently perceived, but a lso about a l l i ts neighbouring shades and, it seems, al l other 
colours that the subject can perceive.  For it turns out that human colour-space has a 
distinctive and thoroughly asymmetrical structure – for example, red can be more saturated 
than any other of the unitary hues, red and green can be darker than any other unitary 
hues, a maximally saturated yellow is closer to an achromatic stimulus than any other 
maximally saturated colour, and so forth.  When we take into account al l such 
peculiarities in the geometry of discriminabil i ty space, it becomes apparent that the 
relations of similarity and difference that obtain between the colours to which we are 
perceptually sensitive are such that they permit only one type of organisation in 
discriminabil i ty space. Thus we might compare the task of mapping a perceptible colour to 
a point in colour space to the task of assigning a number to an empty box in a Sudoku grid. 
The choice of which number to fi l l in might seem an arbitrary decision, but Sudoku-space 
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(the grid) has been so designed that for any box, there is one and only one number that can 
go in it whilst respecting the geometrical rules of the space.  Likewise, the 
discriminabil i ty relations that dictate the geometry of colour space permit only one way of 
mapping a particular colour to a point in that space.  This fact means that the enabling of 
the discriminatory abil i ties perta ining to a particular colour for a perceiver carries 
information not just about the relations of similarity and differences obtaining between 
that colour and its neighbouring shades, but (to some extent) about al l the other points in 
the relationally-defined discriminabil i ty space.   
 
These two points might be recruited in responses to perhaps the most obvious objections to 
our proposal – that the abil i ties in terms of which we wish to explain colour experience 
might be enabled for an agent with absent or inverted qualia (recall 1.1).  As we just noted, 
our account entails that the range of abil i ties the action-space account appeals to are 
identical in grain and relational structure to the range of colours a perceiver can detect – 
this might help assuage any absent qualia worries that are motivated by the apparent 
paucity of enabled abil i ties as a candidate explanans.  However, it sti l l seems legitimate 
to question why a range of abil i ties, however complex, should implicate conscious 
experience – also noted above was the fact that we might design a robot that manifested 
some kind of sensitivity to chromatic information in its behaviour without any inclination 
to suppose that i t enjoyed colour experience, and that some blindsight subjects seem to 
possess residual abil i ties to make chromatic discriminations when prompted, but in the 
absence of colour experience.  We will not be in a position to give the action-space account’s 
response to such worries unti l the end of chapter 6, which explicitly addresses the relation 
of the action-space account to the explanatory gap.  As a pall iat ive, we can note for now 
that this problem is not unique to the action-space account, but arises for any attempt to 
give an account of colour perception in non-phenomenal terms – short of ‘explaining’ our 
colour experience in terms of our acquaintance with experientia l properties, any theory 
will have to tackle the diff icult question of how the physical properties to which they 
appeal relate to the experientia l properties they wish to explain.  The action-space 
account’s response to this question is that the non-phenomenal abil i ties to which they 
appeal contribute to the content of a conscious experience only when they are integrated 
with the subject’s capacities for practical reasoning97.  Thus, the action-space theorist’s 
account of colour blindsight wil l be an instance of the general account of blindsight given in 
                                                
97 Cf. Austen Clark (2007), who argues that those abil i ties issue in consciousness only when 
attention is directed upon them.  The action-space account has some affinity with theories 
of consciousness that appeal to attention in this way (see a lso Prinz (2000)), since some 
psychologists define attention in terms of the capacities to put information in touch with 
practical reasoning to which the action-space account appeals. 
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3.4: normal perceivers automatically know that the coloured patch in front of them affords 
matching with such-and-such a range of colours, tracking against such-and-such a range of 
backgrounds, and so forth – when appropriate, their sensitivity to colour-based 
affordances is automatically put in touch with their intentional goals and projects, thus 
issuing in colour experience.  This contrasts with  the case of the blindsight subject 
mentioned at the start of this section.  This subject reta ins some of this sensitivity to colour-
based affordances, but the intermediary of a prompt from the experimenter is required 
before this sensitivity can be put to use in the achievement of their current goal (in the 
context of the experiment) of matching or discriminating.  We have been given some 
empirical reason to think that such integrabil i ty of informational states with practica l 
reasoning is key to conscious experience by our discussion of the DVS data in chapter 2, and 
the diagnoses this hypothesis can provide of visual agnosia, blindsight, and unilatera l 
neglect, and in chapter 6 we will consider conceptual arguments for our view. 
 
Inverted spectrum arguments look easier for the action-space account of colour looks to 
respond to.  It might be objected that a mere appeal to sets of enabled abil i ties leaves i t 
opaque why the enabling of some such set should look (say) purple, rather than pink.  But, 
as we noted above, it turns out that the structure of our colour-space is thoroughly 
asymmetrical in a way such that the set of relations of sameness and difference in which 
one point in colour space stands to the rest is unique to that point.  For example, the total i ty 
of discriminabil i ty relations between colours could not be held fixed whilst only (say) red 
and yellow were switched around in colour-space, since the action-space account holds that 
i t is constitutive of yellow and red that, when maximally saturated, yellow is more 
similar to white than to black, and red is more similar to black than to white.  Thus, the 
positions of yellow and red cannot be swapped in colour-space without disrupting the 
relations of similarity and difference that obtain between black and white and those 
colours.  Were we to attempt to resolve this by swapping the positions of black and white 
a lso, we would then need to shift the locations of al l  the colours constitutively related to 
black and white by their discriminabil i ty relations, and subsequently a l l the colours 
constitutively related to those colours by their discriminabil i ty relations, and so forth98 – 
ultimately, we find that if we attempt to move a point in colour space whilst keeping its 
relations of discriminabil i ty intact, a l l other points in colour space must move with i t .  
                                                
98 In the interests of simplicity, the way I’m stating this example has the misleading 
implication that each colour stands in constitutive relations of similarity and difference 
only to certa in other colours in that space.  But recall  our Sudoku comparison, above – the 
geometry of colour-space is such that every point stands in a unique set of relations to every 
other point, not just some subset of those points. 
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And since, on our account, the location of a point in colour space is defined relationally, this 
is tantamount to that point fa i l ing to move at a l l. 
 
It is worth noting with Austen Clark (1993) and Matthen (2005) that this type of account of 
colour perception appears to mesh nicely with an empirically well-confirmed proposal 
concerning the neurological basis of colour-vision -the Hurvich-Jameson opponent-
processing model.  The proposal is roughly as fol lows99: there are three types of colour-
sensitive cones on the retina, each sensitive to different wavelength regions of the visible 
l ight spectrum.  Clusters of cones feed into three types of colour-coding cells at the output 
layer of the network – one cell that registers the value of the incoming light on a continuum 
from red to green, one on a continuum from yellow to blue, and one on a continuum from black 
to white.  Registration works by each cel l computing the ratio between the inputs from 
some combination of cone types (which combination varies according to cell- type), resulting 
in a measurable degree of excitation/inhibition in each cell.  The activation levels of each 
cell constitute a triplet of outputs that combine to yield a particular value in a three-
dimensional space of possible activations.   
 
The interest of this model for our account is that there is considerable evidence that the 
space of possible activations of the HJ-network is strongly isomorphic to the space of 
chromatic discriminations available to a perceiver.  For example, by attending to the 
informational sensitivity of a perceiver’s colour perception mechanisms using the 
apparatus of the HJ-network, we can accurately predict for any pair of samples whether or 
not a subject wil l be able to rel iably discriminate between them.  The two main types of 
colour blindness (impaired abil i ty to make discriminations between red and green in one, or 
between yellow and blue in the other) are found to correlate with selective impairment of 
the relevant type of receptor.  The fact that our colour vision adapts to systematica l ly 
distorted light (as when we perceptually adapt to dark or colour-tinted glasses) is 
predicted by the opponent-process model, which states that prolonged activation of a cel l 
or cluster of cells wil l result in cel l fa tigue, with the cell’s activation-level tending to 
return to a neutral value – so consistent exposure to yellow-tinted l ight wil l fatigue the 
yellow/blue cells, and gradually the perceived yellowness of the perceptual environment 
wil l wear off.  The yellow bias of our chromatic discriminations fades with the 
activation-levels of the yellow/blue cells.  Additionally, the model can reliably predict 
the colour (and the underlying discriminabil i ty-profiles) of our afterimages – in the same 
way as everything is perceived with a bluish tint after removing yellow sunglasses to 
                                                
99 For a more detailed summary, see Churchland (2005).  For original proposal, see Hurvich 
and Jameson (1957). 
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which we have perceptually adapted, fixating on a yellow patch then on a pla in whi te 
background will produce an afterimage of a blue patch.  The previous two phenomena are 
explained by the fatiguing of yellow/blue cel ls, and the assumption of a correlation 
between levels HJ-network output levels and the way things appear to the perceiver (the 
l ink running via enabled discriminatory abil i ties, on our account).  The assumption that 
such a correlation obtains yields impressively accurate predictions of the exact chromatic 
character of our after-images.   
 
The explanatory and predictive power of the opponent-processing model is such th at 
Churchland (2005) has argued that colour sensations should be identif ied with the output 
levels of the HJ-network.  However, identifying such low-level processing with personal-
level sensation seems implausible100.  Surely we should not say that an HJ-network 
operating in isolation from any other cognitive mechanisms is a seat of colour experience?  
The action-space account as sketched thus far can make the more modest proposal that the 
network’s output levels enable the discriminatory abil ities appealed to in the previous 
sections, which can go on to form the basis for a colour experience if appropriately 
integrated into the perceiver’s intentional activity.  However, as we see in the next 
section, this approach cannot be the full story about the role of action in colour-perception. 
 
4.2 Problems: The Objectivity of Colour 
 
We can introduce the problems with the above account by noting that it has been set up by 
appealing to circumstances that differ markedly from those in which we standardly 
perceive colour.  When we perceive colour, it is usually the colour of entire object, 
displayed under one of an open-ended range of possible l ighting conditions, with the object 
displaying some pattern of shadows and highlights across its surface.  It is incredibly rare 
that we perceive an object coloured and li t so it presents a uniform appearance across its 
surface.  But it seems that such exceptional cases have just been used as the building 
materia ls for the theory of colour perception above.  To chart the geometry of a perceiver’s 
colour-discriminabil i ty space, it was proposed that we investigate which uniform 
instances of particular shades she can distinguish from uniform instances of others – 
perhaps by investigating her abil i ties to discriminate a range of Munsell chips, presented 
against a uniform, neutral grey background, under fixed l ighting conditions.  We should 
wonder whether an account constructed in this manner could possibly do justice to the rea l , 
involved and worldly nature of our colour perception. 
                                                
100 See Broackes (2003) for a good discussion of the l imits of an appeal to opponent-
processing mechanisms in an account of colour-perception. 
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The phenomenon of colour constancy is one way of giving this general worry a more specif ic 
expression.  The surface of my office wall appears to me as a uniform cream colour.  
However, due to the patterns of light and shade distributed over it, a patch of the wall in 
shadow and a patch of the wall in l ight wil l enable a very different range of perceptual 
discriminations in me.  Taken in isolation, I might be disposed to sort a patch of the wall in 
l ight with white objects, and a patch in deep shadow with black, for example.  But I 
perceive the wall as neither white, nor black, nor (in the most natural sense) as varying in 
colour across its surface – but as a uniform cream.  Likewise, as the sun sets outside my office 
window and the fluorescent l ights overhead become the chief source of i l lumination, the 
colours presented by the surface of my desk enable a set of discriminatory abil i ties in me 
that differ markedly from those enabled a couple of hours before.  However, I have 
perceived my desk as being identically coloured throughout.  The point is not that I judge 
my wall or my desk to be uniformly coloured despite the colour looks they present – rather I 
experience them as uniformly coloured, whilst the fact that they present different colour 
looks over their surface or passage through time is apparent to me only on reflection101. 
 
The checkerboard il lusion also il lustrates this worry. In the diagram below, square A looks 
dark grey and square B looks l ight grey.  But covering up the surrounding squares reveals 
that they are an identically coloured.  Thus, taken in isolation, each square enables an 
identical range of perceptual discriminations of similarity and difference in the perceiver, 
whilst appearing very different in colour102. 
                                                
101 Thanks to Matt Nudds for pressing this objection against the action-space view. 
102 See http://www.lottolab.org/Brightness%20il lusions%20page.html# for analogous 




Similarly, in the i l lusion below, the left central cross appears blue, whilst the right 
appears yellow.  Viewed in isolation from their surroundings, however, each is a neutra l 
shade of grey103. 
 
                                                
103 See http://www.lottolab.org/Brightness%20il lusions%20page.html# for a version of 
this i l lusion where the yellow and blue fi lters can be manually adjusted to strengthen and 
weaken the effect.  The designer of this il lusion cla ims that the central crosses are 




So, according to the action-space account as developed so far, each cross should enable a 
similar range of discriminatory abil i ties in the perceiver, and so look the same.  It seems 
unable to explain how the crosses are experienced as opponent colours, despite th is 
similarity in the abil i ties their colours enable. 
 
It seems, then, that perceivers can see something as being uniformly coloured whilst i t 
exhibits differing colour-looks, and as differently coloured whilst it exhibits the same 
colour look.  The cases of colour constancy and il lusion presented above show that an object’s 
presenting a particular colour-look to a perceiver is neither necessary nor sufficient for that 
perceiver to experience it as being a particular colour.   
 
A more general worry for the action-space account is that colours, for the most part, are not 
experienced as subjective, observer-dependent properties, but rather as enduring and 
objective properties of objects.  The ways in which we use colours to categorise, track and re-
identify objects over time i l lustrate this aspect of our conception of colours.  But the action-
space account of colour has a subjectivist slant – by explaining the colour an object appears 
to a perceiver by reference to the range of chromatic discriminatory abil i ties enabled in 
the perceiver, it makes colours ‘response-dependent’ properties, whose character is 
dependent on their effects on the subject who perceives them.  This is in tension with the 
objective aspect of the phenomenology of colour perception.   
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Can the action-space account accommodate the perceived objectivity of colour?  We cannot 
objectivise colour-looks via an appeal to the physical properties of coloured objects; the 
physical constitution of an object is compatible with i ts presenting a wide range of 
different colour-looks under different conditions of contrast, l ighting and perceptual 
adaptation, so we cannot establish a reliable connection between its physical properties 
and the colour-look it presents.  In light of this, some theorists104 build a specif ication of 
these conditions into their account, holding that colour-looks signal the objective property 
of being a certa in type of physical object, viewed under a certa in combination of such 
conditions.  By including a complete specif ication of the context in which the look occurs, 
this gives us a link between colour-looks and an objective (though complex) property of 
being a certa in type of physical object, viewed under a certa in range of lighting conditions, 
against a certa in sort of background, by a particular perceiver in a certa in state of 
perceptual adaptation.  But this doesn’t preserve the objectivity of colour experience in the 
sense we were interested in.  Part of the intuition we wished to honour was that colour 
experience seems to present us with properties of external objects that persist over time, 
and that can be manifest to various perceivers.  This cannot be achieved by indexing the 
objective property we are acquainted with in colour experience to a single combination of 
conditions of the object, its surroundings, its lighting and the perceiver. 
 
Matthen (2005) pursues an alternative strategy, proposing that colour-looks acquaint us 
with the property a coloured-object visually appears to have.  On this account, since we are 
only put in touch with the way things appear, the object need not be coloured as it appears 
to be, nor need the perceiver believe that the object is so coloured.  When things are 
suffused in artif icia l red light they appear redder than usual without having changed 
their colour, and without the perceiver necessari ly having a tendency to believe them to be 
reddishly coloured.  But the reddish look of the scene sti l l has objective purport since were 
the perceiver to take her perception at face value, she would take everything around her 
to be tinted red.   
 
But this proposal neglects what we have just seen - that an object’s having a certa in colour 
look is consistent with various different ways of appearing to be coloured to a perceiver 
(recall the checkerboard i l lusion), and it’s appearing to be coloured in a certa in way is 
consistent with i ts presenting various different colour-looks (recall colour constancy). 
Matthen cla ims that colour-looks put us in touch with the colour which things appear to 
have, but we have seen that something exhibiting a certa in colour-look is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for its appearing to be coloured in a certa in way.  The real problem 
                                                
104 E.g. Cohen (2000), McLaughlin (2003) 
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of objectivity facing colour-look-based theories of colour perception is thus that reflection 
on the way we perceive the enduring colours of objects suggests that the colour-look 
presented by an object usually fa i ls to determine the colour that object appears.  In order to 
do justice to fundamental facts about colour perception, then, an account must appeal to 
more than just colour-looks. 
 
 
4.3 Colours as Ways of Changing the Light: A Sensorimotor Theory of Colour 
Perception? 
 
The action-space account thus far can give us a plausible account of colour-looks – it can tel l 
us how and why the colours of the two squares in the checkerboard i l lusion look, in one 
sense, the same, and how and why the colours of the shadowed and li t portions of my office 
wall look, in one sense, different.  The considerations of the previous two sections showed 
that such an account leaves out much of importance about colour perception.  In the most 
natural sense, we perceive the squares of the checkerboard il lusion as differently coloured, 
and my office wall as uniformly coloured.  Relatedly, an account of colour perception in 
terms of colour-looks struggles to do justice to the way we perceive colours as objective and 
enduring properties of objects. 
 
Justin Broackes (1992, 2007) argues for a conception of colours that looks able to deal wel l 
with the objections levelled at proposals in terms of colour-looks – that colours are ways in 
which surfaces change incident into reflected l ight.  He marshals various considerations in 
favour of this.  Think, first of al l , of our tendency to look at an object in a variety of 
l ighting conditions and from a variety of angles when trying to establish its colour.  A 
theory of colour perception based on colour-looks might suggest that this behaviour 
constitutes our trying to find some optimal l ighting condition or angle from which the object 
wil l exhibit a colour-look corresponding to its true colour.  But considerable doubt has been 
cast on the cla im that a colour-look, taken in isolation, serves as a rel iable indicator of the 
objective colour-property a surface possesses.  Such a proposal also faces the task of giving 
a principled specif ication of the optimal conditions for colour-perception.  But is i t 
plausible to think such ideal conditions exist?  Why should the colour-look presented by 
an apple against a backdrop of green leaves in the midday sun be a more objective indicator 
of its colour than the look it presents against a background of brown earth in early 
evening105?  Broackes suggests that this behaviour does not a im ultimately at el iciting 
                                                
105 See Hardin (1988) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties facing attempts to specify 
‘standard conditions’ for colour perception. 
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some favoured colour-look from the object, but at gaining a detailed appreciation of the 
constant way in which the object’s surface modifies various different types of incident 
l ight into reflected light.   
Consider also the phenomenon of aspect-shift in colour perception.  Broackes (1992, 
p.460) describes the experience of viewing the cover of a book from a particular viewpoint 
(one from which the visual information received is ambiguous with regards to the way in 
which the cover is l it) and experiencing its colour as indeterminate between dark blue and 
black.  At this stage, aspect-shifts in the perception of the book’s colour can occur, whereby 
it is one moment perceived as dark blue, the next as black, sometimes even with the shif ts 
occurring under the intentional control of the perceiver.  However, upon further exploration 
(moving the book with respect to the l ight-source, or the perceiver with respect to both of 
these), the book’s cover wil l be perceived as its proper colour, and such aspect-shif ts can no 
longer occur.  Similar aspect-shifts can occur when looking at the checkerboard i l lusion 
above.  This can be explained as due to ambiguities in the l ight reaching the eye regarding 
the way in which the object is changing the l ight – in the former case, it might be a black 
book in good light, or a dark blue book in weak l ight.  As we have seen, the same colour-
look can signal different objective colour properties.  Only further exploration can resolve 
this ambiguity and result in veridical perception of the book’s colour. 
Perhaps most interestingly, Broackes notes that he himself has impaired 
red/green colour vision, but he denies that red, green and grey objects present uniform 
appearances to him or other colour-blind subjects.  Grass is experienced as green, old phone-
boxes as red, and Broackes is equally good at perceiving the colours of large blobs of red and 
green paint, ruling out the possibil i ty that his colour experience is grounded in semantic 
knowledge of the perceived objects.  His problem is that he is occasionally prone on a first 
viewing to take objects to be red or brown when they are, in fact, green.  However, when he 
explores further, an aspect-shift occurs, and the object is perceived as its true colour.  
Broackes’ conclusion is that “The person with red-green deficiencies is simply less good at 
tel l ing from one viewing what is the object’s way of changing the light; but by getting a 
variety of views of it, he may nonetheless recognise that property.” (Broackes, 1992, p.462)  
He gives an analogy with a perceiver with monocular vision:  we are not tempted to say of 
such a perceiver that she experiences the world as two-dimensional.  Rather, her visual 
experience of spatia l properties can be ambiguous where that of other people is not.  But 
these ambiguities can be resolved by further exploration.  Again, this is a damaging piece 
of evidence against a version of the above action-space account that rel ies on the opponent-
processing model as the underpinning of the abil i ties constitutive of colour experience.  If 
perceptions of red and green were constituted by discriminatory abil i ties underpinned by 
the red/green channel of the opponent-processing network, we should not expect red/green 
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colour-blind subjects to experience those colours at al l , contrary to Broackes’ experience.  
Even without rel iance on the opponent-processing model, it is not clear how the action-
space theory as sketched thus far can deal with th is fact.  For there are undeniably 
chromatic discriminations of the sort the theory appeals to when constructing a colour-
space that are unavailable to Broackes and colour-blind perceivers.  However, it is being 
cla imed that colour-blind perceivers can have veridical experiences of the colours that our 
theory claimed were grounded in the discriminatory abil ities that they lack106. 
 
This view of colour can deal well with the checkerboard i l lusion and colour constancy cases 
from the previous section. When we look at the checkerboard, we take square A to be freely 
i l luminated, and square B to be in shadow.  Though there is a way in which the two 
squares share a look, an object can look that way either by being a l ight grey object freely 
i l luminated, or a dark grey object in shadow.  Since we take A to be freely il luminated, and 
B to be in shadow, we perceive A as l ight grey and B as dark grey107. We can provide a 
similar diagnosis of the way we perceive the coloured crosses in the second il lusion.  
Though both crosses are a similar shade of grey, we perceive the cross on the left as being 
viewed through a yellow fi l ter, or yellow l ight, and the cross on the right as viewed 
through a blue fil ter, or blue light.  Though each cross presents a similar colour-look when 
viewed in isolation, we implicitly understand that such a look can signal a blue object 
viewed in yellow light, or a yellow object viewed in blue light.  We take the left cross to be 
viewed through yellow light and the right to be viewed through blue light, and so 
perceive the left cross as blue and the right as yellow.  Similarly, the different colour-
looks displayed by different portions of my office wall provide me with information about 
the constant way the wall modifies different types of incident l ight into reflected light.   
 
Thus, the colour a surface appears to be is a function not of the colour-look presented by the 
surface, but by the way we implicitly take it to be changing incident into reflected l ight.  
This view of matters can make sense of the objectivist intuition from the previous section – 
colour perception is perception of a surface’s objective property of modifying light in a 
constant way. 
 
                                                
106  See Broackes (1992, 2007) for further examples and arguments motivating this view.  
107 The effect is no doubt enhanced by our perception of the pattern of the board, and the 
contrast effects resulting from A’s being surrounded by l ight squares and space, and B’s being 
surrounded by dark squares.  However, a range of similar (though slightly less impressive) 
i l lusions demonstrate that the effect can be independent of these factors. 
See: http://www.lottolab.org/Brightness%20il lusions%20page.html# 
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Just as our colour-look-based theory found empirical support from the H-J opponent-
processing model, a conception of colours as ways of changing light finds empirical support 
in recent work on colour by Phil ipona and O’Regan (2006) (henceforth POR).  POR begin by 
noting that existing theories of colour perception struggle to explain cross-cultural 
commonalities in colour-naming and judgements of unique hue – judgements that a colour-
sample is a ‘pure’ instance of a colour, not tinged with other colours.  Cross-cultural surveys 
on colour (Berl in and Kay (1969)) find that there is something special about the colours 
red, green, blue and yellow: in widely separated cultures, these are the four colours most 
l ikely to be given individual names, and the only colours with instances that are judged to 
be unique hues.  These patterns of naming and judging are sufficiently robust across cultures 
in diverse environments that it is implausible to attempt to explain this fact by appeal to 
the colours that most commonly occur in perceivers’ surroundings. 
How could our colour-look-based theory explain these facts?  Reflection on the structure of 
discriminabil i ty space leaves it unclear why some points on it should be more privileged 
than others, either by being accorded a status as a unique hue, or by being likely to be given 
a name by diverse cultures.  It might seem that a  theory that makes appeal to the 
opponent-processing model is well-placed to explain these facts. Recall that according to 
the opponent-processing model, colours are coded by their values on a red/green axis, and a 
yellow/blue axis.  Perhaps if human colour vision across al l cultures proceeds by measuring 
the l ight fa l l ing on the retina using those colours as parameters, we might reasonably 
expect to find an echo of this in linguistic practises across cultures.  However, a case would 
need to be made for this response that did not rely on an oversimplif ied mapping of 
features of subpersonal processing onto features of experience and linguistic practise.  There 
are, no doubt, many perceptible properties that are processed via measurement against 
subpersonal parameters that are quite opaque to us, having no echo in experience or 
l inguistic practise.  Detection of ‘zero-crossings’ might be a crucia l part of the subpersonal 
underpinnings of object or scene perception without being a category that shows up cross-
culturally in language, or strikes us as experientia l ly sa l ient.  It might nonetheless be 
possible to explain colour-naming practises via an appeal to opponent-processing 
mechanisms, but further arguments are required to demonstrate this. 
Additionally, it is diff icult to find an explanation for the cross-cultural 
similarities in judgements of unique hues in terms of the opponent-processing model.  
Maximal activation of the red/green channel does not result in perception as of the most 
reddish red, nor does minimal activation result in perception as of the most greenish green.  
The same is true of the yellow/blue channel and its corresponding colours. 
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POR propose a theory that accounts for these features of our colour experience.  For each of 
a set of 1600 Munsell chips (as well as a large array of naturally occurring surfaces), they 
calculated a function of the chip’s reflectance properties, in terms of the way the chip’s 
surface transformed the perceptible incident light (specified by a three-valued vector) 
into perceptible reflected light (specif ied by another three-valued vector)108.  This gives us 
a function for each coloured surface which tel ls us, given the properties of the l ight 
incident upon it, what the properties of the l ight reflected from it wil l be.  POR found tha t 
the functions corresponding to the chips most frequently judged to have a unique hue had 
what they term “singular reflectance properties” – whilst non-unique hues transform al l 
three values of incident light into different values of reflected l ight, unique hues 
transformed the l ight a long two or fewer (as in the cases of black and white) dimensions.  
In light of this, a ‘singularity index’ can be constructed, against which the complexity of 
the way any given colour changes incident to reflected l ight can be measured.  When the 
colours most l ikely to be given names, or judged to be unique hues, are measured against th is 
singularity index, it turns out that the hues most l ikely to be judged unique or named are 
those that transform incident into reflected light in the simplest way.  POR cla im th at 
their singularity index can predict, to within the range of a single Munsell chip, which 
hues a perceiver wil l judge to be unique, and that the index accurately tracks the 
probabil i ty that a colour wil l be given a name.  The natural conclusion from this data 
(though one that POR apparently resist drawing in their (2006)) is that perceiving colour 
involves sensitivity to these reflectance profiles.  These results, coupled with the 
considerations adduced above, make a compell ing case for understanding colours as ways of 
changing light. 
 
The work of both Broackes and POR has been taken as support for a sensorimotor theory of 
colour perception – a theory which states that the content and character of colour 
perception is determined by perceivers’ expectations concerning how their perceptions wil l 
change as a result of certa in movements109.  Colour is perceived by grasping the ways in 
which colour appearances wil l vary with movements of the perceiver, and changes in 
other colour-critica l conditions – our grasp of the sensorimotor contingencies relevant to 
colour perception enables us to perceive the constant way an object modif ies l ight, and thus 
                                                
108 This differs from the physical notion of a surface spectral reflectance profi le, since here 
the reflectance properties of the objects are identif ied with respect to incident and 
reflected light with only three degrees of variation, corresponding to the variations to 
which the human visual system is sensitive.  The surface spectral reflectance of an object is 
calculated with references to al l the differences between incident and reflected l ight, not 
just those to which human perceivers are sensitive. 
109 I assume for now that this interpretation is warranted.  This assumption will be 
examined in section 4.5. 
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i ts colour110.  We have just seen that such a view can deal well with the criticisms of the 
action-space account considered in the previous section.  But we shall now see that just as 
the action-space theory faced a series of problems related to the objective dimension of 




4.4 Problems: The Subjectivity of Colour 
 
Many of the problems faced by the action-space theory of colour stemmed from its 
diff iculty in accommodating the plausible observation that colours are presented to us in 
perception as objective properties.  Perhaps a more puzzling, but equally plausible 
observation about colour perception is the fact that the nature of a colour can be at least 
partia l ly known via transitory and non-standard experiences such as perceiving an after-
image, or a neuroscientifica l ly- induced flash of colour111.  For example, if Jackson’s (1982) 
Mary can induce a momentary il lusory perception of a flash of red mist in herself , 
intuitively this wil l suffice for her to ‘know what i t’s like’ to perceive red, and recognise, 
remember and imagine objects with that colour.  It is diff icult to reconcile this observation 
about the ease with which colours can be known with the last section’s sensorimotor 
account.  Implicit expectations about the ways in which appearance wil l vary with 
movement do not seem to apply to afterimages or flashes of red mist, and neither 
experience can be plausibly described as involving taking an object to be modifying light in 
a certa in way.  Yet it is clear that each case involves an experience of colour, albeit an 
aberrant one. 
 
We saw in the previous chapter that the sensorimotor view faces similar problems in 
accounting for the perception of synaesthetic colours.  The problem was that subjects lack 
sensorimotor expectations about how their photism will change with movement, and as 
l ighting and other perceptually relevant conditions differ.  More generally, ta lk of 
sensorimotor skil ls implicated in perceiving a photism again seems inappropriate, since 
there is no worldly object for the subject to perceptually engage and interact with.  Because 
of the lack of commonality between the sensorimotor profiles of the sensations of veridica l 
and synaesthetic red, the sensorimotor view could not explain their phenomenological 
similarity.  The view of colour in outl ined in the previous section has similar difficulties 
                                                
110See Noë (2004, p.129-132) for a sampling of the range of sensorimotor contingencies he 
believes a perceiver must grasp to see colour.  
111 See e.g. Matthen’s (2005, p.249-250) discussion of Johnston’s “Revelation Thesis”, and 
h is own “Transparency Thesis” for further motivation of this observation. 
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in dealing with synaesthetic sensations, since synaesthetes do not take their photisms to 
be ways of modifying light, or have implicit expectations about the different colour looks 
a photism would present in different circumstances. 
 
The view of the previous section also has problems accommodating experiences of 
‘impossible colours’.  For example, fixating for a while on the blue patch below then on the 
middle of the black square to its right wil l result in an after-image that appears dark 




The physics of coloured objects precludes there ever being such a colour in the world.  Not 
only do we lack sensorimotor expectations about possible variations in our afterimage, the 
colour of the afterimage does not correspond to a possible way an object could modify l ight.  
The sensorimotor theorist a lso faces the chal lenge of specifying what the sensorimotor 
contingencies involved in the perception of such a colour could be, and explaining how 
perceivers can have implicit knowledge of these contingencies for colours which they have 
never before experienced, and would previously have deemed impossible112. 
 
Lastly, a less esoteric worry is whether the sensorimotor account can explain the sense in 
which the squares in the checkerboard i l lusion appear the same colour, and my office wal l 
appears differently coloured across its surface.  Though this isn’t the way we usually 
perceive them, it seems undeniable that they sometimes appear this way.  Looking at my 
wall, I can see it as now uniform in colour, now varying – how is this possible if my 
perception of its colour only involves my implicitly taking it to be modifying light in a 
certain way?   
 
Perhaps a sensorimotor theorist should respond that the different ways of perceiving the 
wall correspond to different ways of taking it to be modifying light.  One problem with 
                                                
112 The figure is from Churchland (2005), p.548.  See Churchland for samples which produce 
impossibly dark versions, impossibly bright versions, and impossibly saturated versions of 
various different hues, and an explanation of this in terms of opponent-processing models.  
Recall a lso the aff inity between such models and the action-space account noted in section 
2. 
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this l ine of response is that considering it shows that understanding the sense in which we 
‘take’ an object to be changing the l ight is problematic. If such ‘taking’ is supposed to be 
something that I know about, then to the extent that i t  is plausible to suppose I possess such 
knowledge, I know the wall to be modifying light in a constant way across its surface, not in 
a way that differs according to whether a portion is in light or shade.  On the other hand, 
if the way the wall modifies light is supposed to be something that I automatically grasp 
in perception, how can we explain my abil i ty to attend selectively to the different ways of 
perceiving it?113 
 
Just as the sensorimotor account could readily meet the challenges posed for the action-
space account, the action-space account is ideally placed to accommodate the cases 
considered in this section, each of which poses a problem for, if not a counterexample to, 
the sensorimotor theory.  This is clearest for the cases of colour constancy and the 
checkerboard i l lusion just considered – recall from section 3 that the action-space account 
tel ls us why the portions of my office wall look differently coloured, but not why they also 
appear uniformly coloured.  We can see how it can handle the other cases from this section 
by recall ing its treatment of synaesthetic colours (3.3).  I argued that in contrast to the lack 
of commonalities between the sensorimotor profi les of synaesthetic and worldly colours, 
there are substantia l similarities in the suites of actions empowered in each type of colour 
experience, such as pop-out, priming, interference and Stroop effects.   Ultimately, the 
perceptual similarities between synaesthetic and worldly colours are explained by such 
similarities in the way a subject is poised to sift, sort and track those colours in a way th a t 
respects their perceptible similarities and dissimilarities to other colours to which the 
subject is perceptually sensitive. 
 
The action-space account treats after-images analogously.  As with synaesthetic colours, 
the after- images a perceiver can experience can be located in a multi-dimensional space 
whose geometry is dictated by the range of discriminations the perceiver can and cannot 
rel iably make between its constituent points.  After-images are experienced as similar to 
worldly colours insofar as they stand in relations of relative similarity and difference to 
other perceptible after-images that are similar to the discriminabil i ty relations tha t 
obtain between worldly perceptible colours.  As we have seen, the space of perceptible 
after-images wil l include colours that could not exist in reali ty, such as yellowish blacks.  
The content and character of such impossible colours is likewise explained by the 
                                                
113 Moreover, we might question whether a response suggesting that we switch between two 
ways of perceiving the wall is phenomenologically apt – when we have attended to both 
of them, don’t we see both the constancy and the variation in its colour at once?  See Noë 
(forthcoming) for discussion of this topic. 
 112 
discriminabil i ty relations they stand in to the other colours, standard and impossible, 
that the perceiver can experience.  Were it possible to make Munsell chips yellowish-
black, and other impossible colours, these colours would have been charted by the 
procedure outl ined in section 2.  The fact that such afterimages are both impossible and 
perceptibly coloured shows that the space of discriminations available to a subject outstrips 
the space of physically possible colours114.   
 
In light of al l th is, we can see that the action-space account can readily accommodate the 
point about the subjectivity of colour with which we began this section.  According to the 
action-space view, an after-image or neuroscientifica l ly- induced flash suffices to give a 
perceiver knowledge of a colour since the perceiver automatically and implicitly grasps 
both its place in a network of similar and different colours, and the discriminatory and 
other abil i ties that are enabled in virtue of this. 
 
 
4.5 A Two-Level Enactive Theory of Colour Perception 
 
We have considered two types of enactive theory of colour perception.  Each enjoys strong 
empirical support, and can give promising treatments of cases that confound the other 
view.  But each a lso faces serious problems from cases and observations that the other can 
easi ly handle.  It is natural to wonder whether this situation could be resolved by 
combining the two views. 
 
The two views are prima facie compatible, and there is even reason to think that the 
sensorimotor view stands in independent need of someth ing like the action-space view as a 
component.  The sensorimotor theorist cla ims that we perceive colours by understanding a 
set of possible ways their appearances could change according to different viewing 
conditions.  But the sensorimotor theory as it stands gives no account of these changing 
appearances, only of the higher level property explained by perceivers’ grasp of the 
structures of such possible changes.  In response, we can hold that the action-space theory 
provides the necessary explanation of colour appearances. 
 
The sensorimotor theorist might respond that no such independent account is required - the 
colour appearances they appeal to can be accounted for in terms of the systematic relations 
obtaining between the sensorimotor profi les of colours, rather than in terms of some more 
                                                
114 Recall that a neat explanation of the extent of these abil i ties is afforded by taking 
them to be partly enabled by the H-J opponent processing network (Churchland 2005) 
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basic account.  On such a view, a perceiver understands that an object’s look would differ a 
certain way in different viewing conditions by understanding the different sensorimotor 
profile that the object would look to have in such viewing conditions.  But this wil l not 
work.  The major advantage of the sensorimotor theory was that, by identifying an object’s 
colour with the objective property of modifying l ight in a constant way, it could 
accommodate intuitions and cases that turn on the objective aspect of colour perception.  But 
the solution under consideration shifts from viewing colour perception as a matter of a 
perceiver latching on to an objective property via their grasp of sensorimotor relations, to 
viewing it as a matter of a perceiver taking an object to look as if it has a certa in 
sensorimotor profi le, that stands in systematic relations to other sensorimotor profi les the 
object would look to have in different circumstances.  This undermines the objective aspect 
that made the sensorimotor theory attractive.  If the objectivity of the theory is to be 
maintained, grasping a sensorimotor profi le cannot be accounted for in terms of 
understanding what closely related sensorimotor profi les would look l ike, since this makes 
grasp of sensorimotor profi les holistica l ly defined in terms of a perceiver’s implicit 
knowledge of the profiles’ relations of apparent similarity and difference in just the way 
that resulted in a problematically subjectivist account for the action-space theorist.  To 
preserve the objectivity of the account, then, the sensorimotor profi le an object possesses 
cannot be explained in terms of how it and related profiles appear to the perceiver - an 
object’s having a certa in sensorimotor profi le must be an objective matter.  We might 
appeal to subjective considerations, such as understanding of the systematic relationships 
between actual and possible patterns of looks, to explain how a perceiver comes to be able 
to grasp the objective sensorimotor profi le, but such an understanding cannot be what 
constitutes this grasp, on pain of the sensorimotor account surrendering its objective aspect115.  
This point about objectivity, coupled with the sensorimotor theory’s inabil i ty to give an 
account of cases with which the action-space account can deal naturally, shows that we 
need an account of the underpinnings of the changing appearances to which the 
sensorimotor theory appeals, and the arguments of sections 4.1 and 4.4 give us good reasons 
to think that this account should be in action-space terms.  But the point also gives us 
reason to question whether we were right to think of the work of Broackes and POR as 
motivating a sensorimotor view in the first place.  
 
                                                
115 A simpler though less decisive way of arguing against this sensorimotor solution would 
be an appeal to the subjectivist intuition that there must be some appearances that stand 
behind sensorimotor profi les and need explained – for example, that we can remain neutra l 
on how we take something to be li t, and sti l l think that it looks a certa in way.  If we are 
convinced that such a look needs an explanation, we wil l need to look past the sensorimotor 
view to find one. 
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Our point was that to accommodate objectivist facts about colour, the property to which we 
appeal must be an objective property of the object, not merely a function of the way things 
appear to the perceiver.  The conception of colours as ways of modifying light is attractive 
since it provides a well-motivated way of honouring this point.  But how is identifying 
colour with this objective property supposed to support the sensorimotor view?  Wha t 
motivates the sensorimotor theorists’ cla im that POR’s work uncovers “the intrinsic 
sensorimotor structure of colours” (Hurley and Noë (2007, p.10))?  Their intuitive idea is 
that knowledge of the way colour appearances change with movement and other 
conditions is necessary to grasp the objective colour property an object has.  But compare 
this way of coming to perceiver an object’s colour with the way we come to perceive its 
shape.  The shape of an object can be revealed to me by my understanding of the ways in 
which its appearance changes as I move around it.  But this does not mean we should have 
a sensorimotor theory of what it is for an object to have a certa in shape, or conclude tha t 
the objective property of shape has an ‘intrinsic sensorimotor structure’.  Rather, shape is 
an objective property that can be grasped in perception as a result of sensorimotor 
knowledge.  Likewise, colour is an objective property of objects, perceptual grasp of which 
can be enabled by sensorimotor knowledge. 
 
When considering the support afforded to the sensorimotor view by the work of Broackes 
and POR, we should a lso note that a perceiver’s grasp of the possible perceptual effects of 
their movement with respect to an object is, on their views, only part of what might be 
involved in coming to see how that object modif ies l ight.  Understanding the different 
ways that the object might look under different sorts of light source, when in the shade of 
another object, or as other colour-critica l conditions vary can al l contribute to coming to 
perceive that an object modifies l ight in a certa in way.  And we have been given no 
compell ing reason to think that such relations between appearance and perceptual context 
should be construed as part of the sensorimotor profi le of the object – they look l ike facts 
about relations between objects, l ight sources, and appearances, not about relations between 
a perceiver’s possible movements and appearances.  It seems fair to say that some set of 
counterfactuals contributes to a sensorimotor profi le only when they concern the ways in 
which perceptual appearances change with movement relative to the perceiver – but if we 
define sensorimotor profi les in this natural way, counterfactuals about variations of 
appearance with changes in light sources are ineligible for admission, since those changes 
can obtain without a change in the relative position of the perceiver and the object.  We 
have, then, two reasons for suspicion of the cla im that a conception of colours as ways of 
changing light supports the sensorimotor theory.  Firstly, since sensorimotor properties or 
profiles are relations between possible movements and possible appearances, such 
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properties or profiles cannot accommodate the point that colour is an objective and enduring 
properties that made it appealing to see colours as ways of changing light.  Secondly, on 
this view of the nature of sensorimotor properties and profiles, there are many factors tha t 
can contribute to a grasp of an object’s way of modifying light that should not be understood 
in sensorimotor terms, such as the relationships between changes in the light fa l l ing on a 
static object, and the way those changes effect the appearances that object presents to a 
static perceiver. 
 
If this is right, then an understanding of sensorimotor relations can be invoked to explain 
how grasp of an objective property is enabled, but not how it is constituted, on pain of losing 
the objectivity of colour perception.  What, then, is constitutive of the perceptual grasp 
that an object has a certa in colour property?  I propose that just as perceptual grasp that an 
object displays a certa in colour look consists in the perceiver’s implicit knowledge of the 
range of abil i ties her perceptual sensitivity enables in her (4.1), perceiving that an object 
has a certa in objective colour-property consists in the perceiver’s implicit knowledge of 
abil i ties to co-classify, re-identify, and track the object on the basis of her perceptual 
sensitivity to that property.  If this is a tenable option for perceptual grasp of appearance 
properties, it can be applied to our grasp of higher-level objective colour properties too.  
Perceiving objective colour properties is, as Broackes and POR suggest, a matter of 
perceiving the way l ight is being modif ied.  Knowledge of sensorimotor dynamics – for 
instance, of the ways in which the pattern of colour-looks displayed by an object or surface 
would alter with colour-critica l conditions – is likely to form part of an explanation of how 
subjects can grasp this property in perception.  But whilst sensorimotor knowledge might 
help to enable such a grasp, I am cla iming that the grasp itself consists in a subject’s abil i ty 
to act with respect to coloured objects – sifting, sorting, tracking, comparing and re-
identifying them – in a way that respects their possession of the property of modifying 
l ight in a constant way.  Thus, colour perception emerges as another case where appeal to 
sensorimotor dynamics may play a role, but only in enabling the subject to take herself to be 
poised over a space of enabled actions in a certa in way.  Such knowing poise is the essentia l 
feature of colour experience, not the sensorimotor dynamics which help to enable it. 
 
The argument of this section has been that the theories of colour-perception of 4.1 and 4.3 
need to be combined.  But thinking about how the sensorimotor approach could 
accommodate the objective aspect of colour perception that was supposed to be its strength 
led us to reconsider the extent to which the conception of colour the sensorimotor theorist 
appeals to really supports their view.  We concluded that understanding sensorimotor 
dynamics can explain how our sensitivity to objective colours is enabled, but not how it is 
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constituted, on pain of losing the objectivity of colour perception.  In light of this, I 
proposed that we should extend our action-space account to perception of objective colours.  
We arrive at a two-level enactive theory of colour perception.  At each level, colour 
perception is a matter of the enabling of a characteristic suite of actions of sifting, co-
classif ication, re-identif ication, and the l ike.  Understanding of sensorimotor dynamics 
plays an important role in showing us how the two tiers of our account are related – the 
suite of classif icatory and discriminatory actions constitutive of objective colour perception 
at our second level is enabled by our grasp of the patterns of and relationships between the 
colour looks at our first level.  Our two-level theory of colour-perception is empirica l ly 
well-supported and can accommodate both the subjective and objective aspects of colour 
perception.  Whi lst each of its two-levels is explained in terms of the action-space theory, 
i t can nonetheless accommodate the important but indirect role that grasp of sensorimotor 
relations plays in colour perception. 
 
 
4.6 Synaesthetic Sensations and Special Spectacles Reassessed 
 
We have arrived at a view according to which colour perception has both a subjective and 
an objective aspect.  Most of the time, when we perceive colour we perceive it as an 
objective and enduring property, and one that an object can manifestly possess by appearing 
in one of several different ways, depending on lighting and contrast effects, the perceiver’s 
current state of perceptual adaptation, and so forth.  We have good reason to think tha t 
this property is the way the object modifies incident into reflected l ight.  According to our 
action-space account, sensitivity to this property contributes to the character of a subject’s 
experience when that subject understands herself to be empowered to act in various ways – 
sifting, sorting, classifying, comparing, re-identifying – on the basis of that sensitivity.  
But there is a lso a subjective aspect to colour perception on our account.  This is because we 
see the colour properties an object possesses by or through seeing patterns in the ways that 
the object appears to be coloured, where ‘appearing to be coloured’ in a certa in way is 
compatible with possessing any one of a variety of objective colour properties.  The action-
space account of such colour appearance properties fol lows Austen Clark (1993, 2007) and 
Pettit (2003) in grounding our experience of such appearances in enabled abil i ties to sif t , 
sort, track and classify.  In contrast to the case where a subject takes herself to be able to act 
with respect to an object in ways appropriate to its objective colour, a subject may take 
herself to be empowered to act in ways appropriate to an object’s colour appearance whilst 
understanding that a very different set of actions are appropriate with respect to i ts 
objective colour.  A stark instance of such a case would be when a synaesthete takes herself 
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to be able to sift, sort and track a grapheme in ways appropriate to green objects, whi lst 
nonetheless understanding that the grapheme should be sorted with other black 
characters, is more similar in colour to brown than to blue, and so forth.  Another such case 
would be when a subject sees that a spot catching the light on a dark blue vase looks almost 
white, whilst sti l l understanding that the vase is coloured uniformly al l over, and is more 
similar in colour to black than to white.  Coming to see an object as coloured in a certa in 
way involves coming to understand the regularities and significances in the patterns of 
appearances it presents.  In some cases, this might involve having sensorimotor 
expectancies about the ways the objects appearance would differ with movement.  In some 
cases, it might not – perhaps in some cases the perceiver’s grasp of how an object would look 
were it l i t differently, or were the perceiver in a different state of adaptation suffices for 
perceiving its objective colour116.  Ultimately, however, sensorimotor knowledge is of only 
instrumental importance for a perceiver’s grasp of the significance of appearance 
properties – important only to the extent that it contributes to their grasp of the way that 
an object can be sifted, sorted, tracked and classified according to the way in which it 
changes the l ight. 
 
Our account brings out the fact that our previous survey of synaesthetic sensations and 
special spectacles suppressed certa in subtleties.  The fact that one phenomenon is deal t 
with by the subjective, and one by the objective, component of our account of colour shows 
that the action-space account does not treat them in exactly the same way, a point which 
we were not in a position to see in the last chapter.  But the asymmetry in the action-space 
account’s treatment of these two cases is well-motivated by our two-level theory, and 
corresponds to an asymmetry in the way colours are experienced – as subjective phenomena 
in one case, and as objective properties in the other.  This view of the cases suggests an 
answer to the general question posed by Hurley and Noë (2007) – why don’t synaesthet ic 
colours adapt away?  More generally, how can a single theory of colour perception explain 
both the persistence of synaesthetic colours, and the adaptation to Kohler’s goggles?  The 
action-space account’s response is that the peculiarity of each of these cases l ies in the ir 
pull ing apart one aspect of colour experience from the other that usually complements i t .  
In synaesthetic colour experience, subjective colour looks are divorced from their usual role 
of indicating, as part of a larger pattern of colour looks, objective colour properties.  In 
                                                
116 Noë (2004, p.169) cla ims that the way an object changes its appearance changes as a 
result of the way it’s l it is one of the sensorimotor contingencies relevant to colour 
perception.  However, since movements of the perceiver, object or light source are not 
necessary for an object to change its appearance as a result of the way it is l it, it seems 
implausible to suggest that we should understand the relationship between appearance 
and lighting conditions in terms of patterns of dependence between sensation and 
movement. 
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Kohler’s adaptation results, we find that perceptual grasp of objective colour properties 
can, given sufficient time, adapt to radical distortions in the usual patterns of looks 
underlying those properties.  Thus, our account suggests, synaesthetic colours fai l to adapt 
away because synaesthetes do not take them to be indicative of objective colour properties 
in the same way as standard subjective colour looks – perhaps due to the unusual stimuli 
those colours attach themselves to, perhaps due to the fact that they fa i l to figure in 
larger patterns of subjective looks or display sensitivity to changes in colour-critica l 
conditions in the same way as standard subjective colour looks, or perhaps due to some 
other feature of the way synaesthetes process those colours, which further understanding 
of the neural basis of synaesthesia may uncover.  By contrast, the distortion in the 
perception of objective colour properties caused by Kohler’s goggles does adapt away, since 
over the course of adaptation perceivers come to manifest an automatic perceptual grasp of 
a fact that they explicitly knew all a long – that the aberrant looks caused by donning the 
goggles do not reflect the way objective colour properties are distributed.  Adaptation 
consists in the perceiver’s acclimatising to the new patterns of subjective looks that are now 
indicative of particular colour properties, and thus coming to see objective colour properties 
as distributed in the way they did before donning the goggles.  When the goggles are 
removed, they must relearn the old sets of relations between subjective appearances and 
objective properties, and thus go through another period of perceptual distortion and 
eventual adaptation117. 
This account of adaptation to Kohler’s goggles seems to imply an account of the subject’s 
phenomenology during adaptation process slightly at odds to the one suggested thus far.  
Standardly, interpreters of Kohler’s results speak as if colour vision returns entirely to 
normal over the course of adaptation (Hurley (1998), Petti t (2003), Hurley and Noë 
(2007)), and whilst we have not explicitly endorsed this assumption in our discussion of 
these results, neither have we questioned it.  However, if the action-space account claims 
that adaptation consists in learning to see objects as modifying light in a certa in way 
through seeing the aberrant patterns of colour looks introduced by the goggles, we should 
                                                
117 The account of adaptation to Kohler’s goggles I give here looks similar to those 
provided by Pettit (2003) and Hurley and Noë (2007), each of which invokes sensorimotor 
expectations on the part of the subject.  But any appeal to sensorimotor dynamics is again, 
on my account, of only indirect relevance to explaining the content and character of 
perception – Hurley and Noë suggest that adaptation is triggered since subjects implicit ly 
know all along that the colours of objects do not change in response to head and eye-
movements as they seem to upon first donning the goggles.  On the action-space account, 
however, subjects only have such sensorimotor expectations because they implicitly know 
that objects are invariantly apt to be sifted, sorted and categorised according to the ir 
colours in ways unaffected by head and eye movements.  It is thus implicit knowledge about 
objects and the ways in which they should be treated, rather than about the ways in 
which sensation changes with movement, that explains the fact that adaptation occurs. 
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expect subjects in the experiment to report that colour properties appear to be distributed as 
they did before the goggles were donned, whilst the patterns of colour looks presented by 
the world through the goggles remain distorted.  Does this prediction – that objects appear 
to be veridically coloured whilst the subject’s colour sensations remain distorted – even 
make sense?  Is there any evidence in its favour in Kohler’s reports?  In fact, strange as our 
prediction may sound, it seems to square very well with how subjects describe the ir 
experiences of adaptation.  For example, even after 60 days, at the height of h is 
adaptation, and whilst reporting that objects appear veridically coloured, Kohler says 
that: 
 
“The distracting effect which the spectacles had in the beginning is completely 
gone now.  Now I actually feel comforted by the sight of a table which looks blue 
on one side and yellow on the other.  I am so used to it that I would get upset if i t 
were otherwise…” (Kohler (1964, p.113)   
 
This suggests that whilst he perceives objects to be coloured as they were before he donned 
the spectacles, a focus on the way things subjectively appear to him reveals that the 
distortion in colour looks caused by the spectacles is sti l l present.  Similarly, twenty days 
after the spectacles had been removed (with full re-adaptation occurring after thirty 
days), Kohler reports: 
 
‘I have become total ly immune to the distracting influence of a l l these novel 
impressions.  I can now work for hours on end without being the least bit 
inconvenienced by this great variety of discolourations.  However, I am sti l l aware 
that they are there.’ (Ibid. p.115) 
 
This again suggests that adaptation consists in learning to see objective colour properties 
through the distortions in colour appearances that have been put in place, not necessari ly in 
an alteration of those appearances themselves.  These kinds of reports are just what we 
would expect were the two-level view defended here correct. 
 
We also noted in 3.2 that subjective reports of perceptual adaptation are supported by 
improved performance at a task where the subject must manually adjust the hue displayed 
by a colour wheel unti l it contains no traces of blue or yellow.  However, we did not mention 
there that subjects’ performance at this task improves by only fifty percent, a finding 
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apparently at odds with their reports about the extent of their adaptation118.  But when 
we note that the matching task consists in categorising a single colour patch, under fixed 
l ighting conditions, against a uniform background, and recall the similarity between th is 
and the procedures we outl ined to chart the similarity space of colour looks in 4.1, the fact 
that subjects show only l imited adaptation in this context looks less surprising for our two-
level view.  This particular task is suited to probe the way things subjectively appear to 
perceivers, and the differences between this context and colour vision in a naturally l i t , 
inhomogeneous and freely-explorable environment make it, on our account, an imperfect 
measure of how perceivers take objects to be coloured.  If subjects adapt with respect to the 
objective colour properties they perceive things to have, but not with respect to the colour-
looks they experience, we should expect such a measure to show imperfect adaptation at 
best119.  Also in keeping with our interpretation here is the fact that subjects’ colour 
categorisations in ‘free vision’, with none of the restrictions characteristic of the above 
laboratory set-up adapted almost completely, in contrast to the level of adaptation 
suggested by the colour-wheel experiment (ibid, p.45).  Kohler’s adaptation results seem to 
support our two-level view’s division between subjective colour sensations and the way 
objects in fact appear to be coloured. 
 
We should conclude, then, that our two-level account of colour perception provides a 
natural way to make sense of the lack of adaptation in synaesthesia, and the presence of 
adaptation in Kohler’s results.  It a lso seems apt to explain the apparent discrepancies in 
subject’s reports, and different measures of adaptation – subjects come to perceive objective 
colour properties as veridically distributed, whilst their subjective experiences of colour 
remain distorted.  Colour perception, on our account, has a subjective and an objective 
aspect, but both are to be understood in terms of the ways a subject takes herself to be 
empowered to act on the basis of her perceptual sensitivity. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                
118 “A blue of one half its initia l intensity on the colour wheel was sufficient to compensate 
for the yellow of the spectacles, and the blue of the spectacles was judged to be completely 
equal to gray – in other words, the subject no longer perceived it as colour.” (Ibid. p.114)  
This fact is also neglected in the other enactivist discussions of Kohler’s results. 
119 There are various possible explanations of why th is measure reveals even a fi f ty 
percent adaptation available to the action-space theorist.  The most simple explanation 
would be that the measure probes partly for how things are subjectively coloured for the 
subject, and partly for the objective colour the subject takes things to have.  A more complex 
proposal might be that the way colours subjectively appear and the way things appear to 
be objectively coloured are not independent of each other – thus, as a subject’s objective 
colour-categorisations adapt to distorted subjective impressions, the subjective impressions 
might adapt with them to some extent.  I won’t attempt to adjudicate between these 
possibil i ties here. 
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I have been arguing for a two-level action-space view of colour perception.  Perceiving 
objective colour is a matter of implicitly grasping how objects can be sifted, sorted, tracked 
and re-identif ied on the basis of the way in which they modify l ight.  This is enabled by a 
grasp of the significance of the current patterns of colour-appearances, and how those 
appearances might vary with colour-critica l conditions, and those appearances are in turn 
explained in terms of a perceiver’s abil i ties to sift, sort and track colours in a way tha t 
places them in a set of relations of similarity and difference that make up perceptual 
colour space.  We have seen that this two-level view can accommodate both the subjective 
and the objective dimension of colour experience, and can deal with problem cases such as 
colour constancy, colour il lusions, afterimages, impossible colours and synaesthetic 
sensations.  Additionally, we saw in the last section that our two-level view accurately 
predicts the unusual phenomenology and apparent discrepancies between different 
measures of perceptual adaptation that we find in Kohler’s experiments with colour-
distorting goggles.  A question that arises for such a view, however, is why it deserves to be 
called a theory of colour experience – why not, for example, take it as a thesis about the 
action-oriented contents of colour experiences?  In 4.1 and 4.5 I stated that, according to the 
action-space account, the enabled abil i ties that explain our colour perception have an 
upshot in conscious experience of colour only when the subject understands that those 
abil i ties are enabled for her – when she is able to integrate those abil i ties with her 
ongoing practical reasoning.  We have been given some reason to endorse this cla im by our 
interpretation of the DVS results in chapter 2, according to which integrabil i ty of 
information with practical reasoning is a functional ha llmark of visual consciousness, and 
perhaps from the plausible treatment the action-space account affords of various cases of 
blindsight, neglect, and the putative counterexamples considered in 3.5.  But what does 
such a requirement of understanding or integrabil i ty really amount to?  And how does it put 
us in a position to meet the challenge from the explanatory gap set out in chapter 1?  The 
next two chapters address these questions – in chapter 5 I say more about the sense in which 
a perceiver must ‘understand’ the abil i ties enabled by her perceptual sensitivity to her 
environment if they are to issue in conscious experience, and in chapter 6 I discuss how the 
action-space account at which we have arrived contains the resources for a dissolution of 
the explanatory gap. 
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Chapter 5: On Thinking Before You Act 
 
 
The action-space account we have been developing claims that conscious experience is a matter 
of implicitly knowing, or having a certa in kind of access to, the ways one is poised to act in and 
upon one’s environment.  We have seen various empirically-motivated arguments for th is 
proposal, and in the next chapter I shall argue that adopting the action-space framework 
suggests a promising way of addressing the ‘Hard problem’ of consciousness with which we 
began in chapter 1.  In this chapter I want to address a lacuna in our sketch of the action-space 
account thus far – the question of how to cash out the crucial appeal to ‘implicit knowledge’ of, 
or access to, or understanding of, enabled actions.  I argue that such an appeal presents an 
apparent problem for enactive theories of consciousness, both action-space and sensorimotor.  
One advantage of enactive theories was supposed to be their abil i ty to explain the presence of 
consciousness in creatures without l inguistic or conceptual abil i ties.  But the most natural 
construal of enactive theories’ appeals to knowledge or access tie them to just such cognitively 
demanding abil i ties, threatening to deny conscious experience to agents who intuitively 
possess it.  Section one brings out the problem, and the constraints on a solution that our 
characterisation of the problem imposes.  Section two outlines Susan Hurley’s ‘shared circuits 
model’, which will frame our discussion of the solution, and section three clarif ies how th is 
bears on the problem as sketched in section one.  Section four sums up how the action-space 
requirement should cash out its appeal to ‘implicit  knowledge’ or ‘access’ in light of the 
previous sections.  The final sections tie up loose ends, clarifying how the materia l of th is 
chapter relates to our account of colour experience in section five, and exploring the extent to 
which our solution suggests a blurring of the boundaries between sensorimotor and action-space 
accounts of conscious perception in section six.  
 
 
5.1  The Problem 
 
 
Recall the reason why sensorimotor and action-space theorists appeal to implicit knowledge 
or non-inferentia l access in the first place.  If a theory of consciousness is to be a grounded in an 
appeal to sensorimotor dependencies or the actions enabled for an agent, then it must appeal to 
more than the fact that we can describe a system in terms of the contingencies that obtain 
between its actions and its perceptions, or the ways in which its sensitivity to its environment 
enables it to behave.  Merely carrying information about the dependencies obtaining between 
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action and perception cannot suffice for conscious experience.  After al l, a standard thermostat 
can do that, as evinced by its abili ty to respond to an input temperature (perception) with an 
output signal that wil l successfully bring about the desired temperature (action).  We should 
reject a theory that makes a standard thermostat a seat of perceptual consciousness.  Likewise, 
i t cannot be enough to be perceptually sensitive to the ways an environment affords 
satisfaction of your goals – after a l l, our thermostat can do that too, as evinced by its abil i ty to 
use information about the environmental temperature to achieve its goal of heating the room 
to a certa in level.  In light of this, we need to add an extra requirement that perceivers must 
meet if their enactive credentia ls are to result in consciousness.  Both action-space and 
sensorimotor theorists have proposed that the agents enactive knowledge must be somehow 
integrated with thought, planning and reasoning to result in conscious experience.  I’l l ca l l 
these ‘integration requirements’. 
 
For example, we find sensorimotor theorists cla iming that: 
 
“For a creature (or a machine for that matter) to possess [conscious] visual awareness, 
what is required is that, in addition to exercising the mastery of the relevant 
sensorimotor contingencies, it must make use of this exercise for the purposes of thought 
and planning…To see is to explore one’s environment in a way that is mediated by one’s 
mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, and to be making use of this mastery in one’s 
planning, reasoning and speech behaviour.”  
O’Regan and Noë (2001), p.944 
 
Likewise, the action-space account appeals to implicit knowledge of, or a kind of automatic 
access to, the space of enabled actions over which the agent is currently poised.  Recall tha t 
DF (or DF’s brain) can use visual information to correctly orient her hand to post a card 
through a slot, but without conscious experience of the slot’s orientation.  The action-space 
account explains this lack of experience in terms of DF’s lack of knowledge of the space of 
actions her perceptual sensitivity to the environment currently affords.  The closest we have 
come to making this cla im about her lack of knowledge explicit is suggesting it should be 
understood in terms of DF’s lack of access to the information about the slot’s orientation – 
though this information is clearly being processed (since her behaviour is differentia l ly 
sensitive to the slot’s orientation), DF is unable to factor this information in to her ongoing 
practical reasoning in the way that a normal perceiver faced with such a task could.  Hence 
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she requires the intermediary of a prompt from the experimenter before this information can 
be put to use in her current project of the posting task. 
 
Each enactive theory clearly needs some story about why the sensorimotor contingencies and 
sensitivity to possible actions in terms of which we can characterize the behaviour of a 
thermostat do not issue in conscious experience.  But the brief stories about the avai labil i ty of 
the contingencies or enabled actions to reasoning and planning offered thus far risk moving the 
bar for conscious experience too far in the opposite direction, denying conscious experience to 
agents who intuitively possess it.  For the orthodox way of understanding the capacities for 
thinking, reasoning and planning to which each account appeals is in terms of a conceptual, 
l inguistic model.  The brief way of stating the problem with which I am concerned in th is 
chapter is that the action-space account appeals to an agent’s nonconceptual grasp of the space 
of actions her environment affords, but cashes that grasp out in terms of the integrabil i ty of 
those affordances with capacities for thought, reasoning and planning that are (prima facie) 
paradigmatically conceptual120.  
 
To bring out the less-brief way of stating the problem, we need to sample some of the reasons 
for viewing thought, planning and reasoning in this way.  First, note that it is indeed natural 
to think of the integration requirements offered by each theory as appeals to the abil i ty to 
enterta in certa in (yet to be fully specif ied) sort of thoughts about sensorimotor contingencies or 
enabled actions.  Each requirement cla ims that the creature’s enactive knowledge must be 
evinced not merely in its behaviour, but also in its thought, by way of its abil i ty to use th is 
knowledge to inform reasoning and planning.  But, for better or worse, the default method 
employed by philosophers for understanding capacities for thought in general, and reasoning 
and planning in particular, is a l inguistic one, tying it to the abil i ty to token mental states 
with conceptual content and freely recombinable constituents.  I’l l ca l l such a view ‘the orthodox 
                                                
120 Another motivation for the integration requirement might be Evans’ cla im that perceptual 
information can only become perceptual experience “when it serves as the input to a thinking, 
concept-applying and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans and deliberations are 
a lso systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input.  When th is 
happens, we can say that the person, rather than some part of his brain, receives and processes 
the information.” (Evans (1982): 158 original ita l ics).  One reason for holding such a view 
would be the thought that it is a necessary condition on experiences that they be had from a 
particular perspective.  I say a l i ttle about how the action-space account can accommodate 
such a view in the last section of this chapter, on the relation between my position and 
Hurley’s. 
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conception’.  I won’t try to do justice here to a l l the ph ilosophically complex motivations for 
such a conception, but here is a sample. 
 
It’s widely accepted that an essentia l feature of thoughts is their capacity to stand in certa in 
rational or inferentia l relations to one another – enterta ining one thought can involve another 
thought’s being entailed, justif ied or ruled out.  We might think this because we need our 
analysis of thought to play a certa in role in an epistemological project, or because we think 
this is a conceptually necessary condition on what i t  is for something to be a thought, or for 
both these reasons.  Such a view of thought thus owes a story about how one mental state can 
rationally relate to another, and the standard one is in terms of inferentia l relations obtaining 
between those states.  Thus, one contentful state can justify another by being able to figure as a 
premise in a valid argument whose conclusion is the other state.  But if we subscribe to such a 
position, the states to be rationally related must be subject to some principles of 
decomposabil i ty and recomposabil i ty – they and their constituents must have a grammar tha t 
respects the rational relations in which they stand to other states121.  For example, the 
thought that ‘a is F’ might carry certa in entailments about the sorts of things that are and are 
not F, and the sorts of things that a is and is not; and the orthodox view of thought holds that 
such inferentia l relations are constitutive of that thought’s content.  So, on this view, it seems 
that attributing such a thought to a subject makes sense only if they can display a grasp of such 
inferentia l relations by, at the very least, being able to enterta in the thoughts which are 
inferentia l ly related to the original thought in such a way as to partia l ly constitute that 
thought’s content.  And this is l ikely to involve, at the very least, the abil i ty to think tha t 
other things are f, and that A has, or could have, other properties.   
 
Considerations such as this motivate the proposal of Evans’ ‘generality constraint’ (GC) as a 
ha llmark of conceptual thought.  GC demands that thoughts be closed under possible 
meaningful recombinations of their constituents – so if a subject can think ‘Conor is Irish’ and 
‘Ezio is Ita l ian’, they must also be able to think ‘Ezio is Irish’ and ‘Conor is Ita l ian’ according 
to GC.  Consequently, a thought’s satisfying GC implies “it has a fine-grained 
intrapropositional structure that enables the subject to decompose and recombine its elements 
promiscuously and transfer them to other contexts, and to generalize and make 
quantif icationally structured inferences that depend on such context-free decompositional 
                                                
121 My characterisation of these issues is influenced by Toribio (ms): Is Perception Compositional? 
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structure.”122  Philosophers such as Peacocke (1992, ch.2), McDowell (1998) and Davies (1992) 
think that satisfying GC is a conceptually necessary condition of having thought, whilst 
Fodor (1987) holds that it is an empirical matter whether a l l thinkers satisfy GC, but that i t 
is extremely unlikely that we will find a thinker that violates it123. 
 
All this begins to look problematic for enactive theories when we consider that the most 
obvious example of a domain where we find structured items that decompose and recombine in 
a general way, and can be inferentia l ly related to each other, is natural language and its 
sentences, words and meanings.  The most obvious way to account for an agent’s abil i ty to think, 
reason and plan, on the orthodox conception, would be to appeal to their credentia ls as a 
competent user of a language.  But a strength of enactivism was supposed to be its abil i ty to 
account for the presence of consciousness in non-linguistic agents.  Even if a defender of the 
orthodox conception thinks that abil i ties for thought can be explained without appeal to 
abil i ties to use a public language, they must sti l l hold that the thinker has language-like 
abil i ties – they can decompose, recombine, and make inferences on the basis of, certa in mental 
states just as if the contents of those mental states were sentences in a language.  So even if the 
orthodox view stops short of requiring linguistic abil i ties of a thinker, they sti l l have a 
cognitively demanding conception of the conditions that must be met in order to enterta in 
genuine thoughts – a conception such that many intuitively conscious agents wil l fa i l to meet 
i t. 
 
The past few paragraphs have been motivating the idea that the capacity to enterta in 
certain thoughts involves meeting GC, or some similar principles of de- and re-composabil i ty 
that can al low the requisite inferentia l relations between contents.  Will any of this be 
relevant to the action-space theory, which emphasises only the avai labil i ty of the action-
oriented contents of perception to reasoning and planning?  It seems so – unti l an enactive 
theory convinces us otherwise, the most natural way of construing reasoning and planning is as 
thought devoted to the topic of possible courses of action.  And the role of the rational and 
inferentia l relations that motivate constraints such as GC seems particularly pertinent for 
thought in this domain.  Reasoning and planning is naturally understood as involving 
counterfactual deliberation between a range of possible a lternatives, and the relative 
evaluation of the l ikely consequences of each of the possible courses of action.   In order to do 
                                                
122 Hurley (2006) section 3. 
123 These references are from Beck (ms.) 
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this, it seems that an agent must grasp that their current situation affords a range of possible 
actions, the ways in which those actions relate to l ikely consequences, and the ways in which 
those consequences relate to the agent’s current interests and projects.  The same consequence can 
be a good one in the l ight of one project, but a bad one in light of another.  And the same action 
could result in one sort of consequence in one environmental context, but a radically different one 
in another.  The domain of reasoning and planning seems to provide a particularly stark 
example of a case where an agent must manifest sensitivity to complex sets of rational 
relations obtaining between both the constituents of both real and counterfactually enterta ined 
environmental situations, actions, outcomes and projects.  And the orthodox view invites us to 
understand this abil i ty in terms of the agent’s being in cognitive states that i t can 
systematically decompose, recombine and inferentia l ly relate to each other, l ike the sentences 
of a natural language and their constituents. 
Thus, according to a natural view of thinking, reasoning and planning, if an agent’s 
grasp of the space of enabled actions that their perceptual environment currently affords is to 
be correctly described as figuring in her thought, her grasp must be such that she conforms to 
GC, or some similar principles of the possible de- and re-combinations of the constituents of her 
deliberations.  This is problematic for the action-space account’s cla im that access to a space of 
enabled actions need not be a conceptual achievement.  When setting out the action-space 
account, I cla imed that neither the appreciation of currently enabled actions nor the 
integration of that appreciation with planning and reasoning required full-f ledged, context-
neutral conceptual abil i ties.  A natural way of cashing this cla im out would be an appeal to 
the possibil i ty that the way in which a perceiver enterta ins the possibil i ty of an action, the 
satisfaction of a goal, or the relations between those actions and goals and the perceiver’s 
h igher- level plans and projects, might fa i l to meet GC: an agent’s perceptual sensitivity to a 
visually presented fruit might enable them to grasp that the fruit affords eating, whilst being 
unable to grasp that other objects to which they are perceptually sensitive do or do not afford 
eating, or that the satisfaction of other of their goals is or is not afforded by the fruit.  An 
agent’s grasp of the actions afforded by her environment was supposed to be a nonconceptual 
achievement since understanding it in terms of conceptual capacities has the counterintuitive 
consequence of ruling out many non-human agents and cognitively- impoverished human agents 
as seats of perceptual consciousness.  But the materia l in this section motivates the worry tha t 
we lack a grasp of what thinking, reasoning and planning could be, if not capacities that 
implicate concept use.  We can express the problem as an apparent dilemma for the action-
space account – it either lacks an integration requirement, ruling in too many systems as seats of 
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consciousness, or includes such a requirement, but in doing so rules out too many agents as seats of 
consciousness.  These conflicting pressures on the account have arisen because of a tension 
between two of its cla ims. On the one hand, we cla imed that the perceiver’s grasp of the ways 
in which she is poised to act is nonconceptual in virtue of her inabil i ty to flexibly decompose, 
recombine and make general inferences on the basis of, the constituents of the contents she 
grasps.  But, on the other hand, the account requires that the same content function as input to 
thinking, reasoning and planning – al l capacities that are naturally understood in terms 
abil i ties to decompose, recombine and make inferences on the basis of the constituents of the 
content grasped, which amount to the possession of conceptual capacities124. 
 
I think the enactivist should respond to this dilemma by agreeing that making sense of a 
content’s availabil i ty for use in thought, reasoning and planning requires that content to be 
subject to certa in principles of de- and re-composabil i ty, in a manner that respects the rational 
relations that obtain between possible contents.  But they should deny that this amounts to 
requiring that conscious agents possess full-fledged, language-l ike, context-neutral conceptual 
abil i ties.  We can make sense of planning, reasoning and thinking without requiring 
unrestricted recombinabil i ty of the constituents of the contents involved in those processes, and 
thus appeal to a notion of practical reasoning that requires more than mere responsiveness to 
the environment, but less than full-f ledged conceptual abil i ties.  Our solution should make 
intel l igible how an agent could be appropriately described as thinking, reasoning and 
planning without such abil i ties.  And the account which enables it to do so should be 
constructed in a way consistent with the enactive focus of our view.  The next sections develop a 
possible solution.  A consequence of what fol lows is that many non-human and human thinkers 
wil l violate GC, held by some to be a conceptual impossibil i ty.  The next sections suggest a 
way in which this might be so. 
 
 
5.2 Materials for a Solution: The Shared Circuits Model 
                                                
124 I’l l be assuming this notion of conceptuality in what fol lows.  It might be that there are 
reasons to view the less demanding form of reasoning, planning and thinking I’ll defend in the 
subsequent sections as involving concept use, but I won’t say anything about this issue.  See 
Toribio (ms.) and Poston (2007) for arguments that states that cannot be decomposed into freely 
recombinable constituents can sti l l be characterized as conceptual.  For what it’s worth, i t 
seems to me that a sensible moral to draw from the account I develop in what fol lows is that 
we shouldn’t think of conceptual thought as a l l or nothing – it comes in degrees, with l imited 




I’l l argue that considering Hurley’s (2004, 2008) ‘Shared Circuits Model’ (SCM) suggests how 
we can give the necessary response.  In this section I’l l outl ine the relevant features of the 
model, and in the next I’l l say how it bears on our problem.  Before that, some caveats.  SCM is 
a deep and complex proposal, and I’l l present a severely attenuated version of it, focusing only 
on the aspects relevant to my proposed solution.  I’l l thus be leaving out much of the empirical 
support for the model that Hurley draws from myriad sources.  Multiple suggestions concerning 
how SCM ties in with work in cognitive science at various levels can be found in her original 
treatments.  SCM is a thoroughly empirical and testable hypothesis, with an impressive 
level of detail .  As such, it could easi ly turn out to be false in some or al l of its aspects.  The 
proposal I develop here rel ies only on fairly high-level features of the view, and so might 
sti l l be a correct account of the way in which perceivers meet the integration requirement i f 
many of the low-level details of SCM are incorrect.  But I think my proposal has some value 
even if the aspects of SCM on which it rel ies turn out fa lse, since it outl ines one way (there may 
be others) in which an agent could meet the integration requirement in the absence of general 
conceptual abil i ties.  Part of the chal lenge suggested in the previous section was to 
demonstrate that this was even an intell igible possibil ity.  I cla im that the account I offer 
does this, even if it turns out that agents do not in fact meet the integration requirement in th is 
way.  Now, on to the model. 
 
SCM is proposed by Hurley as a model of subpersonal mechanisms that could enable personal-
level capacities.  A chief virtue of such a focus is the possibil i ty that by framing proposals 
about how information is processed at the subpersonal level, we can learn about how things are 
at the personal level, just as knowledge of the micro-structure of an economy can give us new 
insight into, and the resources to better characterize, its higher-level structures. Hurley 
wished to use the model to provide enabling explanations of social cognitive phenomena such 
as action-understanding and mind-reading.  We shan’t be concerned with these features of 
SCM here – our project is to investigate the extent to which it can provide us with a model of 
counterfactual deliberation about possible actions that could inform our integration 
requirement. 
 
To get a sense of SCM’s focus, and the use we’l l be making of it, note that much of its 
motivation is the provision of an account of imitation and imitative learning, and the ir 
significance.  Imitation is a demanding cognitive capacity that humans are particularly 
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disposed to, and that we find only in cognitively sophisticated creatures; demanding because 
i t requires an agent to perform a novel action to ach ieve a goal by copying another’s goal-
directed action.  Thus it’s distinct from the more common capacities for movement- or response-
priming, where only the means to a goal is copied (as in the coordinated flocking behaviour of 
birds, or schooling behaviour of fish), and goal emulation, where only the goal, but not the 
means is copied (as in a case where an agent perceives an attractive goal of another’s action, 
and tries to achieve that goal through their own means).  Imitation requires the copying of 
both, and thus an implicit grasp of the means/end relation between them.  Some such grasp of 
this relation is required since (for example) a monkey could use a tool to achieve a goal in the 
same way as she saw another monkey use the same tool for the same goal, but fa i l to be 
imitating – she may be copying only the action’s end, and has coincidentally adopted the same 
means to pursue it, or copying only the means, but has found that it can be used to achieve an 
end that she desires, that happens to coincide with the end of the action originally copied.  
Imitation requires a grasp of the means/end structure of intentional action, and thus turns out to 
involve “something phylogenetically rare: the flexible interplay of copying ends and copying 
means: a given movement can be used for different ends and a given end pursued by various 
means.” (Hurley (2008), p.5). 
 
Five different levels or layers of control mechanisms are described in SCM.  At layer 1, a 
system has the capacity for adaptive control of behaviour to achieve a goal, using 
environmental feedback as guidance.  For example, a thermostat has the goal of making the 
room a certa in temperature.  It achieves this goal by transducing an input signal – the room’s 
temperature – and using a comparator circuit to compute the difference between the actual and 
desired inputs.  We can say that this mode of control is an ‘inverse model’: one where the 
system employs a function that specifies a means, output or action on the basis of comparing 
actual and desired inputs.  It thus ‘maps goal to means’ (Ibid. p.22), or specif ies the means that 
wil l be used to achieve the goal.  This sort of control is adaptive – different outputs are needed 
for the same goal in different circumstances, and the control mechanism allows the system to 
select outputs in l ight of the state of the environment.  Importantly for our purposes (as wil l 
become apparent), Hurley hypothesizes that: 
 
“Specific means/ends associations or instrumental mappings can be chained (output A 
is the means to controlled result B, while B in turn is the means to controlled result C, 
and so on) or organized into hierarchies. There are independently determined 
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evolutionary, developmental, and individual differences in the grain and complexity 
of the possible control sequences and hierarchies of different creatures.” (Ibid. p.20-1) 
 
Thus, the control mechanisms a system uses for various of its actions might l ink up, or fa i l to 
l ink up, in various ways125.  An agent might have different subpersonal mechanisms controll ing 
i ts grasping behaviour depending on whether it employs a power or precision grip, and 
another mechanism that controls its throwing behaviour (for example).  The grasping and 
throwing mechanisms might l ink up – the power-grasping mechanism takes sensory inputs 
and, via use of an inverse model, converts them into motor outputs resulting in the grasping of 
the object.  The endpoint of this control mechanism could serve as the starting point of another 
mechanism126 – the throwing mechanism might take as input visual and/or proprioceptive 
information about an object held in a power-grip, and use an inverse model to form a motor plan 
detail ing the movements required to throw the object in a particular way.  But not a l l control 
circuits need l ink up in this way – there might be an agent who can throw objects held in 
power, but not in precision, grips.  We could explain th is by saying that the control circuit for 
power grips, but not for precision grips, is such that i t  can be linked to the circuit for throwing 
objects. 
 
Though the feedback-modulated control at layer one is adaptive, it is a lso slow, since the 
feedback runs through the environment.  Another drawback of such a minimal control system is 
the possibil i ty of overshooting its target value – our thermostat produces an output signal th a t 
is appropriate to its goal of making the room a certa in temperature, but the signal takes a 
while to have the requisite effect on the room’s temperature.  In the meantime, the thermostat 
has received environmental feedback tel l ing it tha t the room is sti l l too cold, and it thus 
boosts its output signal, eventually making the room too hot.  Layer two of SCM employs 
simulated prediction of effects for improved control.  The system retains an ‘efference copy’ of 
i ts motor signal, and builds up an association between this signal and the feedback that is 
received as a result of it. As a result of acquiring these associations, a system’s motor outputs 
wil l evoke expected input signals.  The mapping of output onto expected input in this way is a 
‘forward model’.  Our thermostat might improve its control process by employing a forward 
model in this way, predicting the consequences of its current output signal for future 
                                                
125 Making the same point, Hurley notes that “SCM doesn’t describe one al l- inclusive structure, 
but has multiple instances for specific movements and results, at various points along different 
means/ends chains.” (Ibid. p.25) 
126 Consequently, we should understand the means/end distinction as relative rather than 
absolute – the same action can be an end for one control circuit, and a means for another. 
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temperatures, and modifying its output as a result.  This can speed up and smooth out a 
system’s control, since the system no longer needs to wait for environmental feedback to 
compute the next appropriate output, relying instead on simulations of the l ikely input127.  
Such mechanisms could a lso be adaptive for a system by providing informational resources for 
distinguishing between actions on the part of the agent, and impingements on the agent by the 
world.  Actions by the agent wil l be accompanied by predictions about l ikely effects, so the 
resulting input wil l be ‘expected’ by the control system.  This wil l not be true of impingements 
by the world upon the agent128. 
 
At layer three, we suppose that the output/result associations built up at layer two can be 
activated bilaterally – as well as output signals evoking expected input signals, input signals 
can evoke l ikely motor responses.  As a result, observed actions wil l be copied, if the evoked 
motor response is strong enough, or the system’s capacity to inhibit i t is weak enough129.  At 
this level, we have a control system that can enable “…simulation of means/ends associations 
from either direction: observed action retrodicts motor activation in the observer via mirroring 
of causes, which are associated with further results via simulative prediction of effects.” 
(Ibid. p.24)  Depending on the complexity of, and relations between the control mechanisms 
available to an agent, fa irly complex forms of action and cognition could be enabled at th is 
layer.  For example, Hurley remarks: 
 
“No doubt a monkey can move her hand to grasp a piece of sushi and move it to her 
mouth to eat i t. But I can move my hand to operate chopsticks to pick up sushi to dip i t 
in soy sauce and then move it to my mouth to eat it, in order to impress my boss; given 
associated simulative mirroring functions, I may start to resent you for eating the last 
piece of sushi as soon as you reach for your chopsticks.” (p.26)   
 
The idea here is that an agent might have separate control systems for object-grasping, 
grasped-object-eating, chopstick-wielding, sushi-grabbing, boss-impressing, and so forth.  
Such control circuits could be linked and articulated so that the input of visually-presented 
                                                
127 See Clark and Grush (1999, section 1) on skil led reaching behaviour for a nice example of 
this sort of control and its adaptive function. 
128 See Frith’s (1992) explanation of thought and action-insertion in schizophrenia for a 
discussion of how deficits in such control processes could distort a subject’s abil i ty to 
distinguish between their actions and impingements from the world. 
129 For certa in actions, this supposes that the system can solve the ‘correspondence problem’ of 
mapping the observed action of another on to possible actions of their own.  See Hurley (2008) 
for a survey of suggestions about how this might be ach ieved. 
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chopsticks evokes a motor plan for sushi-grabbing, and the evoked sushi-grabbing is registered 
as something can be employed as a means to the socia l end of boss-impressing.  When I see 
someone else reach for their chopsticks, such l inkages between my control systems could enable 
me to perceive their action as a means to sushi-grabbing, and perhaps to perceive their 
predicted sushi-grabbing as a means to boss-impressing, and thus lead me to resent them.  
Hurley is contrasting these flexible relations between the ends of some control circuits and the 
means of others, and the sophistication of the sorts of control circuits we might have (e.g. for 
complex socia l functions such as boss-impressing) with the possible inflexibil i ty and lack of 
sophistication we might find in the control apparatus of a monkey, and the corresponding 
simplicity of their intentional behaviour.  
 
Layer four introduces the capacity to inhibit actual behavioural output, and monitor the fact 
that output is being so inhibited.  This capacity is of particular importance for our purposes, 
since when combined with layer two this could enable offl ine instrumental deliberation.  At 
layer two the use of simulations for improved control doesn’t require the control system to 
distinguish actual and simulated feedback.  If simulative predictions can be taken offl ine, and 
the fact that they are offl ine can be monitored by the agent, this could provide information 
about results of possible actions.  As a result of such information, “Simulated results of 
a lternative possible actions could be compared for the closest match to a target prior to actual 
action.” (Ibid. p.28) thus enabling deliberation and choice among possible courses of action by 
the agent.  For example, if my goal is to impress my boss, the respective expected inputs for 
output actions of sushi-dipping and racist-joke-tel l ing could be compared for the best match 
with the goal state of my boss-impressing control circuit. Finally, at layer 5 inputs as well as 
outputs can be taken offl ine, enabling counterfactual simulation of inputs.  At this stage, fair ly 
elaborate counterfactual deliberation could be enabled.  The counterfactual inputs of my boss 
smiling, laughing, or looking aghast could be enterta ined, and the different possible courses of 
action in light of each one could be compared in virtue of the apparatus at layer four. 
 
A final thing to note about SCM is that Hurley intends it as an instance of a horizontally-
modular organization of information-processing resources.  That is, neither the ordering of 
layers nor the actions governed by these layers are to be understood in terms of a hierarchica l , 
vertical organization.  Rather, different sorts of actions wil l have control systems of different 
levels of sophistication, and different possibil i ties for links with other control systems.  The 
fact that the control circuit for one of an agent’s actions has the level of complexity we find at 
layer five does not entail that the control circuits for al l her actions wil l.  And the fact th a t 
 134 
one of her control circuits is l inked to many others does not entail anything about the way 
those other circuits might be linked to each other130. 
 
Now we have the necessary elements of SCM on the table, let’s see how they might suggest 
the right way to construe the integration requirement. 
 
 
5.3        The SCM Solution – Practical Reasoning Without Full Generality 
 
The above consideration of SCM is relevant to our attempt to spell out the integration 
requirement since the way it enables rational relations between means and ends, and the 
possibil i ty that means/end pairs can be decoupled and recombined suggests a less demanding 
analogue of the unrestricted de- and re-composabil i ty we find in language and concept use, and 
thus suggests the materia ls with which to state our integration requirement131.  SCM 
hypothesises that such capacities could be enabled for an agent by a series of progressively 
more sophisticated subpersonal mechanisms for sensorimotor control.  The prospect, then, is 
that SCM could show us how an agent’s meeting the integration requirement (and thus enjoying 
perceptual consciousness, according to the enactive views) fa l ls out of its credentia ls as a source 
of intel l igent behaviour.  Such an account of the integration requirement would thus meet one 
of our initia l desiderata – stating the requirement in a way that meshes with the action-space 
account’s emphasis on skil led, worldly action. 
  
The key feature of SCM for our purposes is the way it suggests ends and means might be 
flexibly related for an agent, capable of de- and recomposing in different ways according to the 
levels of sophistication, articulation and connectivity of its control structures.  Recall that the 
horizontally modular structure of SCM means that the level of complexity involved in a 
system’s control circuits, and the level of connectivity obtaining between those circuits, need 
not be uniform throughout the system.  Thus the structure of an agent’s control system can 
impose l imits on the way ends and means can be de- and recomposed for her.  It is this point 
that suggests how the model can open up space between the full and free recombinabil i ty tha t 
                                                
130 See Clark (2001, p.91) on Brooks’ can-collecting robot for a good il lustration of a 
horizontally modular architecture and its virtues. 
131 This suggestion about the proto-conceptual nature of intel l igent intentional action is found 
in various places in Hurley’s work.  However, to my knowledge, she never linked this 
suggestion up with her views on the enactive nature of experience.  In 5.6 I indulge in some 
speculation about why this was so. 
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the orthodox conception of thought demands, and brute, unthinking responsiveness to the 
environment132.  SCM suggests how thought devoted to reasoning and planning need not rely on 
full de- and recomposabil i ty of its constituents, with such flexibil i ty and generality coming in 
degrees, according to the structure of the system’s control apparatus.  But before this proposal 
begins to look like a solution, we need to clarify a few points about how SCM, a proposal at the 
subpersonal, non-normative level, is supposed to relate to practical reasoning, a normatively 
constrained, personal-level phenomenon. 
 
First, note that we’re not principally interested in SCM as a story about subpersonal 
architecture – we’re interested in the personal- level agency it enables, and how SCM suggests 
that the structure of that agency could be constrained by the structures of the agent’s control 
systems.  Thus, we’re interested in SCM’s role in enabling an agent to perceive something as a 
reason for acting a certa in way, and as affording or fai l ing to afford the satisfaction of certa in 
of her goals.  Does mapping our subpersonal sketch of SCM onto personal- level conclusions 
about the ways means and ends can be related for an agent involve an over-hasty projection 
from subpersonal to personal levels?  We can give a negative answer to this question since SCM 
has been explicitly framed as an enabling hypothesis about personal-level action and 
perception.  When we speak of the target value for a particular control circuit, we mean the 
value that corresponds to the achievement of a personal- level goal by the agent. The 
hypothesis is that such targets are tuned and re-tuned via multiple fa i led and successful 
interactions with the environment, so the subpersonal target value comes to correspond to the 
success of the personal- level action.  SCM suggests how real and counterfactual perceptual 
stimulation can be used as input for the control circuit in charge of achieving a particular goal , 
and the results of this checked for their match with  the target state of that circuit.  In this 
way, SCM suggests an enabling hypothesis about how perceptual input can become meaningful 
for a subject by being processed in the l ight of its relevance for the pursuit of the subject’s 
current goals.  Just as the target values of a suitably environmentally calibrated circuit 
correspond to personal- level goals, the possible outputs of a control circuit (which can be taken 
offl ine at higher levels of SCM) come to correspond to possible intentional actions on the part 
of the agent, and the possible inputs to the circuit come to correspond to possible dista l 
                                                
132 This possibil i ty seems to be anticipated in Hurley’s suggestion that the recombinant 
structure of means and ends might be an evolutionary precursor of the recombinant structure of 
language (ibid, p.11), and suggested by the connections she a l ludes to between SCM and her 
work in Making Sense of Animals (e.g. Hurley (2006), section 6). The current suggestion is th at 
the l imited recombinabil i ty we find in the practical deliberation enabled by SCM might be a 
precursor of the full generality characteristic of thought according to the orthodox conception. 
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environmental events.  Thus, SCM’s role as a mechanism by which an agent can use 
environmental information to accomplish their intentional goals means that, so long as an 
agent’s circuits are suitably tuned to the relevant actions, events and goals, we are entitled to 
move from claims about the subpersonal SCM to cla ims about the personal- level activity i t 
enables133.  
 
These l inks between SCM and personal- level agency combine with the possibil i ty that an 
agent’s control circuits can be linked and articulated in various ways to suggest how the action-
space account can appeal to something more than brute responsiveness to environmenta l 
affordances but less than fully general conceptual abil i ties when spell ing out its integration 
requirement.  Our SCM-inspired solution suggests that mere responsiveness to affordances fa i ls 
to meet the integration requirement (and thus fa i ls to suffice for conscious experience) since 
such responsiveness doesn’t require a grasp of the means/end structure of action.  An agent 
might perceive that a mug affords grasping, but without appreciating that grasping is an 
action that other objects afford, or that the mug affords actions other than grasping.  They 
thus fai l to distinguish the means and ends of their action, or the relation between those 
means and ends.  The possibil i ties of l inks between control circuits (corresponding to the 
possibil i ty of structured intentional action) and the counterfactual simulation of inputs and 
outputs (corresponding to means and ends) that we find at the higher level of SCM would 
enable the means and ends of an action to be distinguished, decomposed and recombined in new 
ways by an agent, in a way reminiscent but fal l ing short of the full generality we find in 
conceptual thought. 
 
Suppose it’s granted that SCM makes it intel l igible how ends and means could be flexibly 
decomposed and recombined by an agent in the absence of the full generality characteristic of 
thought according to the orthodox conception.  An objector could sti l l question whether such a 
                                                
133 I assume here that the right sort of cal ibration between the system and its environment and 
goals makes it appropriate to speak of parts of the system corresponding to environmental 
features and goals.  Note firstly that this doesn’t entail the cla im that such correspondence 
constitutes a part of the system’s carrying a certa in content (though it might) – just that such 
correspondence contributes to enabling the creature underpinned by the system to be in a state 
with a certa in content.  Secondly, a creature’s control systems having an SCM-like structure 
won’t legitimate cla ims about its personal- level states unless that structure is sufficiently 
articulated and complex to support the decombination, recombination and appreciation of 
ends, means and their relations in a manner governed by principles of holism and normativi ty 
(see my discussion below of Hurley on how complex instances of SCM make it appropriate to 
characterise a creature’s action in these terms). 
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story gives us anything worthy of being called even a primitive form of thought – surely, they 
might cla im, a l l we have demonstrated is the possibil i ty of relatively sophisticated control 
of action.  And recall that part of the problem for the action-space account was that i t needed 
an appeal to at least something like thought about a creature’s poise over an action-space to 
avoid an implausible l iberalism in its attributions of conscious experience.  For the action-
space theorist to demonstrate that the variety of practical reasoning suggested by SCM 
enables them to frame an integration requirement in a way that avoids such l iberalism, they 
need to say something about how the view of practical reasoning on offer relates to the 
orthodox conception of thought sketched in section one. 
 
Worries about whether the view of practical reasoning here bears any relation to thought 
construed according to the orthodox conception would most l ikely be motivated by skepticism 
about whether our view can account for the rich normativity that characterises the 
relationships between thoughts, and between their constituents.  Note firstly that the picture 
of control under consideration has various sources of normativity that stem from elements of 
the control circuits postulated by SCM possessing correctness conditions.  The role of an inverse 
model (layer one of SCM) is to select a means appropriate to achieve a given goal, on the basis 
of comparing current and target inputs – insofar as selections of means can in fact be more or less 
appropriate to the achievement of a goal, they have correctness conditions.  Similarly, the 
role of a forward model ( layer two) is to predict l ikely sensory input on the basis of current 
output – insofar as these are predictions that can be more or less accurate, they have 
correctness conditions also.  Finally, we suggested that the way that perceptions evoke 
associated actions according to SCM enables perception of the environment in terms of the sets 
of actions it affords.  Such perception of affordances a lso has correctness conditions, insofar as 
the agent can be right or wrong about whether their current environment really does afford the 
action in question.  However, as suggested above, the mere possibil i ty of states with such 
correctness conditions does not suffice for the sort of intel l igent agency to which the action-
space account wants to appeal.  Both sensitivity to affordances and implicit expectancies 
about the sensory consequences of action could be in place for an agent that merely responds in a 
fixed way to environmental stimuli.  The key source of normativity for our model is the way in 
which an agent’s grasp of ends and means is such that the ends and means of a given action can 
decouple, and be flexibly recombined in ways that are sensitive to the ways in which they 
relate to the goals of the agent and the right ways to achieve those goals.  This feature, as 
emphasized by Hurley (2006) makes it appropriate to characterize the behaviour of the agent 
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in terms of holism and normativity134, and gets us a form of intel l igence at least on a continuum 
with the orthodox conception of thought with which we begun this chapter. The higher 
levels of SCM enable a form of intell igent agency where:     
 
“Perceptions and intentions combine to make certa in actions reasonable and 
appropriate from the animal’s perspective.  Means and ends can decouple:  an 
intentional agent can try, err, and try again, can try various different means to achieve 
the same end.  The holism of intentional agency provides a minimal, coarse kind of 
recombinant structure:  an intentional agent has the abil i ty to combine a given 
intention with different perceptions, given ends with different means.” (Ibid. Section 
2) 
 
Hurley’s idea is that the right sort of interplay between action and perception can make it 
appropriate to speak of reasons for action that apply from the animal’s perspective, and thus 
to begin to characterize the mental states of the animal that subserve that action in normative 
terms that anticipate the richer normativity and generality we find in the orthodox 
conception of thought.  This is because in the sort of behaviour in question, relations between 
environmental stimuli and the agent’s responses are not invariant but (normatively) 
constrained by a context of means/end relationships, such that “A different intention or end 
will yield different actions given different perceptions about means/ends contingencies, and 
vice versa.”  The agent thus views environmental inputs and behavioural outputs through the 
lens of their current goals, and their perceptions of the relations between means and ends.  
Thus, though an agent might be able to directly perceive that a visually-presented fruit 
affords eating, this perception might not result automatically in eating-behaviour – for a 
suitably sophisticated agent, the affordances of the fruit are seen in light of their mesh with 
the plans and projects it is currently engaged in135.  For example, if our agent is engaged in a 
                                                
134 I focus here on the holism and normativity that result from our SCM-inspired view since I 
assume that they are the features of intentional mental states which are most difficult and 
important for a theory of mental content to account for.  See Haugeland (1990) for an excellent 
taxonomy of attempts to naturalise intentionality, anchored around the different ways of 
accommodating holism and normativity.  See Fodor and Lepore (1992) for a more sceptical look 
at the links between holism and intentionality.  
135 As Hurley puts it, in a quote that sums up much of the materia l in this section, “Perceptual 
information may not lead to an invariant response, but explain action only in the context set by 
intentions and the constraints of at least primitive forms of practical rationality.  Perceptions 
and intentions may combine to make certa in actions reasonable and appropriate from the 
animal’s perspective, and mistakes are possible.  As explained, the holism and normativity of 
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projecti le-based food fight, the fact that the fruit is something that affords throwing will be 
more salient to its current activity than the fact that i t affords eating.  The different effects of 
throwing and eating the fruit can be compared for the best match with the target value of a 
control circuit in charge of the animal’s food-fighting behaviour, and the action most 
appropriate to its current goals selected and performed on that basis.   
Note firstly that this gets us a form of practical rationality – in light of her current 
projects, throwing the fruit rather than eating it really was the rational thing to do.  And we 
might a lso think that the agent acts for this reason – if her control circuits have been suitably 
tuned by interactions with the environment, the fact that throwing fruit rather than eating it 
is the right thing to do when one is in a food fight explains and guides her action.  We can say 
that these are reasons for the agent (that they are personal-level and normative, rather than 
subpersonal and causal) since, as noted above, we are interested in SCM chiefly as a 
hypothesis about the sorts of personal-level capacities that might be enabled by various 
forms of sensorimotor control – thus we are interested in the relative evaluation of 
counterfactual inputs to a control circuit in terms of this process’s personal- level description of 
evaluating the ways possible means contribute to the satisfaction of a given end.  And, as we 
have just seen, when the control apparatus of an agent is suitably complex, it can become 
appropriate to interpret the agent’s actions in a way constrained by principles of holism and 
normativity – constraints which separate the personal level from the subpersonal.  It thus 
becomes appropriate to speak of this process as giving the animal reasons for action, from her 
own perspective136. 
Secondly, note that the sort of process we have described rel ies on the agent being able 
to decompose and recombine means and ends, and be sensitive to the normative relations 
between them.  The agent can see the fruit both as affording eating and as affording throwing, 
and the goal of winning the food fight as one that might be pursued via various different 
courses of action.  In this case, our agent correctly decides to achieve this goal by throwing the 
fruit rather than eating it.  But as we have been noting, the generality displayed by an agent 
in their practical reasoning can fa l l short of the full generality that comes with conceptual 
                                                                                                                                           
intentional agency bring with them a kind of coarse recombinant structure, but this fal ls wel l 
short of enabling the context-free inferentia l promiscuity of conceptual abil i ties.  An animal’s 
various goals could nevertheless give him reasons to act in one way rather than another in 
particular circumstances--his own reasons, reasons from his own perspective.” (Ibid, 6.9) 
136 Hurley (Ibid, section 6.9) notes that “The animal may not conceptualize these as reasons--but to 
require that would be to beg the question at issue,” since the question at issue is whether there 
can be reasons for action without fully general conceptual capacities.  I won’t try to sett le 
whether genuine reasons must be conceptualised as such here, but see Peacocke (2001) and 
Hurley (2001) on Brewer for arguments against this cla im. 
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abil i ties.  SCM can explain this in terms of the presence or absence of l inks between different 
control circuits137.  So, we have arrived at a suggestion of how an agent could display a form of 
practical reasoning that is normatively constrained, gives the agent personal- level reasons for 
action, and where the mental states involved are subject to at least some principles of 
compositionality.  This shows us how our SCM-inspired model occupies a space between mere 
responsiveness to the environment and the orthodox conception of thought138 – the space we 
needed to locate in order to give a plausible account of the integration requirement on behalf of 
the action-space view. 
 
5.4 The Integration Requirement 
 
So, what does the possibil i ty of such an intermediate conception of practical reasoning suggest 
about how the action-space theorist should cash out their integration requirement?  Recal l 
that our previous gestures at such a requirement demanded that an agent’s grasp of the actions 
currently afforded by her environment be such that i t could be integrated with their ongoing 
practical reasoning, or that the agent have some kind of direct, non-inferentia l access to the 
space of currently-afforded actions.  In the first section of this chapter, I suggested that a 
problem arose from these suggestions, since the natural construal of practical reasoning is in 
terms of the orthodox conception of thought, making the integration requirement too difficult 
to fulfi l l for creatures who lack general concepts, but are nonetheless intuitively conscious.  
Likewise, the most natural way to construe the requirement that an agent have ‘access’ to the 
space of actions they take to be currently afforded is in terms of Block’s (1995) conception of 
access – the avai labil i ty of a content for reasoning and report.  These are capacities which 
a lso invite understanding in terms of the orthodox conception. 
 
                                                
137 I won’t say anything here about the possibil i ty of a SCM-inspired solution to another 
problem about normativity and content – how to tel l whether an agent has successfully pursued 
one goal rather than fa i led to achieve another (slightly different) goal.  This is the 
traditional rule-following problem that arises for any attempt to naturalise intentional 
content.  Since it’s not clear whether or how it can be solved at a l l, the fact that i t arises here 
shouldn’t count against our proposal (as also noted by Hurley (Ibid, section 6.4)). 
138 Making the same point, Hurley suggests that “Perhaps the metaphor of a space of reasons 
should be replaced with the metaphor of islands of reasons emerging from a sea of causes.  For 




But our consideration of SCM has suggested a less demanding way of meeting that integration 
requirement.  We can appeal to a form of practical reasoning that does not rely on 
l inguistical ly-mediated thought, but consists in being able to enterta in the possibil i ties of 
various different actions and grasp how these actions would contribute to the satisfaction of 
the agent’s current goals.  So when the action-space account cla ims that an agent’s grasp of the 
possibil i ties for action afforded by their environment must be such as to al low practical 
reasoning about those possibil i ties, this should be understood as requiring that the agent be 
able to grasp that the afforded action is a means to one among a selection of ends, and the 
relationship between their performance of that action and the satisfaction of their current 
goals and projects.  Thus, whilst DF’s spared perceptual sensitivity to the orientation of the 
slot in the posting task might prime her to behave in ways that can be brought out via 
prompting, she fa i ls to be conscious of the slot’s orientation since she lacks an automatic grasp 
of the ways she is currently poised to act relate to her current goals and projects (of engaging in 
a slot-posting task).  Standard perceivers possess such a grasp, and are thus able to use the 
information about the slot’s orientation to achieve their current goal.  Sophisticated agents 
can practical ly reason about whether performing the posting task, or engaging in some other 
currently-afforded action yields the best chance of satisfying their overall goals and projects.   
To take a more complex example than the simple slot-posting task, suppose someone is 
playing a game on the Nintendo Wii, where they must orient their wrist in such a way, and 
move their hand appropriately in space, to match the orientation and location of an avatar of 
themselves that appears on screen to the orientation and location of an avatar-shaped slots in 
a series of bubbles that f loat towards the bottom of the screen.  The object of the game is to pop 
the bubbles by posting your avatar through each of their slots before they hit the bottom139.  
This game is relatively easy for a standard perceiver, since perceptual information about the 
orientation and position of the slots in each bubble is automatically put in touch with the ir 
current goal of preventing the bubbles from hitting the bottom of the screen. According to the 
action-space account, this explains their being conscious of the positions and orientations of 
the bubbles.  More cognitively sophisticated agents could engage in practical reasoning about 
which bubble to pop first, based on comparison of the anticipated consequences of popping 
different bubbles.  On the other hand, according to our interpretation of her condition in 
chapter two, DF would be unable to play this game successfully.  Though her brain sti l l 
processes information about the orientations of the slots in each of the various bubbles before 
                                                
139 Interested parties can find this game on the Wii-play disc for the Nintendo Wii.  Thanks to 
Mog Stapleton for bringing this game to my attention. 
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her, this information cannot be automatically used to guide her performance in the game in the 
way that it can for a standard perceiver.  If she were prompted to begin posting-behaviour 
when the game began, her success in prompted slot-posting tasks makes it l ikely that she 
could succeed in popping some bubbles.  But such responsiveness to the bubble-popping 
affordances of her environment does not suffice for consciousness according to the action-space 
view, since (I conjecture) DF’s responses to the ways in which the fa l l ing bubbles afforded 
avatar-posting cannot be put in touch with her overall goal of popping the bubbles before they 
reach the bottom of the screen. 
 
It’s perhaps useful to compare our formulation of the integration requirement with Hurley’s 
(1998) notion of ‘noncognitive access’ to information.  A creature has such noncognitive access 
when processed information is automatically availa ble for use in their forming an intention 
whose content is provided by that information (Ibid. p.149), where ‘automatically’ is 
understood in such a way as to rule out rel iance on prompting or forced-choice conditions140.  For 
example, someone with prosopagnosia, a deficit in their abil i ty to recognise faces, “does not 
have the normal abil i ty to form an intention such as: if the face is familiar, say ‘hello’…And 
she is unable to spontaneously form correct intentions to act on the basis of information about 
whether the face is familiar.” (Ibid. p.152) A theory that makes noncognitive access to content 
a necessary condition for a conscious state’s having that content says that the access she lacks 
is necessary for consciousness of facia l similarity.  But in doing so, we have not tied intentional 
access, or the abil i ty to make use of processed information, to conceptual abil i ties: 
 
“Information can be used explicitly to meet a creature’s immediate needs, even though 
it is used in a context-bound way and the creature lacks the abil i ty to use general 
concepts of itself, its states or the objects or properties of which it is conscious in a 
variety of contexts detached from those needs.” (Ibid. p.153) 
 
Our account of the integration requirement plausibly coincides with a requirement of 
noncognitive access to contents for consciousness.  The action-space account cla ims that the 
contents of conscious experience are action-oriented, and that for a content to become conscious, 
i t must be apt for use in the subject’s current practical reasoning.  We have tried in this chapter 
                                                
140 Hurley a lso includes the condition that the agent be able to act successfully upon this 
intention.  This seems too demanding - for example, it appears to rule out the possibil i ty that a 
temporari ly-paralysed agent could have conscious experience whose content and character is 
explained by his abil i ty to form intentions upon which he could not act. 
 143 
to cash out this metaphor of ‘aptness’ in SCM-inspired terms of an agent’s abil i ties to recognise 
an action as a particular means to various possible ends, and to grasp the relevance of 
relationships between means and ends for the satisfaction of their current goals.  On a 
plausible view of what i t is for an agent to have an intention, such abil i ties are criteria l – 
brute responsiveness to the environment is not intentional behaviour, since true intentional 
behaviour requires responsiveness that manifests sensitivity to the way the means required to 
achieve the goal of the behaviour vary according to context, and the ways in which the same 
means might be used to pursue different goals in different contexts.  And accounting for the 
possibil i ty of such responsiveness without requiring full conceptual abil i ties was the purpose 
of our appeal to SCM, and the basis for our integration requirement.  Consequently, our 
integration requirement says that for an action-oriented content to be part of the content of a 
conscious experience, that content must be available to guide the agent’s intentional 
behaviour, where ‘intentional behaviour’ requires sensitivity to a range of possible 
relationships between means and ends, as brought out by our discussion of SCM and the relation 
of the abil i ties it enables to the orthodox conception of thought.  
 
 
5.5 Thinking about Colour 
 
How does our statement of the integration requirement relate to our account of colour experience 
in chapter four?  Recall that there we gave an account of the content of colour experience in 
terms of an agent’s implicit knowledge of the range of discriminations currently afforded for 
them by their perceptual exposure to a coloured object.  Our integration requirement states th at 
for information to become part of the content of a conscious experience, that information must be 
available to inform the content of an intention on the part of the agent.  We might think there 
are a couple of sources of tension between our account of colour experience and our statement of 
the integration requirement.  Firstly, it seems that the sorts of capacities in terms of which we 
explained colour experiences, such as the capacity to discriminate between different shades of 
colour, or to locate a colour in a relationally-defined colour space, are not actions we seem to 
engage in very often – certa inly not as often as we experience colour, a pervasive feature of our 
visual consciousness.  Secondly, our account of the integration requirement has appealed to the 
idea of control circuits for the sorts of afforded actions that constitute the content of conscious 
experience according to the action-space theory.  This appeal a l lowed us to emphasise the 
way the means and ends of a given circuit might decouple, and serve as possible inputs or 
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outputs to different control circuits – and it was argued that possibil i ties such as these let us 
see how reasoning about intentional action can be a normatively constrained and personal-
level phenomenon without requiring linguistic or conceptual abil i ties, and thus meet the 
desiderata for our integration requirement.  But is it plausible to think of our discriminations 
of colours as structured and controlled in this way?  If so, what are the possible means and ends 
that might decouple and recombine in colour perception?  Addressing these questions wil l help 
clarify both our account of colour experience and the integration requirement. 
 
In response to the first potentia l source of tension we should note that our requirement has not 
demanded that our abil i ty to make certa in discriminations must in fact contribute to the content 
of a current intention in order to become the content of a conscious experience, merely that our 
grasp of the fact that such abil i ties have been enabled be apt to contribute to our current 
intentions.  Thus, the fact that we perceive colours when we are not engaged in matching or 
discrimination tasks need not be in tension with the integration requirement.  Our discussion of 
the action-space account in general in chapter three made it plausible that abil i ties being apt 
for such integration was importantly l inked to the content of a subject’s experience – recall our 
analysis of the colour-blindsight patient (chapter 4.2).  Such a patient can rel iably make fine-
grained colour discriminations between colour samples presented in their blind-field, but only 
when externally prompted, and sincerely report lacking any experience of the colours in 
question when doing so.  The action-space account cla ims that this is because they fail to meet 
our integration requirement – their discriminatory abil i t ies are not such as to be automatically 
put in touch with their intentional behaviour (in this case, performing a discrimination task).  
This is not so for standard perceivers.  When absent-mindedly casting my eye over the range of 
coloured objects before me, the colours of those objects form part of the content of my visual 
experience, since my perceptual sensitivity to them is such that I could at any time decide to 
(for example) intentionally categorise a seen object according to its colour, or pick the 
background which provides the best match for that colour141.   
                                                
141 In addition to our general arguments from chapters 3 and 4, demonstration of 
inattentional/change blindness for colour (see e.g. Chabris and Simons (1999)) seems to support 
our cla ims about conscious colour vision here.  Large changes in the colour of a visually-
presented object can go unnoticed when a subject is attending closely to other features of the 
object or scene.  The action-space account might explain this in terms of the irrelevance of the 
object’s colour to the agent’s current projects.  Whilst unnoticed changes in colour might prime 
subsequent responses or performance, they are not consciously experienced if the discriminatory 
abil i ties enabled by them were not at that time apt to contribute to the content of an intention 
formed by the subject, perhaps due to the way the subject’s attention was focussed at the time.  
However, the correct interpretation of change and inattentional blindness results is 
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The second potentia l source of tension is more complex.  Broadly construed, we can see it as a 
worry about the apparent disanalogy between the types of actions we appealed to in our 
account of colour vision and those appealed to when setting up our account of the integration 
requirement.  One sort of disanalogy is that the actions appealed to in colour are 
discriminatory and apparently automatic, whereas those appealed to in our discussion of SCM 
are bodily and intentional.  In response, note firstly that an object’s colour wil l often make a 
subtle background contribution to our intentional behaviour.  The way an object looks with 
respect to its colour helps us to distinguish it from other surrounding objects, perceive its shape 
via the patterns of l ight and shade displayed on its surface142 and even to perceive what kind 
of object it might be.  According to the action-space account, such abil i ties and dispositions 
aren’t straightforwardly results of our perceiving a particular colour – rather they help 
constitute what it is to perceive that colour.  In this way, abil i ties to act upon objects based 
upon their boundaries, shape and even their semantic properties are bound up with experience 
of colour, and such abil i ties look more l ike the intentional bodily abil i ties to which we 
appealed when setting out our integration requirement, undermining the apparent disanalogy.   
 
This helps us see how to respond to the point that the actions to which we appealed in our 
account of colour experience don’t seem to have the kind of means/end structure that was 
crucia l to the actions we appealed to in our discussion of the integration requirement.  Whi lst 
discriminating one colour from another is not naturally understood as an intentional action 
with a goal, and a means by which that goal is ach ieved, our account of colour perception 
makes dispositions towards intentional actions that do have such structure, such as sorting 
objects based on their colour, or acting on an objects based on the shape or texture they appear to 
have, constitutive of our colour experience.  More importantly, on our account of colour 
experience, there are analogies between the structure of intentional action and the structure of 
the abil i ties in terms of which we explain colour experience which it is i l luminating to note. 
 
The two-level structure of our account of colour perception, according to which perceived 
patterns of colour-looks suggest the colour a surface is likely to have, and the colour a surface 
is perceived to have suggests the patterns of colour looks it is l ikely to display, is reminiscent 
                                                                                                                                           
controversia l (see e.g. Block (2007)), and I won’t attempt to argue for this interpretation in 
further detail here. 
142 Recall that our account of colour made grasp of the signif icance of such patterns partly 
constitutive of perceiving an object’s colour (Chapter 4). 
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of aspects of our discussion of SCM and the view of intentional action it suggests.  The way 
perceiving a surface as a particular colour entails implicit expectations about how it would 
look in different l ighting-conditions and contexts looks like the implicit predictions about 
l ikely consequences of action that forward models run.  The way in which perception of the 
current array of colour sensations from the surface entails a particular perception of its colour 
looks l ike the inverse models that take a system from registration of current input to 
predictions about the l ikely upshot of that input for possible actions.  And the way in which 
understanding colour is a matter of appreciating the relationships between possible sensory 
inputs and possible behavioural outputs thus looks l ike the way in which SCM suggests th a t 
we come to understand the actions of ourselves and others, and the world’s possibil i ties for 
action.   
 
We saw that we could move from talk of relationships about inputs and outputs in SCM to ta lk 
about relationships between means and ends, and it seems that an analogous move is available 
here.  In the same way that one movement wil l be a means to a different end in different 
contexts, colour sensations are a means to different colour-categorisations in different contexts – 
the colour-look of the squares in the checkerboard il lusion (4.3) could correctly result in its 
being judged to be either l ight or dark grey, depending on the context in which it appears.   One 
pattern of sensations can thus indicate different surface colours, and one perceived surface 
colour can also be indicated by different colour looks – just as one end can be achieved by a 
variety of different means, depending on context.  Understanding the relationships between 
colour-looks and colour properties is key to perceiving colour, just as understanding the 
relationships between possible means and ends is key to being conscious, on our account.     
 
Finally, just as the ways in which the means and ends of possible actions relate to each other 
is governed by constraints of holism and normativity, so is the way in which colour-looks, 
surface colours and the discriminatory abil i ties which account for our perception of each, are 
related.  A surface’s displaying a particular array of colour-looks makes it appropriate for a 
perceiver to categorize it in one way, but not in others, and a perceiver’s categorizing a surface 
as a particular colour makes it appropriate to expect it to display certa in colour-looks as 
viewing conditions change, but not others.  And on our account, a creature’s abil i ty to perceive 
one colour is holistical ly related to its abil i ties to perceive a l l others, in a way dictated by 
the geometry of its colour space (recall the sudoku comparison from the previous chapter), in 
the same way as a creature’s abil i ty to perform one intentional action is related to its abil i ties 
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to perform actions with the same means but a different end, and vice-versa.  But just as the 
generality implicated in intentional action fa l ls short of the full generality demanded by GC, 
and characteristic of thought according to the orthodox conception, the way the 
discriminatory abil i ties constitutive of colour-perception relate to each other is a lso subject to 
certain restrictions.  Beck’s (ms.) discussion of cognitive capacities that violate GC but are 
naturally described as involving thought suggests a story about the nature of these restrictions.  
Beck’s starting point is work which shows that pigeons can reliably make discriminations 
between two quantities only if the difference between those quantities is sufficiently large.  
Pigeons seem to be able to think thoughts such as “40ish button-pecks differ from 50ish button-
pecks”, and “38ish button-pecks differ from 47ish”, but not “37ish button-pecks differ from 
40ish”, or “47ish button-pecks differ from 50ish”.  It turns out that, for pigeons, 
 
“…the abil i ty to discriminate two quantities is a function of their ratio. For example, 
just as the pigeons can discriminate 43 from 50 but not 47 from 50, they can also 
discriminate 86 from 100, but not 94 from 100. To put it formally, their numerica l 
discriminations obey Weber’s Law,  I/I = k, where I is the value of the magnitude (in 
this case number), k is a constant, and  I is the minimal change in magnitude required 
for discrimination.”    
(Ibid. p.5-6)  
 
Thus, the constituents of these thoughts are de- and re-composable only in a l imited manner 
that violates GC.  These results are of general interest, since it turns out discriminations in 
many different modalities and domains, such as duration, rate, size, weight, loudness, 
brightness, pressure, taste, smell, pain, length, area and distance, have Weber constants for 
humans as well as pigeons.  Thus some sorts of thoughts about these quantities wil l violate the 
generality constraint, since their constituents wil l be decomposable and recombinable only 
subject to the limits imposed by Weber’s law. 
 
I don’t pretend that the remarks in this section are conclusive – these ideas al l require working 
out in further detail .  But I think they do enough to al lay the worry that there is a 
problematic tension between the action-space account of colour perception and our integration 
requirement.  The key points of this section were firstly that the actions to which our account 
of colour-perception appeals do not have to be executed for their enabling to form part of the 
content of an experience, and that the way the colour-constituting abil i ties figure in reasoning 
and planning will most often be as a background constraint on the sorts of intentional actions 
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available to an agent.  Secondly, I argued that there are more paralle ls between the structure 
of intentional agency and the structure of the abil i ti es at the heart of our colour experience 




6.  Consciousness, Self-Consciousness and an Enactive Pact? 
 
 
On our account, perceptual consciousness and a certa in kind of practical reasoning abil i ty are 
tightly l inked.  I want to end this chapter by suggesting that this feature of the account might 
tel l us something about the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness, and the 
relationship of the action-space theory to Hurley’s sensorimotor view. There are two 
distinctive features of conscious states that we might think a theory of consciousness must 
explain: firstly that such states have phenomenal properties - there is something-it’s-like to be 
in them; secondly, that such states are a lways had from a particular perspective – to explain 
what a conscious state is like is to explain what i t is like for someone or something.  So far in 
this thesis I have focused on only the first feature, but it seems plausible that each of these 
are essentia l features of conscious states – if there is nothing it is l ike to be in a state, then th a t 
state is not conscious, and if a state is not such as to imply a particular perspective on the 
world, that state is not conscious.  Our account of the integration requirement in this chapter, 
and our discussion of the explanatory gap in the next, suggest how these features of experience 
are related. Recall that it was required of our account of practical reasoning that it yield 
reasons for action that apply from the perspective of the agent, rather than merely causal 
reasons for a system’s behaviour.   In section three, I argued that certa in sophisticated forms of 
control involve sensitivity to the relations between possible means, possible ends and the 
current goals of the agent, and that these relations are both holistic and normative in 
character – holistic because the same means can be used to achieve different ends in different 
contexts, or given different goals of the agent, and normative because of the ways in which a 
given means can succeed or fa i l to be appropriate for achieving a given end143.  This meant tha t 
certain forms of control can provide reasons for action from the agent’s perspective in the 
absence of fully general thought – thus, our account of practical reasoning suggests how 
personal- level states that implicate a particular perspective on the world can come into 
                                                
143 Recall from section three that there were other normative relationships between means, 
ends and contexts besides this one. 
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existence by virtue of certa in forms of sensorimotor control.  If such a story is on track, our 
action-space theory can account for the essentia l ly perspectival nature of consciousness. 
 
It might be thought that this is the most important feature of consciousness that a theory must 
explain - since it is not clear whether the possibil i ty of states with phenomenal properties 
that are not had from a particular perspective is one we can make sense of, we might be 
skeptical of a theory that explains only the phenomenal properties of experiences without 
offering an explanation of their perspectival nature, since it seems to admit this possibil i ty.  
However, there are a lso reasons for thinking that the explanation of the phenomenal 
properties of experience should take priority – we might agree with a story about the 
conditions required for a system to have a unified perspective on the world, but question 
whether the presence of such a perspective entails the presence of consciousness, and is thus 
question whether we have been given a story about ‘self-consciousness’, rather than one about 
non-conscious selfhood.  For example, Bermudez’s account of self-consciousness (1998, 2001) 
identif ies various sources of self-specifying information, such as the essentia l reference of 
somatic proprioceptive sensations to one’s body, and the fact that the visual field is bounded, 
manipulable, and flows towards a central point when motion occurs, and uses them to ground an 
account of how it is possible to enterta in thoughts with self-referentia l content in the absence 
of l inguistic or conceptual capacities.  But it might be objected that whilst such appeals can 
account for the presence of states carrying information about how things are with in a certa in 
bounded system, this does not explain why such information should issue in any awareness, or 
consciousness144.  It seems possible that a simple robot might process information about the 
states of its parts, or be able to recognise patterns in the flow of input from a video camera as i t 
moves around its environment, and do so in the absence of any conscious experience.  Even the 
presence of the more sophisticated forms of control to which we have been appealing, 
involving compositionality of means and ends seems compatible with the absence of conscious 
experience, for similar reasons.  We might agree that such control structures involve a 
normativity and holism that makes it appropriate to say that the system in question can act 
inappropriately or appropriately in l ight of its current perceptual and motivational states – 
                                                
144 I don’t cla im here that such an objection applies to Bermudez’ account as a whole – just to an 
account that emphasised only such informational properties of a system. 
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but this seems only to suggest that we should view the system as an intentional one, leaving 
the question of whether or not it is also conscious open145. 
 
It seems, then, that there are motivations for viewing each property of conscious states as 
primary.  It might be thought that this leads to another apparent dilemma – a story about the 
phenomenal properties of experience wil l not be satisfactory unless it explains the 
perspectival nature of experience, and a story about the perspectival nature of experience wil l 
not be satisfactory unless it explains the phenomenal properties of that experience.  We cannot 
cla im to have a theory that explains either one unless we first have a theory that explains 
the other.  But such a problem would only arise for theories that attempt to account for 
phenomenal properties whilst bracketing the obligation to give an account of the perspectiva l 
nature of experience, or vice versa.  The action-space account, however, is not such a theory.  
This chapter has argued that taking an enactive focus al lows an explanation of how a 
perspective on the world can arise from gradually more sophisticated forms of sensorimotor 
control.  The following chapter argues that the same focus also a l lows us to see how to address 
the explanatory gap.  Thus, the conditions that the action-space account states are necessary 
for phenomenology are a lso necessary for a perspective on the world, and vice-versa.  The 
action-space account can therefore explain why the perspective of an agent with suitable 
control apparatus should involve phenomenology.  And the fact that the necessary conditions 
the action-space account gives for conscious experience involve an integration requirement, and 
meeting the integration requirement involves (as we have seen) a particular perspective on 
the world, means that the action-space account wil l not admit the counter-intuitive 
possibil i ty of isolated and unowned phenomenal states. 
 
It seems plausible that Hurley never (to my knowledge) made an explicit l ink in her work 
between her sensorimotor account of consciousness and her work on practical rationality for 
reasons suggested by the above discussion.  For Hurley, questions about the perspectival unity 
of consciousness and its phenomenal character were tackled together.  Her work on practica l 
rationality overlaps with her work on the unity of consciousness, which is in turn bound up 
with her views on the interdependence of perception and action, and the role of tha t 
interdependence in an account of consciousness.  She thus never made an explicit l ink between 
her work on practical rationality and her work on consciousness since, I suggest, she did not 
                                                
145 These are abbreviated versions of the explanatory gap worries I considered in more deta i l 
in chapter one – the reasons for thinking that such exercises in conceivabil i ty are important 
were covered there. 
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view these as properly distinct topics.  So it would not have occurred to her to use the model of 
practical reasoning suggested by SCM to provide an integration requirement for her 
sensorimotor view of consciousness since in developing such a model, she a lready took herself 
to be addressing the question of how a creature can come to have a conscious perspective upon 
the world.  This might cause us to wonder whether the action-space view and Hurley’s view 
as I have depicted them here are really distinct.  For each depicts an agent’s consciousness as 
arising from a certa in kind of practical knowledge of the possibil i ties perta ining to action in 
i ts environment, and cashes this practical knowledge out in a way inspired by Hurley’s work 
on practical rationality.  In 1.5 we contrasted action-space and sensorimotor views by noting 
that action-space views emphasise knowledge of the possible consequences of perception for 
action, whilst sensorimotor views emphasise knowledge of the possible consequences of action 
for perception.  But the model of practical reasoning set out in this chapter seems to cast doubt 
on whether such a contrast can be sharply drawn.  Recall that according to our model of 
practical reasoning the distinction between ends and means is not absolute – the same 
movement can be an end in the context of one goal and a means in the context of another.  We 
might l ikewise think that, on our model, the distinction between knowledge of the sensory 
consequences of action, and knowledge of the practical  consequences of sensation is not absolute.  
For according to it, perceptual inputs are understood in terms of their significance for possible 
actions (this sort of perceptual state affords that sort of behaviour), and possible actions are 
understood in terms of their l ikely effects on perceptual inputs (that sort of behaviour affords 
this sort of resultant state) and then evaluated according to the match of the predicted inputs 
with the agent’s goals.  Thus we can employ neither a one-sided emphasis on the consequences 
of action for perception (as Noë does), nor the consequences of perception for action (as the 
action-space account prior to our introduction of the integration requirement does), since our 
model suggests that the grasp of perceptual consequences is in terms of their significance for 
action, and the grasp of practical consequences is in terms of their significance for future 
perception.  This suggests that the contents of perceptions and intentions are co-enabled, co-
dependent and co-defined, as Hurley argued in Consciousness in Action. 
 
So does our action-space view merge into Hurley’s two-level interdependence view with the 
introduction of the integration requirement? I am not convinced that it does – it sti l l seems open 
for a proponent of the action-space account to agree that the contents of perceptions and 
intentions are co-enabled and thus co-dependent, but differ in holding that appeal to an 
implicit grasp of a space of avai lable actions plays a privileged role in the explanation of 
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experience.  I suggested in this section that a theory of consciousness must account both for the 
perspectival nature and the phenomenal character of conscious experiences.  Hurley’s 
sensorimotor view suggests an account of the first feature, but is largely si lent on the second.  
Nothing in her view suggests how we might construct either a conceptual bridge between 
phenomenal properties of experience and sensorimotor dynamics, or why such a conceptual 
bridge is not required in an explanation of phenomenal consciousness.  We saw in chapter one 
that a successful explanation of consciousness must meet one of these obligations.  Hurley 
restricts her explanatory aims with regard to consciousness to addressing the “comparative” 
rather than the “absolute” explanatory gap146 – the question of why one experience differs 
from another, rather than why there is any experience at al l .  Whilst I think it is likely to be 
true that a specif ication of the features in virtue of which one experience differs from another 
wil l include reference to sensorimotor dynamics, I don’t think that bracketing questions about 
why experience occurs at al l is a legitimate way of explaining experience.  For any two 
differing experiences, there wil l be numerous candidates for the property or properties tha t 
explain that difference.  My visual experience of a cube will differ from my visual experience 
of a sphere in terms of its sensorimotor dynamics, but a lso in terms of the range of actions I 
implicitly take to be enabled in each case, the levels of activation of certa in brain areas that 
help to enable that experience, the physical states of certain neurons that make up those brain 
areas, and the physical states of the particles composing my body as a whole and the objects in 
my environment.  How can we decide which of these levels of explanation should be 
privileged in our account of the difference between the two experiences?  It seems to me th at 
the only way to adjudicate between these competing candidate levels of explanation is to 
provide reasons why one of them should be more relevant to the character of experience than 
others, and that until we have a story about why any non-phenomenal level of description is 
relevant to the character of experience, such reasons wil l not be forthcoming.  The next chapter 
attempts to provide those reasons on behalf of the action-space account. 
 
If the position argued for there is successful, we have reason to think that whilst both 
directions of explanation between action and perception are relevant to constructing an account 
of perceptual and intentional content and practical reasoning, the action space direction of 
explanation takes precedent when explaining the phenomenal character of experience.  In 
keeping with the conclusions of the previous chapters, we would thus endorse an action-space 
account of the content and character of experience, whilst reta ining something like Hurley’s 
                                                
146 E.g. Hurley and Noë (2003), Hurley (forthcoming) 
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I began this chapter by arguing that the action-space account’s appeal to an agent’s abil i ty to 
think, reason and plan about the affordances of their environment disclosed by the ir 
perceptual sensitivity creates a dilemma.  On the one hand, such an appeal is necessary to 
avoid ruling in very primitive information-processing systems as seats of perceptual 
consciousness.  On the other, since thinking, reasoning and planning are standardly understood 
as cognitively demanding abil i ties, requiring something akin to l inguistic, or general 
conceptual, abil i ties, the appeal looks to rule out al l but the most cognitively sophisticated 
systems from the ranks of conscious perceivers.  The action-space account, we worried, was too 
l iberal without such a requirement, and too conservative with it.  However, via a 
consideration of Hurley’s shared circuits model, we saw that there could be forms of practica l 
reasoning that go beyond brute responsiveness to an environment, but stop short of requiring the 
l inguistic and conceptual abil i ties thought to be largely confined to mature human beings.  I 
argued that when an agent consciously perceives that some action is currently afforded by her 
environment, she grasps that the end whose satisfaction is afforded might, in other contexts, 
a lso be satisfied by different means, and that the means that the environment currently 
solicits from her might, in other contexts, be used to achieve different ends.  Such an interplay 
of means, ends and contexts can bring with i t a holism and normativity that fa l l short of the 
richer normative relations that characterise linguistic and fully general conceptual thought, 
but can sti l l support cognition that is appropriately described as practical reasoning.  An agent 
with a suitably rich and flexible repertoire of actions can grasp the different ways in which 
currently afforded actions could contribute to the satisfaction of her various goals, and sett le 
on a course of action on the basis of a comparison of the predicted consequences of those ways.  
The action-space account claims that, to the extent to which she can do this, she enjoys 
conscious experience. 
 
The final three sections of this chapter explored some consequences of this account of the 
integration requirement.  In 5.4 I suggested that, upon a plausible conception of intentional 
action, our integration requirement requires with Hurley’s (1998) suggestion of ‘intentional 
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access’ to contents as a necessary condition on a content’s being conscious.  In 5.5 I showed how 
our account of the integration requirement meshes with chapter 4’s account of colour-
perception.  Lastly and, in my view, most importantly, I argued in 5.6 that developing the 
action-space account in this way opens up the possibil i ty that an account of self-consciousness 
could fa l l out of our account of consciousness.  Tying consciousness to a capacity to practical ly 
reason about intel l igent intentional action, as suggested in this chapter, ties consciousness to a 
particular, normatively constrained and coherent perspective on the world.  In doing so, we 
account for what many have thought to be an essentia l property of conscious states – that they 
are a lways the conscious states of someone, or someth ing, had from a particular perspective.  
But I also suggested that questions about the perspectival nature and the phenomenal 
character of conscious experience must be tackled together.  For without an account of the 
relation between knowing poise over an action-space and the phenomenal character of 
experience, it might justly be asked why our story so far constitutes a theory of consciousness at 
a l l .  Additionally, without such an account, there is no story about self-consciousness in the 
offing from the action-space approach – our account in this chapter might hint at how 
particular perspectives on the world come into existence, but it would give us no reason to 
believe that there should be anything it is l ike to occupy such a perspective.  Much hinges, 
then, on whether the action-space account as I have sketched it can provide a way of 
responding to the chal lenge of the explanatory gap outl ined in chapter 1.  Fortunately, I think 
that it can, and showing this is the task of our next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: The Action-Space Theory and the Explanatory Gap 
 
It is time to address a question that has been looming throughout our discussion of the action-
space theory – why does the action-space account deserve to be called a theory of conscious 
experience rather than, say, of perceptual content, or of cognitive capacities that usual ly 
coincide with conscious experience?  The theory cla ims that conscious experience consists in a 
subject’s grasping the space of enabled actions disclosed to her by her perceptual sensitivity to 
the environment in such a way that she can practical ly reason and form intentions on the basis 
of that sensitivity (as we saw in the previous chapter).  But how does this help us with the 
problems with which we began, in chapter 1?  Could we not imagine a perceiver’s possessing 
such a grasp whilst lacking conscious experience, or two perceivers manifesting identica l 
grasps of identical spaces of enabled actions, but nonetheless differing experientia l ly?  An 
upshot of the considerations of chapter one was that if a putative account of conscious 
experience cannot say something about these questions, then we have been given at best a story 
about plausible functional or intentional correlates of consciousness, which fa l ls short of a true 
explanation.  However, I wish to argue here that the action-space account can make progress on 
these questions – it can tel l us why the situations they invite us to conceive are in fact 
unintel l igible, whilst explaining why they do not strike us as such, and why we are tempted 
to worry about such questions in the first place.  I’m going to do this by surveying three popular 
ways of addressing the explanatory gap – appeals to cognitive access, representationalism, 
and the phenomenal concept strategy – and arguing that the action-space account lets us see 
what the methods have in common, and how they may be fruitfully combined.  Once we see 
the common basis of the three views, we can see how the criticisms that can be levelled at 
each should be resisted. 
 
 
6.1 The Gap Revisited 
 
This section briefly reviews materia l covered in greater detail in chapter 1.  In 1.1 we saw 
that the al leged explanatory gap between the phenomenal – the domain of facts about wha t 
i t is l ike for subjects to have particular experiences – and the physical stems from our inabil i ty 
to specify a conceptual connection between physical and phenomenal facts about persons, and 
our consequent inabil i ty to move from facts about the physical way things are with a person to 
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the ways things are for them phenomenologically147.  The zombie, inverted spectrum and 
knowledge arguments we considered there were al l intended to bring out the intuition that we 
lack a grasp of how the physical and the phenomenal might be conceptually l inked.  For 
example, the knowledge argument works by inviting us to imagine a subject, Mary, with the 
maximal amount of non-phenomenal information about the mind and its workings, as well as 
unlimited abil i ties to draw inferences and conclusions from this stock of information – if 
anyone were able to move from physical to phenomenal facts, it would be Mary.  However, we 
are additionally invited to suppose that Mary has spent her life incarcerated in a 
monochromatic environment.  The popular intuition is that, despite her complete 
physicalistica l ly-acceptable knowledge and deductive powers, Mary will nonetheless lack 
knowledge of certa in facts about what it is like to have certa in experiences – in particular, 
visual experiences of colour.  This suggests that we can see neither a conceptual connection 
between the phenomenal and physical realms, nor the possibil i ty of such a connection – for i f 
we could, we would conclude that Mary in her monochrome room would possess information 
about what i t was l ike to see colour, due to her abil i ty to move from the physical information 
she possesses to phenomenological conclusions. 
 
We also saw that demonstrating the conceptual mesh between explanandum and explanans 
that seems lacking in the case of the physical and the phenomenal looks l ike a necessary 
condition on a successful reductive explanation.  Employing Chalmers’ taxonomy of attempts to 
naturalise phenomenal consciousness, we saw in 1.2 that each position appears unsatisfactory.  
Type-A materia l ists hold that there is in fact a conceptual mesh between phenomenal and the 
physical realms, but do so in the face of strong countervail ing intuitions from the zombie, 
inverted spectrum and knowledge arguments – if reflection on our experience showed tha t 
physical properties can be conceptually l inked to phenomenal properties, we would not have 
the intuitions that absent or inverted qualia were possible, or that Mary would lack 
knowledge of phenomenal properties in her black-and-white room.  It seems, then, that the 
type-A materia l ist must employ a revisionist conception of experience, at odds with th a t 
suggested by our introspective evidence, if phenomenal properties are to be conceptual ly 
connected to structural and functional ones.   
Type-B materia l ists hold that the physical necessitates the phenomenal, but that 
the relevant necessities are not ones which may be deduced a priori.  Below, I criticise an 
                                                
147 Recall that my use of ‘physical’ facts abbreviates the domain of al l facts that a 
naturalistica l ly acceptable explanation might appeal to, including functional and intentional 
facts. 
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interpretation of the action-space theory as a type-B materia l ism that reviews the reasons 
for our dissatisfaction with such a position in some detail, but the essentia l problem was tha t 
type-B materia l ists might be able to tel l us which physical processes give rise to 
consciousness, but could not tel l us why or how they do so.  This is because the necessities to 
which the type-B materia l ists appeal are a posteriori – if they were a priori the nature of our 
concepts would make it clear why and how the requisite physical conditions could not occur 
without certa in phenomenal conditions.  It seemed plausible to grant that understanding why 
and how the domains in an explanation relate to each other is a desirable feature of a 
reductive explanation, and one that the type-B materia l ist cannot deliver. 
S imilar considerations rule out a dualist reductive explanation of consciousness, since 
dualism is typically motivated by the cla im that there can be no conceptual connection 
between the physical and the phenomenal.  Lastly, type-C materia l ists hold either that our 
cognitive l imitations mean that we cannot grasp the conceptual connection between the 
phenomenal and the physical, or that some kind of conceptual revolution is required before 
such a connection will be available. 
 
I argued in 1.3 that there is room for an acceptable reductive explanation of consciousness in 
between type-A and B materia l isms.  We can agree with the intuition that i t seems natural to 
construe our introspective evidence in such a way as to suggest that there can be no conceptual 
l ink between physical and phenomenal properties, but argue that an alternative construal of 
that evidence is available – one according to which al l properties of our experience follow 
conceptually from structural and functional properties.  Such a deflationist position avoids the 
standard criticisms of type-A materia l ism as el iminativist, whilst reta ining it’s commitment 
to the existence of a conceptual mesh between the phenomenal and the physical.  It also agrees 
with the type-B materia l ist that there is no reductive explanation with an a priori component 
of the phenomenal, standardly construed, in terms of the physical in the offing, but disagrees 
that we must conclude from this that only an a posteriori l ink between the phenomenal and the 
physical can be demonstrated.  Such a deflationism thus incorporates the intuitions behind 
type-A and type-B materia l ism, without the features which made each of them unacceptable 
as candidate forms of explanation.  For a deflationist strategy to be plausible, then, it must 
accommodate the introspective evidence that leads to the putative explanatory gap, but 
plausibly redescribe that evidence in a way that renders it compatible with physicalism.  
The redescription must be such as to explain why the anti-physicalist construal of the 
evidence is natural, but mistaken, and must be empirically plausible – otherwise the 
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deflationist has shown only how the explanatory gap could be closed (perhaps a worthwhile 
achievement in itself), but not how it can be closed for our experience.  We also saw in 1.4 tha t 
a deflationist strategy should say something about the properties of conscious experience that 
are standardly thought to make it a problematic candidate for reductive explanation – 
ineffabil i ty, privacy, direct avai labil i ty and intrinsicali ty.  Crucial ly, the deflationist need 
only explain why our introspective evidence makes it natural to construe experience as 
possessing those properties, and may do so without granting that our experience in fact 
possesses those properties. 
 
Chapter 1 argued that the above deflationist position is the form a reductive explanation of 
phenomenal consciousness should take.  In this chapter, I wil l argue that the action-space 
account suggests an explanation of consciousness that meets al l the requirements of the 
deflationist position we have set out.  Before moving on to our consideration of how the action-
space account can address these obligations, let’s il lustrate them by looking at three ways in 
which the action-space account might be thought to address the explanatory gap that strike 
me as lacking.  Firstly, we might interpret the action-space account as an attempt to 
operationalise consciousness.  Considerations such as our discussion of DVS in chapter 2, or the 
neat ways in which the action-space account can handle the problem cases of chapters 3 and 4 
might prompt us to think that knowing poise over a space of enabled actions is at least a close 
approximation to the functional correlate of consciousness.  Given this, perhaps we should see 
the action-space account’s contribution to a solution to the explanatory gap as specifying a 
functional profi le with which conscious experience can be plausibly identif ied.  But this wil l 
not meet the constraints on a solution we have la id out.  Such a strategy is an instance of the 
type-B materia l ism criticised in 1.2.  For a reminder of why this position fa i ls to address the 
explanatory gap, recall Jackson’s (2003) argument that naturalising explanations without an a 
priori component are indistinguishable from eliminativism about the target explanandum.  If 
science informs us that the temperature of a gas turns out to be its mean molecular kinetic 
energy then, without some conceptual l ink between temperature and mean molecular kinetic 
energy, it is indeterminate whether we should interpret this as a new discovery about 
temperature, or as the discovery that there was no such thing as the temperature of gases, only 
certain functions of their kinetic energy.  Similarly, if a scientist were to inform us that 
conscious experience in fact consisted in quantum-level dipole oscil la tions in thousands of 
neural microtubules resulting in the collapse of a superpositional state to a post-reduction 
outcome state of consciousness, it is indeterminate whether we should understand this as new 
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information about consciousness, or as the discovery that there was no such thing as 
consciousness as we conceived it, only various quantum phenomena.  This is because there is no 
clear conceptual path between such quantum phenomena and the experiences we wished to 
explain.  Were there such a path, we would be able to see that the relevant quantum effects 
entail the phenomenal explanans, and the explanatory gap would have been closed.  So, 
according to our standards here, finding a physical  or functional correlate of phenomenal 
states does not constitute an explanation of those states unless something further can be said 
about the conceptual connections between the two levels148.     
 
Secondly, recall the strategy employed by sensorimotor theorists that we considered and 
rejected in 5.6 of distinguishing between ‘absolute’ and ‘comparative’ versions of the 
explanatory gap.  The idea was that an appeal to sensorimotor dynamics might not afford an 
answer to questions of why an agent has some experience rather than none, but can afford an 
answer to the question of why they have one type of experience rather than another.  Perhaps 
the action-space account could l imit i ts explanatory aspirations and take such a tack.  
However, I argued that the problem with this proposal is that there are indefinitely many 
levels of description at which similarities and differences between the physical correlates of 
experiences can be expressed.  A visual experience of a cube will differ from a visual experience 
of a sphere in terms of its sensorimotor dynamics, but also in terms of the spaces of actions 
enabled by the subject in each case, in terms of the neural activity correlated with each 
experience, and perhaps in terms of the computational states subserved by the collapse of the 
superpositional states of thousands of neural microtubules that correlate with each 
experience.  How should we decide which of these ways in which the experiences differ 
should be privileged in our explanation of their different phenomenal characters?  A natural 
suggestion seems to be that we should privilege any option that seems to have some conceptual 
connection to phenomenal consciousness.  If a l l the options are a l ike in lacking such a 
connection, and in being merely correlated with the phenomenal level we wish to explain, 
then al l options appear on an equal footing with respect to their credentia ls as candidate 
explanations of the differences between the two experiences.  If, however, one of the options 
can tel l us something about its conceptual connection to phenomenal consciousness, this gives us 
both a reason to favour it over the others, and addresses the ‘absolute’ explanatory gap – 
physical conditions that have a conceptual connection to phenomenal conditions would show 
                                                
148 In 1.2 we also considered the argument that explanations that appeal to identities without 
a conceptual bridge seem to entail a conceptual dualism that rules out the possibil i ty of 
successful reductive explanation. 
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us why those conditions obtaining for a subject entails that the subject enjoys some experience 
rather than none.  Thus, we can conclude, if a proposal is to address the comparative 
explanatory gap, it must first address the absolute gap. 
 
Finally, it might be cla imed that the action-space account as developed thus far affords a 
direct response to the conceivabil i ty arguments used to motivate the putative gap between the 
phenomenal and the physical.  Proponents of the explanatory gap will cla im that we can 
conceive of the enabling of the sorts of skil ls the action-space theorist appeals to in the 
absence of experience, and that this conceivabil i ty reflects the lack of a conceptual path from 
enabled skil ls to phenomenal consciousness.  We might respond by appealing to the richness of 
the enabled skil ls, the fact that our grasp of such enabled skil ls need not entail our abil i ty to 
conceptualise or report upon the precise nature and extent of those skil ls, and the requirement 
that a perceiver’s grasp of the space of enabled actions be such that it can inform her ongoing 
practical reasoning.  When we appreciate a l l these points fully, is it perhaps not obvious tha t 
we can conceive of a suitably rich body of skil ls being practical ly grasped in the appropriate 
way whilst phenomenal consciousness is absent149. But such a response does not adequately 
address the challenge posed by the explanatory gap as we have sketched it.  As we saw in 
chapter 1, the conceivabil i ty cla ims typically adduced by proponents of the explanatory gap 
are merely a means to bring out the apparent lack of conceptual path between structural and 
functional descriptions and phenomenal consciousness.  Appreciating this shows us that merely 
undermining the conceivabil i ty cla im need not banish explanatory gap worries – to meet these 
worries directly, we need to show that we have undermined it by providing a conceptual path 
from our structural/functional account to the appropriate characterisation of our experience.  
The response under consideration does not do this.  Consider again the proposal that conscious 
experience was explained by quantum-level dipole oscil la tions in thousands of neural 
microtubules resulting in the collapse of a superpositional state to a post-reduction outcome 
state of consciousness.  It’s not clear that it can be objected of such a proposal that we can 
conceive in appropriate detail of a l l these conditions obtaining, but of conscious experience 
nonetheless being absent, or different.  But this is not because the proposal has closed the 
explanatory gap – rather, it has put a set of conditions in place that are sufficiently complex 
                                                
149 It might be objected by some that they are perfectly capable of conceiving of the conditions 
set out by the action-space account being satisfied in every detail , and phenomenal 
consciousness being entailed.  It seems to me that our necessary and sufficient conditions are 
multifarious and complex enough that I am unable to hold them all in mind, in full and at once, 
to see what does and does not self-evidently fol low from them.  It is possible that things 
might seem different to someone with a more expansive mind, however. 
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that i t is no longer clear what is and is not consistent with their obtaining.  What makes the 
above quantum explanation of consciousness unsatisfactory is not straightforwardly a matter of 
what can and cannot be conceived of consistently with the conditions it specifies, but how 
unfamiliar ta lk of microtubules and dipole oscil la tions is supposed to l ink up with the 
phenomenal explananda each of us is so intimately acquainted with150.  Again, this brings out 
the fact that an adequate explanation of conscious experience must build a conceptual bridge, 
or at least say something about how their proposed explanation relates to such a requirement.  
Only if this is done can the action-space undermine the true worries behind the conceivabil i ty 
arguments – if we have a conceptual bridge between the physical and the phenomenal, it wi l l 
be evident to us which features of the physical conditions we have set down for conscious 
experience rule out their conceivably obtaining in the absence of consciousness, and how they 
do so. 
 
As noted, I believe that the action-space account can meet the demanding constraints to a 
solution of the explanatory gap we have set out here.  We can begin to see how this is so by 
considering its relations to some existing promising proposals for tackling the gap. 
 
 
6.2 Three Ways to Bridge the Gap 
 
In this section, I’l l consider three promising proposals for tackling the explanatory gap.  For 
each, however, I wil l ra ise two questions.  Each sort of account aims to specify a set of 
naturalistica l ly-acceptable conditions that wil l suffice for phenomenal consciousness.  The 
first sort of question for each account is whether we have reason to believe that these 
conditions obtain in our own case.  If not, then even if the account in question is correct, we wi l l 
be able to see only how the explanatory gap could be closed for some hypothetical class of 
conscious perceivers, but not for us.  The second sort of question for each account concerns how the 
conditions they propose relate to the deflationist framework for which I argued in chapter 1, 
                                                
150  Although what is wrong with this quantum proposal  can be cast in terms of conceivabil i ty – 
the explanatory gap challenge could be met if phenomenal states self-evidently followed 
from the quantum computational states to which our proposal appeals, and their absence was 
thus strictly inconceivable if such computational states were present.  This is simply a further 
reminder of why thought experiments were supposed to test for the presence of a conceptual 
bridge in the first place.  The problem with using our action-space or quantum proposals to 
block conceivabil i ty arguments in the way under discussion is that this rules out the presence 
of a conceptual bridge – this strategy claims that the conditions we have put in place are 
sufficiently opaque that it is unclear what does and does not self-evidently follow from them. 
 162 
and our requirement that a successful explanation of consciousness must build a conceptual 
bridge.  I wil l argue that the action-space account al lows us to see the connections between the 
proposals, and in doing so, suggests answers to the questions I ra ise for them.  Our conclusion 
will be that the action-space account suggests a solution to the explanatory gap tha t 
incorporates the best elements of the three proposals we will consider, and that we have good 
empirical reasons to believe that the conditions it sets out for phenomenal consciousness are 
met by conscious human perceivers. 
 
6.2.1 Access and the Zombie-free Zone 
Andy Clark (2000) has argued that certa in patterns of access to perceptual discriminations can 
entail phenomenal consciousness – that is, the presence of phenomenal consciousness might be 
entailed by information being available for a subject’s capacities for report, recall, and 
reasoning in a certa in way.  To motivate this cla im, he asks the reader to imagine a creature 
(let’s cal l her Nicky) who can reliably make a range of perceptual discriminations, such as 
identifying or distinguishing objects based on their olfactory, visual, and tacti le properties.  
As we noted above, there seems to be no entailment between the mere presence of such abil i ties 
and phenomenal consciousness.  But now suppose that Nicky can report on her discriminations, 
and respond to our interrogations about the way she makes those discriminations.  Asked about 
how she has just successfully discriminated between two stimuli, Clark suggests her response 
must fa l l into one of two categories: 
 
 “[She] must say either: 
a)  I have no access to the act by means of which I detect the differences.  The answer 
just comes to me.  I perceive nothing when I make my judgements – I simply find 
myself saying that there are two objects, one red and one yellow, and so on. 
Or: 
b)  I have access not just to the products of my sensory activity, but a lso to certa in 
aspects of that activity i tself.  For example, I am non-inferentia l ly aware that I am 
using a visual rather than a tacti le modality.  I am aware that I see, rather than hear 
or feel, the difference.” (Ibid. p.30) 
 
The presence of a kind of l imited, non-inferentia l access to the nature of her perceptual 
discriminations would force Nicky to respond in the second way.  Given the right sort of access 
to facts about how she makes her discriminations, she would automatically know when she 
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has made a discrimination by sight rather than by touch (since her access to those facts is non-
inferentia l), but be able to say no more about the ways in which these modes of sensing differ 
(since her access to those facts is limited). 
 
Furthermore, it seems that such patterns of access obtaining will result in Nicky cla iming 
when we interrogate her that feels different to make discriminations by sight and touch. Since 
she has only a l imited access to the features in virtue of which those modes of discrimination 
differ that need not entail an abil i ty to conceptualise or report on those features, it would be 
natural for her to say that there is ‘something it’s l ike’ to make discriminations by sight, as 
opposed to by touch.  If Nicky had no access to the features in virtue of which the ways of 
sensing differed, then she wil l not cla im a difference, in terms of what- it’s-l ike or otherwise, 
between perceiving (say) the size of an object by sight and by touch.  If she had complete access 
to the features in virtue of which the ways of sensing differed, then it is plausible th a t 
differences between sensory modalities would strike her only as differences between the 
content and extent of the information gleaned in perception, and we need not suppose that such 
a difference in content need feel l ike anything to her151.  But if Nicky has the l imited, non-
inferentia l access suggested above, there wil l be a sal ient difference between discriminations 
she makes by sight and those she makes by touch – a difference that she can report and reflect 
upon, but can give us no further information about, save that those ways of sensing differ for 
her.   
 
It seems, then, that the presence of some limited non-inferentia l access to features of 
information-processing has forced Nicky into a ‘zombie-free zone’, where what- it- is- l ike for 
her differs according to whether she is sensing by sight, touch or smell.  Importantly, it does 
not look l ike the conditions we have used to demarcate this zombie-free zone presuppose 
conscious experience – we began by ascribing Nicky the abil i ty to make various sorts of 
perceptual discriminations, added the abil i ty to make reports about those discriminations, 
and gave Nicky’s capacities for reasoning, reflection and report a l imited degree of access to 
the states underlying those discriminations.  Taken individually, we can conceive of each of 
these capacities obtaining in the absence of conscious experience.  But when they come 
                                                
151 Clark (2000) does not mention the possibil i ty that the perceiver he considers has complete 
access to the features in terms of which its modes of sensing differ, which would require a 
third option to be included in the possible responses it could give in response to our 
interrogation.  There are thus two ways that a creature’s access to its sensory operations could 
fa i l to result in phenomenal consciousness – if it has too much or too li ttle.  Clark has 
emphasised this in recent presentations of this materia l. 
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packaged together for one perceiver, Clark’s argument pumps the intuition that things wil l 
seem a certa in way for that perceiver as she makes her discriminations – seeing, hearing and 
touching will each feel different to her, though she wil l not be able to say much to us or 
herself about how or why this is.    
 
However, as noted above, I want to ra ise two sorts of issues for this proposal, and each of those 
that follow.  The first issue for Clark’s strategy is that we need to say something substantia l 
about the sorts of patterns of access to which we are appealing – what exactly is it that is 
being accessed, and what does a perceiver’s standing in such an access relation consist in?  Once 
we have answers to these questions, we need to consider whether we have good reasons to 
believe that the relevant patterns of access obtain in our own case152.  Without such reasons we 
would be in the unusual position of seeing how the explanatory gap could be bridged, but being 
unable to apply this method to our own conscious experience – possibly an advance on our 
current position, but surely not what we were after. 
The second issue is that we might wonder exactly how Clark’s story squares with the 
challenge posed by the explanatory gap as I have set it out above.  The task was to specify a 
conceptual path from structural and functional facts (here facts about patterns of access) to 
facts about experience.  Should we see Clark’s argument as an attempt to provide such a 
conceptual entailment, or as an intuition pump designed to assuage the need for such an 
entailment?  We can bring this issue into focus by considering an obvious objection to Clark’s 
proposal, which he attributes to Dave Chalmers: 
 
‘Our argument, it wil l be said, ‘establishes at most that a certa in kind of access 
implies a certa in tendency to judge and report a difference (the sort of tendency my 
zombie twin might have) rather than implying a real phenomenal difference.’’ (Ibid. 
p.32) 
 
It wil l then be objected that it was not our tendencies to judge and report that we wished to 
explain, but the conscious experiences thought to l ie behind those tendencies.  Clark’s response 
is to note that his proposal also suggests how such tendencies can be justified or mistaken, since 
a subject might be mistaken about the access she has to the differences between her modes of 
                                                
152  This question, as well as the analogous questions raised for each of the positions considered 
in this section, should not be taken as criticism of any of these proposals, since each a ims only 
at establishing a general framework from which to address the explanatory gap, not fleshing 
out the details of such a framework, as my question demands. 
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sensing, or make a fa lse judgement on the basis of that access.  But, Chalmers wil l surely 
respond, the truthmakers of our judgements and reports about experiences are not 
nonphenomenal differences between modes of sensing, but the conscious sensory experiences 
themselves.  Should we interpret Clark’s account as building the kind of conceptual bridge 
between those nonphenomenal differences and experiences that proponents of the explanatory 
gap require, or as showing us that the demand for such a conceptual bridge is misguided?  I 
think we are best able to see what Clark should say here by considering the relation of his 
account to our next two strategies. 
 
6.2.2 Representation and Instantiation 
A common response to the explanatory gap consists in cla iming that demonstrating the 
existence of the gap relies on some kind of mistaken construal of the properties of experience 
we wish to explain.  For example, Jackson (2003) argues that we should not conclude that 
physicalism about phenomenal consciousness is fa lse on the basis of his knowledge argument 
(1982), and that representationalism lets us see how to avoid doing so.  Start by assuming the 
truth of representationalism about experience – experience is exhaustively representational , 
meaning that any change in the character of an experience is a change in the way that the 
experience represents things to be153.  If representationalism is granted, this al lows us to see 
that there are a couple of ways in which we can describe what happens to Mary upon her 
release from the black-and-white room.  The key point to remember is that to represent 
something as being the case does not entail that there is an instantiated property tha t 
corresponds to the way things are represented as being154.  It is a mistake to think that saying 
“unicorns do not exist” commits us to some entity of which non-existence is predicated.  The 
sentence should be understood as representing things as being a certa in way, rather than 
picking out an object and predicating a property of i t.  Likewise, it is widely agreed tha t 
saying “I have an experience of red” does not entail that there need be some existent red thing 
to which I stand in an experientia l relation.  Assuming otherwise was the mistake of the 
                                                
153 See e.g. Tye (2000), Lycan (1996) for defences of representationalism.  Beginning a defence of 
a representationalist solution to the explanatory gap with an assumption of the truth of 
representationalism appears question-begging, but, as we shall see, the argument aims only to 
prove the conditional that if representationalism is true, then we can see how the worries tha t 
motivate the explanatory gap rest on a mistake. 
154 See Harman (1990) for a longer defence of this cla im.  Harman’s position there can be 
interpreted as an instance of the strategy under discussion in this subsection. 
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sense-data theorist’s response to the argument from il lusion155.  According to the sense-data 
theorist, our experience having the properties it does is explained by our acquaintance with 
sense-data that are appropriately related to those properties.  Representationalism suggests 
an a lternative picture – the properties which account for the character of our experience are 
representational properties.  My having an experience of red is a matter of my being in a state 
that represents things as being a certa in way.  But my representing things in this way need not 
entail that I stand in a relation to some existent object with the represented property.  To 
think this is so, according to representationalism, is to confuse a representational or 
intentional property (or intensional property, in Jackson’s terminology) with an instantiated 
one. 
 
How does this bear on what we might say about Mary upon her release from her room?  
Jackson’s point is that drawing an anti-physicalist conclusion from the fact that Mary has a 
new experience when she leaves the room relies on a certa in conception of experience.  The 
anti-physicalist suggests that when Mary sees her first red object, she learns about a new 
property of experience (phenomenal redness) that the physical information she assimilated 
in her black-and-white room did not tel l her about.  But viewing matters from a 
representationalist perspective a l lows us to question this conception of experience.  The above 
remarks showed us that we need not think of Mary’s experience of red as involving her 
standing in a relation to some instantiated experientia l property that physicalism does not 
tel l us about.  Rather, we can understand her as being in a new kind of representational state, 
one that her previous black-and-white environment rendered off-l imits.  The intuitive l ine of 
resistance to this idea is that merely saying that Mary represents things in a new way leaves 
out the fact that she learns something of the form “red things look like this”.   But whilst i t is 
true that this is something Mary might say upon entering her new representational state, 
moving from that fact to the fa lsity of physicalism requires interpreting the above ‘this’ as 
picking out some instantiated property of experience that is new to Mary, precisely the 
characterisation that the representationalist rejects156.  Once the possibil i ty of this view of 
                                                
155 For more of this sort on the relation between sense-data theory and the mind-body problem 
see Crane (2000), whose position there also has aff inities with the general strategy 
considered in this subsection. 
156 Of course, this view of matters is not incompatible with representationalism if the new 
property picked out is understood to be Mary’s property of being in a state with a certa in 
representational content.  But this can’t be the sort of acquaintance with a new property the 
advocate of the knowledge argument has in mind if the argument is to work against 
physicalism. 
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matters has been opened up, Jackson suggests we attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness 
by giving an account of the distinctive features of the representations which constitute it. 
 
I take Rorty (1979, ch.1.2) to be suggesting a similar position in his discussion of the 
phenomenal and the physical:  “Why do we think of the phenomenal as immateria l?  We do 
so because, as Ryle put it, we insist on thinking of having a pain in ocular metaphors – as 
having a funny sort of particular before the eye of the mind” (Ibid. p.31).  Rorty thinks that 
the phenomenal seems incongruent with the physical only when shift our focus from 
phenomenal states that are essentia l ly properties of people to phenomenal particulars: 
 
“The neo-dualist who identifies a pain with how it feels to be in pain is 
hypostasizing a property – painfulness – into a certa in sort of particular, a particular 
of that specia l sort whose essi is percipi and whose reality is exhausted in our init i a l 
acquaintance with it.” (Ibid, p.30) 
 
But once we are viewing pains as phenomenal particulars with which people can be 
acquainted, rather than as a certa in kind of state of a person, physicalism is doomed.  For the 
essence of any putative phenomenal particular is exhausted by the way it appears to subjects 
who are acquainted with i t, and thus any attempt to reductively explain such particulars in 
terms of factors other than how things appear to subjects wil l fa i l to capture the essence of 
that particular, to explain what is ultimately distinctive of it.  Luckily for physicalism, as 
our discussion of Jackson suggested, this view of matters is not mandatory – we must take care to 
think of pains as properties of people, not as particulars, if physicalism is to be defended.  
Jackson and the representationalists propose that pains, and all other experientia l properties, 
are properties of how the subject represents things to be. 
 
Again, two classes of questions are ra ised by th is proposal.  Firstly, adopting th is 
representationalist framework for a solution obliges us to provide a further story about the 
character of the representations to which we are appealing – do we have reason to think th at 
representational states with whatever features are necessary to house an explanation of the 
character of phenomenal consciousness obtain in human perceivers?  Secondly, one might a lso 
think that Jackson’s argument does not completely dispel the residual intuition that merely 
representing things in a certa in way need not entail phenomenal consciousness – we can grasp 
the details of his proposal and sti l l, i t seems, worry that the right sorts of representational 
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states might be present whilst phenomenal consciousness is absent.  Fleshing out our account of 
the relevant properties of the representations constitutive of phenomenal consciousness might 
help with this – but can we say anything more generally about why a representational state 
should entail phenomenal consciousness?  As with Clark’s proposal, I think we need to address 
this second issue by considering how Jackson’s proposal relates to the challenge of the 
explanatory gap as we have sketched it – is representationalism supposed to provide a 
conceptual bridge between the phenomenal and the physical, or to show that such a bridge is 
not required?  And, as with Clark’s proposal, I wil l argue that we can see how the 
representationalist should respond by considering the relations between their position and the 
others considered in this section. 
 
6.2.3 The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
The last general strategy for tackling the explanatory gap that I want to consider is the 
phenomenal concept strategy (PCS).  PCS acknowledges that there is, on one interpretation, a 
principled gap between our conscious experience and any structural or functional account we 
might give of that experience.  However, this gap need not stand in the way of physicalism, 
nor need it rule out the prospect of our having a good explanation of phenomenal consciousness.  
This is because, PCS argues, the presence of the gap is explained by our distinctive way of 
thinking about phenomenal states – by appeal to the specia l character of our phenomenal 
concepts, and the way in which that character differs from that of the structural and 
functional concepts in terms of which we wish to frame an explanation. 
 
There are various types of phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) on the market157, and we shan’t 
consider any of them in detail here.  We are interested here in the general strategy and how it 
combines with the two proposals above and the action-space theory, rather than which 
detailed version of the strategy should be pursued.  What unites the various instances of PCS 
is the cla im that the concepts we use to think about our experiences – our phenomenal concepts 
– are conceptually isolated from our structural and physical concepts.  Different types of PCS give 
different accounts of this conceptual isolation – for example, following Loar (1990) and Tye 
(2003) we might think that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from structural and 
functional concepts since they are recognitional concepts, applicable only in the presence of the 
phenomenal state they pick out.  In addition to this recognitional aspect, such concepts must 
                                                
157 E.g. Loar (1990), Hil l (1997), Perry (2001), Aydede and Guzeldere (2005), and Papineau 
(2006). 
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also lack logical or inferentia l ties to our other concepts to be conceptually isolated in the 
requisite way158.  We might have a partia l ly structural/functional concept of red that is 
inferentia l ly related to objects, surfaces, light and so forth, but our phenomenal concept of red 
applies to our experience, and lacks such relations (Carruthers (2000), Carruthers and Veil let 
(2007)). 
 
If i t is granted that conscious perceivers possess phenomenal concepts that are isolated in the 
requisite way, then we can see how to resist the moves from the conceivabil i ty of zombies, the 
knowledge argument, and the intuitive presence of an explanatory gap between the 
phenomenal and the physical, to anti-physicalist conclusions.  The conceivabil i ty of zombies 
is explained since the structural and functional concepts we use to give our description of the 
zombie are inferentia l ly isolated from our phenomenal concepts.  When considering whether a 
zombie is conceivable, we use a phenomenal concept to think about an experience, then consider 
whether the conditions for applying that concept must be fixed by the structural/functional 
description of the zombie we have put in place.  Given that phenomenal concepts are (for 
example) conceptually isolated recognitional concepts, it wil l a lways seem conceivable that a 
zombie could lack the experience a phenomenal concept picks out, regardless of how our 
structural and functional concepts say things are, and will never seem that our 
structural/functional description allows us to infer the phenomenal way things are.   
The same points apply to Mary’s inabil i ty to move from structural and functional 
information to phenomenal knowledge of the experience of red.  The structural and functional 
information she is given is conceptually isolated from the phenomenal information she is 
trying to deduce.  Consequently, the relevant phenomenal information cannot be arrived at via 
inferentia l moves from structural and functional  facts.  For Mary to think ‘red is 
(phenomenologically) l ike this’ in the relevant way, she would have to deploy the 
phenomenal concept of red, and our account stipulates that this concept is only applicable in 
the presence of the state which it picks out, rather than on the basis of any amount of 
structural or functional information.  Since Mary’s environment has been designed so that state 
picked out by the phenomenal concept of red will not occur in her, she cannot token tha t 
phenomenal concept, and thus cannot know what it is like to experience red. 
                                                
158 This characterisation is taken from Carruthers and Veil let (2007).  It seems plausible that 
the isolation requirement should only apply to connections between phenomenal and 
structural/functional concepts, since it seems plausible that phenomenal concepts (e.g. of colour 
experiences) might stand in relations of relative phenomenological sameness and difference to 
each other. 
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 Finally, the intuitive appearance of an explanatory gap is explained by the structural 
and functional vocabulary on one side of our candidate explanation being conceptually isolated 
from the phenomenal vocabulary on the other side.  
PCS can thus accommodate al l our anti-physicalist intuitions about consciousness.  But 
if we also assume that our possession of conceptually isolated concepts can be given a reductive 
explanation consistent with physicalism, we can see that these intuitions can be explained 
without conceding physicalism’s falsity. 
 
Again, at least two sorts of questions arise for PCS.  The first concerns how the appeal to a 
class of concepts that are conceptually isolated from our structural, functional and other 
naturalistica l ly-acceptable concepts is to be cashed out – how does such conceptual isolation 
come about, and do we have reason to believe that the phenomenal concepts of human 
perceivers may be isolated in such a way? The second question concerns what sort of solution to 
the problem of the explanatory gap we should see PCS as affording – should it be understood 
as a means of closing the gap by providing an explanation which meets the requirements of 
section two, above, or only as a means of avoiding anti-physicalist conclusions whilst 
accepting the existence of the gap?   The discussion above suggests that we should see it as the 
latter – if our way of framing the explanandum when thinking about the explanatory gap 
involves deploying a phenomenal concept, then we cannot hope for an explanation of this in 
structural and functional terms, since these classes of concepts are isolated from each other159.  
But might there be a way to reta in PCS’s attractive explanation of our intuitions regarding 




6.3 Building our Bridge 
 
                                                
159 Carruthers and Veil let (2007) note that whilst the truth of PCS would mean that we could 
not infer the fa lsity of physicalism from (for example) the conceivabil i ty of zombies, PCS is 
neutral as to whether conscious experience is subserved by physical properties a lone.  An anti-
physicalist could agree that introspecting a phenomenal state involves deploying a 
conceptually- isolated recognitional concept, but sti l l hold that those concepts pick out 
intrinsic and non-intentional properties of experience that turn out to be incompatible with 
physicalism.  Again, I wil l suggest that we can see how to use PCS to argue for physicalism 
when we view it in relation to the other proposals of this section, and in the context of the 
action-space approach. 
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In this section, I argue that the three proposals considered above can be combined in a way 
that resists the criticisms to each.  Before doing so, however, I want to suggest that considering 
the relation of the action-space account to each of the above proposals suggests how they 
should each respond to the first sort of question I ra ised for them – how should the conditions 
they identify as sufficient for phenomenal consciousness be fleshed out, and do we have reason 
to think that such conditions are met by conscious perceivers? 
 
The relation of Clark’s (2000) proposal to the action-space account is fairly direct.  In the 
original article, he leaves the question of just how to characterise the l imited, non-inferentia l 
access to which he appeals open, but at one stage floats the fol lowing suggestion: 
 
“Perhaps, then, what we have access to when we have access to the modali ty 
involved in the act of detection is the specif ic battery of skil ls that we could have 
deployed.  Insofar as the sets of skil ls differ according to the modality involved […] 
access to the sets of skil ls which could have been deployed would constitute direct non-
inferentia l access to the modality in use…” (Ibid, p.35) 
 
Our consideration of the empirical (and philosophical) support for the action-space account in 
previous chapters suggests that this is exactly right – we have been arguing that we should 
construe conscious visual experiences as an agent’s perceptual sensitivity poising her over a 
space of actions currently afforded by her environment in such a way as to al low a form of 
practical reasoning about the afforded possibil i ties.  Different perceptual experiences are 
characterised by a different range of enabled abil i ties and skil ls, and we saw in chapter 5 how 
an agent’s grasp of the actions currently afforded by her environment could be direct and 
without conscious inference, apt to be integrated with ongoing practical reasoning, but 
nonetheless unavailable for cognitively demanding capacities such as verbal report and 
conceptualisation.  The action-space account, then, suggests how an agent could have the kind 
of l imited but direct access to features in virtue of which sensory episodes differ a l luded to by 
Clark, and our consideration of the DVS data, the plausible diagnoses the action-space 
account affords of various pathologies of consciousness, and our reflections on colour vision a l l 
provide reasons to believe that such patterns of access obtain in conscious human perceivers, 
and are implicated in visual experience. 
 
 172 
We can see how the support we have marshalled for the action-space account gels with a 
representationalist account of experience if we gloss the action-space account (as I sometimes 
have) as in part a thesis about the content of perceptual experience. We can understand a 
perceiver’s being poised to act in certa in ways by her perceptual sensitivity to the environment 
as a matter of her occupying a representational state, with the content of the state given in 
terms of the abil i ties which it empowers – the way that state represents the affordances of 
the perceiver’s environment.  Our account of the integration requirement in chapter 5, and the 
above discussion of Clark’s proposal and the action-space account, suggests that this is the sort 
of content to which we have direct, non-inferentia l, but l imited, access to in experience.  
Jackson (2003) and the representationalists are thus glossed by the action-space theory as 
cla iming that we are prone to conflate this access to the action-oriented contents of our 
perceptual experience with acquaintance with irreducible phenomenal properties.  To the 
extent to which we have seen support for the action-space conception of visual experience, we 
have a lso seen support for the cla im that visual experience involves states with th is kind of 
intentional content. 
 
This a lso suggests how the action-space account might provide a well-motivated way of 
fleshing out a phenomenal concept strategy.  As we saw in chapter 5, the action-space account 
demands that an agent’s grasp of the actions afforded for her by her environment be such tha t 
those affordances can inform her practical deliberation – such integrabil i ty is necessary for 
her perceptual sensitivity to affordances to issue in conscious experience.  We also argued for 
the possibil i ty that an agent could grasp affordances in this way without being able to report, 
conceptualise, or make general inferences on the basis of them.  Thus, the type of grasp of 
affordances that the action-space account requires of a conscious perceiver comes apart from 
the way affordances are grasped when brought under l inguistic concepts, and merely described 
rather than perceived.  When someone reads over a description of an agent whose perceptual 
sensitivity to a range of environmental affordances is apt to be integrated with her practica l 
reasoning, the connection of such an account to her own perceptual experience can seem opaque – 
according to an action-space-inspired version of PCS, this is because the l inguistical ly-
mediated and conceptual manner in which the reader conceives of the affordances in question 
is very different from the engaged and preconceptual grasp of currently sal ient affordances 
that is crucia l for conscious experience according to the action-space approach160. 
                                                
160 On this account, the support the action-space affords to PCS is thus slightly different from 
that which it affords access-based and representationalist strategies.  The latter strategies 
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These remarks on how the action-space approach as we have developed it supports the three 
proposals al low us to see what they have in common. Each attempts to deal with the 
explanatory gap by cla iming that we are prone to making a certa in sort of mistake when, by 
reflecting on our experience, we fix the concept of phenomenal consciousness we’re trying to 
explain.  Clark suggests that we mistake our limited access to the features in virtue of which 
our sensory episodes differ for confrontation with some non-structurally or functional ly 
analyzable explanandum.  Jackson and the representationalists say that we mistake 
properties of the way our experience represents things as being for instantiated properties of 
our experience.  And phenomenal concept strategists say that we mistake the conceptual 
isolation of the phenomenal concepts we use to think about experience for a kind of 
metaphysical isolation of the phenomenal from the structural and functional.  Viewing the 
proposals in this way suggests how I think the action-space theorist should respond to the 
explanatory gap.   
 
In brief, the action-space theorist holds that conscious experience consists in being put in touch 
with the affordances of your environment in a way that enables intel l igent action, but tha t 
certain facts about our mode of access to those affordances make it natural to think we are 
confronted in experience with phenomenal properties that go beyond mere specif ications of 
possibil i ties for action.  In slightly more detail , the action-space theorist agrees with the 
phenomenal concept strategist that the appearance of an unbridgeable explanatory gap 
between the phenomenal and the physical arises since we are prone to thinking about conscious 
experience in two distinct ways.  One of these ways (the one that gives rise to the apparent 
explanatory gap) relies on a distortive conception of experience – as Jackson and the 
representationalists suggest, we are prone to reify facts about how our experience represents 
the world and our relation to it into putative facts about phenomenal particulars with which 
we are confronted in experience.  Specifical ly, we are prone to move from the fact that an 
experience manifestly empowers us to act in certain ways that can be reflected in our practical 
reasoning to the putative fact that there is some further instantiated phenomenal property of 
experience that stands in need of explanation.  But we can give an account of why th is 
distortive conception of experience is natural – as Clark suggests, the access we have to the 
skil ls enabled for us by our perceptual sensitivity is subject to certa in limits.  We suggested 
                                                                                                                                           
are supported by the arguments in favour of the action-space account’s conception of visual 
experience in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  I am suggesting that PCS can be fleshed out via an appeal to 
the model of practical reasoning and grasp of enabled actions suggested in chapter 5. 
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above that these l imits are imposed by the discrepancies between the preconceptual grasp of 
enabled actions necessary for the form of practical reasoning outl ined in chapter 5, and the 
l inguistic, conceptual grasp we have of the affordances that correctly characterise the content 
of perceptual experience when they are presented to us as a verbal description of the 
conditions that suffice for conscious experience.  Thus, when we reflect on our experience, and 
attempt to describe the ways in which two visual experiences differ, the full range of 
differences between the suites of enabled actions that characterise each experience is not 
accessible to verbal report or conceptualisation.  It thus does not seem to us, on the basis of 
introspective reflection, that experiences differ only in virtue of the way they poise us over a 
space of enabled actions.  Once we have explained this in terms of the distinctive features of 
the access we have to such a space of enabled actions, we see the possibil i ty that the obtaining 
of such knowing poise and patterns of access can ground a complete account of phenomenal 
consciousness.  It might sti l l be tempting for some to suppose that the relevant patterns of 
access involve acquaintance with essentia l ly experientia l phenomenal particulars, but PCS 
and the representationalists have shown us how such an inference may rest on a confusion, and 
Clark’s demonstration of how facts about access can entail facts about how things seem from a 
particular perspective make such an inference less tempting sti l l. 
 
As mentioned above, I think that viewing the three proposals through the lens of the action-
space theory not only discloses the relations between them, but suggests how each might 
respond to the second class of questions I raised for them in the previous section.  I asked 
whether we should read Clark’s proposal as an attempt to build a conceptual bridge between 
patterns of access to differences between sensory episodes and phenomenal consciousness, or to 
assuage the need for such a conceptual bridge.  Our discussion here suggests that we should 
understand the proposal as offering a conceptual l ink between phenomenal consciousness 
properly construed (as appropriate grasp of the practical consequences of perceptual sensitivity) 
and patterns of access, as well as an account of why such a construal of perceptual experience is 
not introspectively obvious.  We considered a development of Chalmers’ objection, where i t 
was cla imed that Clark’s proposal can explain propensities to judge or report that one is 
having conscious experiences, but leaves out the phenomenal truthmakers of such judgements 
and reports.  In response, we should hold that the intuition that some phenomenal property 
that is in principle independent of the ways the subject is disposed to act and practical ly 
reason stands behind the subject’s introspective judgement of difference between two 
experiences stems from a natural but distortive conception of experience which we have been 
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given reason to think is a mere artefact of the discrepancy between the l imited but intimate 
access to environmental affordances we have in experience, and the l inguistic and 
conceptually-mediated access we have to them as they f igure in our description of the 
sufficient conditions for conscious experience. 
 
S imilarly, we should see representationalists as suggesting a conception of experience 
according to which there can be a conceptual mesh between conscious experience, properly 
characterised, and a physicalistica l ly-acceptable explanans (understood, on our account as a 
certain way of representing the current possibil i ties for action afforded by one’s environment).  
I asked how representationalists might explain residual intuitions that the representational 
contents to which they appeal might be tokened in the absence of phenomenal consciousness.  
The representationalist can invoke our discussion of Clark and PCS in response.  We have 
suggested that there are different modes of access to contents involved when actively 
perceptually engaged with one’s environment on the one hand, and indulging in disengaged 
conceptual reflection on those contents on the other, and that these differences can explain the 
apparent gulf between the ways experiences strike us introspectively, and the structural and 
functional characterisations we can give of those experiences.  However, Clark’s proposal also 
makes it plausible to suppose that when patterns of access of the kind to which we appealed 
in chapter 5 and above obtain, an agent wil l sincerely make judgements on the basis of 
introspection such as “there is ‘something it’s like’ to undergo this experience as opposed to 
that one”, clarifying how a representational state can bring about things feel ing a certa in way 
for an agent.  Note a lso the added resources to explain the temptation to the 
represented/instantiated confusion afforded by viewing the representationalist strategy in 
l ight of the proposals of Clark and PCS. 
 
Lastly, I questioned whether PCS could do more than demonstrate the compatibil i ty of our 
inabil i ty to construct a naturalistica l ly-acceptable explanation of conscious experience with 
the truth of physicalism. I a lso noted (in fn. 13, fol lowing Carruthers and Veil let (2007)) that 
the truth of PCS is not incompatible with conscious experience being subserved by non-physica l 
properties.  As Carruthers and Veil let note, the way we have sketched PCS rel ies on a 
distinction between 1st and 3rd-person characterisations of, or ways of picking out, phenomenal 
concepts.  1st-person characterisations are those that presuppose a particular perspective, such 
as “the concept I deploy when thinking about this experience”, or “the recognitional concept 
which applies to states l ike this and that.”  A 3rd-person characterisation such as “phenomenal 
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concepts are conceptually isolated recognitional concepts that are applicable only in the 
presence of the states which they pick out” presupposes no such perspective.  The 1st-person 
characterisations are intended to il lustrate the way phenomenal concepts figure in our 
thoughts about our experiences, whilst the 3rd-person characterisations are intended to open up 
the possibil i ty that our 1st-person characterisations can be given a reductive explanation.  
However, we might worry that we have aff irmed the existence of an explanatory gap, but 
relocated it between our 1st-person and 3rd-person accounts of phenomenal concepts.  We noted 
above that an anti-physicalist might hold that a distinctive kind of phenomenal concept does 
figure in our 1st-person thoughts about experience, and serves to pick out intrinsic, non-physica l 
phenomenal properties.  If PCS cannot provide a story about the relations between the 1st-
person construals of phenomenal concepts and their physicalistica l ly-acceptable 3rd-person 
construals, the anti-physicalist can claim that the absence of a conceptual mesh between the 
1st and 3rd-person characterisations points to the existence of an explanatory gap between our 
1st-person experience and the 3rd-person structural and functional vocabulary with which we 
wish to explain it. 
But our consideration of Clark and the representationalists suggests how PCS should 
respond here.  If we hold that, as the action-space suggests, the apparent discrepancy between 
1st and 3rd-person methods of conceiving of our experience can be explained by appeal to the 
discrepancies between the preconceptual grasp of environmental affordances necessary for 
conscious experience and the conceptual grasp of those affordances as they figure in a 3rd-
person characterisation of the content and character of an experience then Clark’s proposal 
has shown us how patterns of access to afforded access, characterised in 3rd-person terms, can 
entail there being something-it’s-l ike for the agent for whom the actions are afforded.  
Whilst it is sti l l logically possible that the relevant patterns of access involve acquaintance 
with non-physically-analysable explananda, the suggestions of Jackson and the 
representationalists have made it plausible that drawing this conclusion on the basis of our 
introspective evidence rests on a confusion, and the suggestion that Clark’s proposal shows 
how facts about access could entail facts about what-it’s-l ike from a particular perspective 
removes what I take to be the most plausible motivation for embracing such a possibil i ty. 
 
It seems, then, that viewing our proposals through the lens of the action-space theory has 
suggested ways in which each might be further developed and empirically-supported, as wel l 
as how the proposals share a common structure that a l low them to work together in order to 
resist the criticisms that arise for each.  I want to close by clarifying how our discussion of the 
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three proposals and the action-space theory in this section suggests a unified solution to the 
explanatory gap that meets the conditions on an adequate deflationist theory we set out in 1.4. 
 
 
6.4 The Duties of the Deflationist Revisited 
 
In 1.3 I suggested that we view the task of constructing a deflationist explanation of conscious 
experience as analogous to explaining a magic trick.  On a natural interpretation of the trick, 
we are confronted with events that resist explanation in terms of our standard physica l 
ontology, and we may be driven to various anti-reductionist theories as a result.  However, 
empirical and conceptual investigation into the trick lets us see that a description of the trick 
that makes ineliminable references to vanishings, teleportations and suchlike is not the only 
way to accommodate our evidence – we can instead explain it via an appeal to sleight-of-
hand, a phenomenon that can be explained in physicalist terms, whilst explaining away the 
temptation to construe the trick as involving genuine magic.  Last section’s discussion of the 
action-space account and the three proposals suggests a similar position with regard to 
conscious experience.  Having a conscious experience with a certa in content and character turns 
out to be a matter of grasping the ways one’s perceptual sensitivity to one’s environment 
currently poises one to act.  However, facts about the nature and limitations of our access to the 
suites of affordances that contribute to the content of our conscious experience mean that th is 
fact is not introspectively obvious to us – rather, we are prone to suppose that we are 
acquainted in experience with phenomenal particulars that are essentia l ly neutral with 
respect to their relations to possible actions on the part of the agent161.  Both this type of poise 
over a space of actions, and the l imits of our access to the nature and extent of those actions are 
amenable to reductive explanation.  It seems to me that the account of phenomenal 
consciousness we have arrived at thus meets the desiderata we set out in 1.4 of accommodating 
the introspective evidence that leads to the positing of an explanatory gap, but redescribing 
that evidence in such a way as to make it compatible with physicalism, and showing why the 
physicalistica l ly-acceptable construal of that evidence is not introspectively obvious.   
                                                
161 An interesting and open question arises about the extent to which the temptation to think 
about experience in this way is universal, culturally informed, or the product of studying a 
certain sort of philosophy.  The difficulties I sometimes have explaining to people without a 
background in philosophy why there is thought to be a particular problem about the reductive 
explanation of consciousness makes me curious about the latter possibil i ty, but I shan’t attempt 
to speculate further here. 
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In general, I have stressed the obligation of a theory of consciousness to say something 
about how it meets (or at least relates to) the requirement that reductive explanations 
demonstrate a conceptual mesh between explanandum and explanans.  According to our action-
space account, no such conceptual mesh is in the offing on one construal of our introspective 
evidence.  This prompts the conclusion that there is an unbridgeable explanatory gap between 
the phenomenal and the physical.  But our discussion of the three positions above has shown 
us how to resist the conclusion – the construal of our introspective evidence required to 
motivate the explanatory gap is natural, but distortive.  We argued that we can also view our 
introspective evidence as consisting in our automatic and non-inferentia l practical grasp of sets 
of possibil i ties for various sorts of action suggested by our current perceptual sensitivity to the 
environment – experience construed in this way is compatible with a physicalist explanation 
that includes an a priori component162. 
Additionally, the arguments in favour of the action-space conception of experience in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4, and the model of practical reasoning and access to perceived affordances in 
chapter 5, suggest that our redescription is empirically plausible, and thus that the conditions 
the action-space account specif ies for phenomenal consciousness are indeed met by conscious 
perceivers. 
 
We also noted in 1.4 that a candidate deflationist account of phenomenal consciousness should 
say something about the properties of conscious experience that are sometimes held to make it 
a problematic candidate for reductive explanation.  We l isted ineffabil i ty, privacy, direct-
accessibil i ty and intrinsicali ty as examples, and concluded that the deflationist should 
either explain how such properties can arise as a result of physicalistica l ly-acceptable 
conditions for conscious experience obtaining, or explain how our introspective evidence makes 
i t natural to posit such properties despite the fact that no such properties of experience obtain.  
Our discussion above suggests how we might discharge this obligation for each property. 
 We can begin to explain the ineffabil i ty of conscious experience by noting the 
complexity of the enabled abil i ties that characterise visual experience.  For example, our 
discussion of colour experience in chapter 4 suggested that experiencing a surface under natural 
l ight as a uniform colour is a matter of being able to sift, sort and track it according to its 
location in a multi-dimensional space of possible ways of modifying light, that this abil i ty in 
turn was enabled by grasping the signif icance and likely patterns of variations in the array of 
                                                
162 Recall that I have assumed that representational and intentional properties can be 
reductively explained in physical terms. 
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colour-looks it displayed, and that perceptual sensitivity to those colour-looks in turn was a 
matter of being able to place different portions of the surface in a multi-dimensional space 
whose geometry is dictated by relations of relative sameness and difference.  The nature and 
extent of the abil i ties which form the basis of a standard visual experience of colour, then, are 
diff icult both to catalogue and to convey.  Moreover, our access to those enabled abil i ties is 
l imited by the possible constraints we set out in chapter 5 – the practical grasp of enabled 
abil i ties necessary for conscious experience according to our account does not entail the abil i ties 
to conceptualise and report on those abil i ties.  We brought this point out in our above 
discussion of Clark’s creature with l imited non-inferentia l access to features in virtue of which 
its sensory episodes differ.  We would expect such a creature to find its sensory experiences 
ineffable, since the nature of its access to the properties of those experiences imposes limits on 
the detail in which it can conceptualise and report upon them. 
 An account of privacy and direct avai labil i ty is also suggested by such considerations 
about access.  The experiences of a creature with the patterns of access to which we have been 
appealing will a lways be private, firstly since it is unable to fully convey the character of its 
experiences in its reports to others, and secondly since, for any conscious sensory episode, i t 
a lone enjoys the access to the range of affordances disclosed for it by its perceptual sensitivi ty 
to the environment that suffices for conscious experience according to the action-space account.  
Phenomenal properties of experiences are l ikewise directly-available to such a creature since 
a detected affordance only figures in an agent’s experience when it is apt to inform her ongoing 
practical reasoning, thus ruling out the possibil i ty that there could be phenomenal properties 
of the agent’s experience that were inaccessible to her163. 
 Lastly, the considerations of the previous two sections, in particular our discussion of 
representationalism, suggest how the action-space account should treat the putative 
experientia l property of intrinsicali ty.  We noted in chapter 1 that we cannot think of 
phenomenal properties as ‘intrinsic’ if we hope to construct a reductive explanation of 
consciousness.  This was because doing so seemed to entail the essentia l independence of those 
properties from any structurally or functionally specifiable corollaries.  However, as suggested 
by our quote from Rorty in 6.2.2, such a conception of experience shifts from viewing experiences 
as essentia l ly properties of persons to viewing them as phenomenal particulars whose essence 
is exhausted by the way they appear to experiencing subjects.  As we saw there (and in 1.4), 
such a conception is incompatible with physicalism about experience.  However, we also saw 
                                                
163 So long as we are construing aptitude for integration with practical reasoning as a form of 
availabil i ty or accessibil i ty.  This is in l ine with Block’s (1995) standard definition of 
‘access’. 
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as a result of our discussion of representationalism and its relation to the other positions of 6.2 
that we have reason to think that such a conception of experience is misguided.  Viewing 
experiences as involving confrontations with instantiated intrinsic phenomenal properties 
involves the equivocation Jackson highlighted between instantiated and intentional 
properties of experience.  In the last section we saw how the facts about access to which the 
action-space account appeals suggests that such an equivocation is tempting but non-
compulsory, and we have good reason to think it distortive.  Intrinsicali ty, then, is at best an 
apparent property of conscious experiences. 
 
Our action-space brand of deflationism, then, meets the desiderata we set out on an adequate 
explanation of conscious experience, addressing the conceptual mesh requirement, giving a 
plausible and physicalistica l ly-acceptable construal of our introspective evidence whilst 
explaining the temptation to an alternative construal, providing empirical evidence in its 
favour, and affording plausible diagnoses of each of the putative problematic properties of 





I have argued in this chapter that the action-space account of conscious vision al lows us to see 
how to close the explanatory gap.  We need not view the action-space account as merely a 
proposal about the contents of visual experience, a thesis about the functional role of conscious 
experience, or a way of addressing the comparative explanatory gap, though it provides a l l 
these things.  We saw above, though, that i t can also make intel l igible how facts about an 
agent’s access to the skil ls enabled for them by their perceptual sensitivity to the ir 
environment can entail facts about how things seem from that agent’s perspective, can result in 
ineffabil i ty, privacy and direct-availabil i ty being properties of that agent’s experience, and 
make it natural (though mistaken) for that agent to suppose that she is confronted in her 
experience with intrinsic phenomenal properties which resist structural and functional 
explanation.  Drawing on Clark’s access-based strategy, representationalism and PCS, we 
traced the source of this confusion to facts about the distinctive mode of access an agent has to 
the skil ls enabled for her when those skil ls form the basis of a conscious experience.  The 
preconceptual, practical and immediate accessibil i ty of those skil ls to the agent for whom 
they are manifestly enabled is unlike the conceptual, theoretical and inferentia l access to 
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those skil ls as they f igure in a verbal characterisation of the content of that agent’s 
experience, creating the impression of an unbridgeable gap between 1st and 3rd-person 
characterisations of that experience.  However, Clark’s proposal about access suggested tha t 
facts about how things are from a 1st-person perspective can follow from 3rd-personal facts 
about patterns of access, and our consideration of representationalism and PCS suggested tha t 
we can resist moving from the residual intuition that such a conception leaves features of 
experience unexplained to anti-physicalist conclusions. Instead, I suggested that we explain 
this intuition away as a confusion between intentional and instantiated properties of our 
experience that arises due to facts about the nature of our access to those intentional properties 
in conscious perception.  Cashing out the three proposals of 6.2 in action-space terms enabled us 
to see their common structure, to suggest how they can work together to accommodate the 
criticisms faced by each and, thus unified, benefit from the empirical support for the action-
space theory provided in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  We emerge, I think, with good reason to believe 
that conscious vision, and not merely its perceptual content or functional role, can be explained 
in terms of an agent’s grasp of the practical consequences of their perceptual sensitivity – in 





Conscious visual experience, I have argued, consists in an agent’s exercising a certa in kind of 
grasp of the practical consequences of their perceptual sensitivity to their environment.  
Episodes of conscious visual experience occur when an agent’s perceptual sensitivity to the 
mesh between their current environment and their current goals and projects is apt to inform 
their practical reasoning.  Evidence in favour of such a view has come from considering what 
the DVS data tel ls us about the functional role of conscious vision (ch.2), considering how such 
an account can handle problem cases which confound other enactive theories and present 
problems for any candidate account of perceptual consciousness (ch.3), and the merits of the 
account of colour perception which it suggests (ch.4).  I suggested that the requirement tha t 
perceptual sensitivity to affordances be “apt for integration with practical reasoning” if it is 
to issue in conscious experience should be understood as requiring that the perceiver grasps both 
that the perceived afforded action is a means to one among several possible ends, and the 
relevance of such means/ends relationships for her current goals.  We also considered the 
possibil i ty that such a view suggests how questions about the perspectival nature and 
qualitative character of conscious experience are tackled together for the action-space 
approach – the conditions that bring about experiences with qualitative character might a lso 
suffice for the existence of a unified, normatively constrained perspective (ch.5).  Lastly, I 
argued that the action-space account lets us see how the belief that there is an unbridgeable 
explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical rests on a natural but distortive 
perception of experience, and shows us how to remedy the weaknesses and combine the 
strengths of existing attempts to address the explanatory gap (ch.6). 
 
I’d l ike to finish by noting some areas where the action-space account I have sketched might 
be improved, and some possible avenues for further research.  Firstly, much more needs to be 
said about the specif ic sorts of actions and propensities for worldly engagement to which the 
action-space account appeals.  I focussed in some detail on colour experience in chapters 3 and 4, 
suggesting that in that perceptual domain abil i ties to sift, sort, compare, contrast and track 
can ground an adequate account of the content and character of experience.  But my focus on 
colour experience was motivated in large part by the fact that i t appears to be an atypical 
case for the action-space account – a class of perceptual experience where the qualitative 
dimension of the experience seems intuitively independent of the sorts of actions that might be 
associated with i t.  We should thus investigate the possibil i ty that other domains of visual 
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experience might possess their content and character in virtue of very different spaces of 
actions.  Rick Grush’s (1998, 2007) work on the behavioural basis of spatia l perception, or 
Matthen’s (2005) discussion of the visual experience of presence both suggest how propensities 
to act of a different kind from those which we have mostly been concerned might contribute to 
an account of aspects of visual content.  The action-space account would benefit from 
investigating whether any unified account of the actions which form the bases of episodes of 
conscious vision can be given in light of work such as th is. 
 
Secondly, more remains to be said about the relationship between the action-space and 
sensorimotor views.  For example, Hurley (1998, ch.6) warns against the “Myth of the Giving” 
(the corollary to the discredited “Myth of the Given” concerning perceptual content) – 
according to which the content of intentions and actions is taken as basic and unproblematic.  
Hurley’s cla im is not that this thesis is often explicitly endorsed, but that work in the 
philosophy of mind often helps itself to the assumption that some intention or action has a 
specific content in a way that Sellars (1997), McDowell (1996) and others have rendered 
unacceptable for the content of perceptual episodes, and that there is no compell ing 
theoretical justif ication for this asymmetry. Hurley’s desire to avoid both the Myth of the 
Given and the Giving is one of the considerations that leads her to a view of perception and 
action as dynamically interdependent, whereby the content of a perceptual state is fixed by its 
implications for possible actions, and the content of an intentional action is fixed by its 
implications for subsequent perceptions.  Hurley’s “sensorimotor” view thus combines the 
action-space account’s emphasis on the practical consequences of perception with Noë’s 
emphasis on the practical consequences of action.  The action-space theorist needs to consider 
whether they have succumbed to the Myth of the Giving – certainly, in our account here, we 
have argued that the content and character of perceptual experience should be accounted for in 
terms of the perceiver’s current grasp of avai lable opportunities for intentional action, 
without giving an account of what distinguishes the content of one enabled action from 
another.  Unanswered questions surface here, then, as to whether the action-space theorist is 
obliged to give an account of intentional content, whether they can do so without their view 
collapsing into Hurley’s dynamic interdependence theory, and whether such a collapse would 
undermine aspects of the account we have developed here. 
 
There are many other points in the action-space account as I have sketched it here that would 
benefit from further discussion and elaboration, and I shan’t try and enumerate them here.  
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The action-space account of consciousness, we should admit, is perhaps not yet best viewed as a 
full-f ledged theory, but as a research programme centred around the idea that conscious 
experience can be fruitfully understood in terms of a grasp of the practical consequences of 
perceptual sensitivity.  This thesis has suggested how I think this guiding idea can be 
supported and fleshed out, and I want to close by suggesting how it might apply in domains 
other than those a lready considered.  One interesting avenue for future research concerns the 
extent to which the action-space account we have sketched might be generalised to other 
aspects of conscious experience.  Our arguments have been largely confined to showing tha t 
visual sensitivity to the affordances of our environment issues in conscious experience when apt 
for integration with capacities for practical reasoning, but there are several ways in which we 
might attempt to extend our framework to other perceptual modalities.  Firstly, we have used 
the dual visual systems data to support our claim that visual information that carries 
implications about the current opportunities for the satisfaction of an agent’s intentional plans 
and projects, rather than information apt to specify the details of the movements necessary to 
achieve those plans and projects, makes up the content of conscious visual experience.  There is 
evidence that a similar duality of processing obtains for hearing as well as vision.  A ventra l 
stream appears to carry information about the enduring semantic properties of the source of a 
sound, whilst a dorsal stream carries detailed information about the source of that sound 
relative to the perceiver (Arnott et a l (2004), Rauschecker and Tian (2000)).  Evidence for such 
a model is sti l l emerging, but it wil l be interesting to see how closely the paralle ls between 
functional profi les of auditory and visual streams run.  If those paralle ls extend to the features 
of ventral processing we identif ied as relevant to the action-space account in chapters 2 and 3, 
then a version of the action-space account generalised to auditory perception would predict 
i l lusions and pathologies of aural experience analogous to those discussed in chapter 2.  Cases 
of “deaf hearing” (Mozaz-Garde and Cowey (2000)) that seem to be auditory analogues of 
blindsight have indeed been reported – it might be that the neuropsychology behind such 
cases makes it plausible to diagnose them in an analogous way to the action-space account’s 
treatment of DF and blindsight in chapters 2, 3 and 5.  S imilarly, the plausibil i ty of an action-
space account of tacti le experience might be investigated by considering the possibil i ty of an 
action-space account of “numbsense”, an apparent somatosensory analogue of blindsight 
(Rossetti et a l (1995)). 
 
More generally, the action-space account of colour perception sketched in chapters 3 and 4 
suggests how the action-space approach might be extended to sensory perception more 
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generally.  Recall that a keystone of our strategy there was to place the colours to which an 
agent was perceptually sensitive in a space whose geometry is dictated by relations of 
relative similarity and difference.  We then claimed that an agent’s perception of a 
particular colour consisted in their manifesting a practical grasp of the way a visually-
presented object or region stands in a complex set of relations of similarity and difference to the 
other colours to which they are perceptually sensitive.  In summary, we constructed for the 
domain of colour qualities to which perceivers are visually sensitive a relationally-defined 
quality space, and then argued that such a quality space obtaining for a perceiver consists in 
their possession of a certa in network of practical abil i ties.  Our construction of this account 
made much use of conceptual apparatus for understanding sensory perception in general th at 
has been developed in detail by Austen Clark (1993) and Matthen (2005).  Clark sees the 
ordering of sensory qualities into quality spaces whose geometries are defined by relations of 
perceptible similarity and difference as a general approach to sensory perception that extends 
beyond the domain of colour, and Matthen argues for a view of the senses as automatic sorting 
systems that class perceived stimuli according to relations of graded similarity and issue in 
information about how stimuli should be treated in light of the overall goals of the perceiver.  
However, both Matthen and Clark focus chief ly on the modality of vision, and the specific 
case of colour, in order to i l lustrate their conception of sensory perception.  A further avenue for 
research, then, is investigating the extent to which such approaches are supported by current 
empirical work on perception in other modalities, and whether the accounts they might 
provide are also apt to provide support for the action-space account. 
 
Lastly, we might investigate whether the action-space account affords the materia ls for an 
account of our experiences of emotions.  Whilst emotions seem like a prime example of priva te 
subjective states that can often be suppressed, rather than manifested, in overt behaviour, 
there is nonetheless empirical and philosophical precedent for viewing emotions as 
inextricably tied to the ways we are disposed to act in the world.  Emotional experience, we 
might argue, consists in a sense of the way in which currently-obtaining possibil i ties for action 
are restricted, or fa i l to be so restricted.  The possibil i ties for action suggested to a perceiver in 
a state of joyous enthusiasm might be very different from those suggested by the same scene to 
a perceiver in the depths of despair.  In this vein, Radcliffe (2008), following Heidegger, 
argues that the experience of mood should be understood in terms of the notion of “possibil i ty-
spaces”, and Frijda (2006) emphasises the essentia l motivational components of affective 
states in his account of the emotions. 
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However, the chal lenge that is both most formidable and most exciting for the action-space 
approach goes beyond the above questions of how the approach might apply to other 
perceptual modalities.  It concerns the vision of mind that l ies at the heart of the action-space 
approach – as always and everywhere environmentally embedded, engaged and active.  
What does such a view of the mind tel l us about the relation between mind and world, and 
how might such a view reconfigure traditional problems in the philosophy of mind?  In 
chapter 5 I examined, fol lowing Hurley, how an enactive focus might inform our view of 
practical reasoning and deliberation, and suggested that the tasks of explaining self-
consciousness and of explaining phenomenal consciousness might coincide for an enactive 
theory.  In chapter 6, I argued that the action-space account lets us see how a traditional 
philosophical conception of experience may be misguided, and how the view of experience 
suggested by the action-space account affords a solution to the problem of the explanatory gap.  
These discussions merely hint at the beginnings of the ways in which viewing the mind as 
essentia l ly active, engaged and environmentally intertwined can shed new light and afford 
new perspectives on existing philosophical discussions.  The most exhilarating thing about the 
enactive view of the conscious mind is the prospect that philosophy might look very different 
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